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The notion of representation is fundamental to cognitive science. Representations figure in 
psychological explanations of low-level perceptual processes like shape perception as well as the 
more “central” reasoning processes studied by cognitive and social psychologists. A fault line for 
theories of the architecture of the mind concerns whether perceptual processes deliver 
representations couched in special modality-specific formats, or whether perception deploys 
amodal conceptual states also used in cognition. This dissertation is a defense of perceptual 
pluralism, according to which perception delivers both kinds of representations. I develop and 
motivate perceptual pluralism with particular attention to its consequences for the border between 
perception and cognition. 
Converging empirical evidence in several areas (e.g., mental imagery, high-capacity 
sensory memory, the structure of visual cortex) suggests that some perceptual representations are 
iconic, or image-like. Iconic representations are syntactically and semantically distinct from 




propositional thoughts, icons cannot explicitly predicate properties or figure in classical 
computational processes. I develop a compositional syntax of icons called the coordination model, 
according to which each part of an icon determines values along multiple feature dimensions (such 
as color and spatial location) simultaneously. The coordination model departs from rival feature-
placing models of perception and imagery. I show how the model can be used to develop a 
semantics of icons, and how it can help explicate the notion of nonconceptual content. 
Not all perceptual representations are iconic, however. Object perception—the ability to 
perceive and track objects by means of the senses—is a rich perceptual capacity present in both 
infants and adults, and has been the focus of intense study in perceptual and developmental 
psychology. I argue on empirical grounds that perceptual object representations (PORs) have a 
discursive, non-iconic format that involves distinct representations for separate individuals and 
their properties. Furthermore, PORs are amodal, represent high-level properties, compose in 
concept-like ways, are mapped to lexical representations, are propositionally structured, and are 
apt to function in inferences. I argue on these grounds that PORs, like beliefs and other cognitive 
states, are composed of concepts. 
Perceptual pluralism has consequences for theories about the distinction between 
perception and cognition. Theorists like Tyler Burge, Susan Carey, and Ned Block argue that this 
distinction lies in part in the fact that perceptual states are iconic and nonconceptual. The fact that 
PORs are conceptual and not iconic, however, is incompatible with this approach to the 
perception–cognition border. One option, then, is simply to deny that there is any such border. 




(such as Firestone & Scholl) have often argued that perceptual modules are immune to the 
influence of cognition over time. However, PORs contain concepts like PIANO and FISH that may 
not be innate, suggesting that learned concepts can seep into the object-perception system. 
I sketch an architectural approach to the perception–cognition border, according to which 
perceptual processes (including object perception) are synchronically encapsulated; that is, they 
operate on a fixed set of information at one time, which does not include beliefs, desires, or other 
information stored in cognition. This set of information can change over time, however, to 
integrate new concepts through learning. The resulting view incorporates key insights of 
modularity theory by holding perception to be synchronically encapsulated and dependent on 
sensory stimulation, while also incorporating anti-modularist insights by allowing the outputs of 
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“The log of knowledge or information contained in the brain of the average citizen is 
enormous. But the form in which it resides is largely unknown.” 
 —Cormac McCarthy 
 
“There are two kinds of visual memory: one when you skillfully recreate an image in 
the laboratory of your mind, with your eyes open (and then I see Annabel in such 
general terms as: "honey-colored skin," "thin arms," "brown bobbed hair," "long 
lashes," "big bright mouth"); and the other when you instantly evoke, with shut eyes, 
on the dark innerside of your eyelids, the objective, absolutely optical replica of a 
beloved face, a little ghost in natural colors[.]” 
 —Vladimir Nabokov 
 
“Philosophy of perception must become largely a branch of philosophy of science. 






It is evident that thinking about tigers and seeing one in the flesh are not the same sort of mental 
process. It is less evident how precisely they differ. This dissertation is an attempt to articulate 
aspects of this difference in the vocabulary of cognitive science. Understanding the border between 
perception and cognition is a first step toward understanding the architecture of the mind more 
generally. While a reader will not come away from this document with a comprehensive 
understanding of the perception–cognition border, they will hopefully come away with some more 
clearly formulated opinions on the subject. Ideally those opinions will align with the ones put forth 
below, but the primary goal is to get clearer on the questions rather than to provide definitive and 
uncontroversial answers. 
The core thesis is perceptual pluralism, according to which perceptual systems deploy a 
multiplicity of representational forms including both proprietary (iconic) representations and 
non-proprietary (discursive, conceptual) representations. The heart of the view is articulated in 
Chapter 2; Chapter 3 extends the core argument and Chapters 1 and 4 clarify some foundational 
issues in the neighborhood. Nonetheless, the views articulated about the vehicle-content 
distinction and informational encapsulation in Chapter 1 as well as the coordination model of 
iconic representation defended in Chapter 4 float free of the truth of perceptual pluralism. Some 
approaches to the perception–cognition border are ruled out by perceptual pluralism while others 
are highlighted as avenues for further investigation. The Conclusion points toward future research 




This dissertation is technically a work of philosophy. The aim is to understand the human 
mind, an aim that belongs to no particular academic discipline. Much of the discussion is relatively 
a priori, e.g., about what does or doesn’t count as a concept or as an iconic representation. Many 
of the citations in the bibliography are psychology experiments. There are no uniquely 
philosophical methodologies employed: no conceptual analyses, no delineation of synthetic a 
priori truths, no phenomenological reductions, no careful attention to ordinary language. Instead 
my goal is to make evidence-based claims about the representations delivered by human perceptual 
systems and explore how the truth of those claims bears on the most basic structural aspects of the 
mind. 
Because this project involves making large-scale theoretical hypotheses that synthesize a 
wide variety of evidence, and because these hypotheses bear directly on some central debates in the 
history of philosophy, it seems appropriate to call this dissertation a work of philosophy. But as 
Jerry Fodor wrote about whether a certain type of theory counts as linguistics, “The question what 
it is for a linguistic theory to be true is an interesting question[.]…The question what it is for a true 
theory to be linguistic is a boring question” (1981b, 197). The question of whether a theory is part 
of philosophy or part of cognitive science (if those are mutually exclusive) is a boring question. 
The questions of how perceptual representations are structured, how perception differs from 
cognition, and what distinguishes the various representational formats and computational systems 




MENTAL ARCHITECTURE:  
IN SEARCH OF A BLUEPRINT 
Chapter 1 
“You need a blueprint, a recipe, an instruction manual, a program. This goes for the 
mind as well as any other contraption.” 
—Fred Dretske1 
§1. Mental Architecture as the Fundamental Object of Cognitive Science 
Cognitive science, whatever it is, aims at understanding the most basic aspects of the mind. And 
the mind, whatever it is, is probably not a single undifferentiated thing but instead likely consists 
of distinct interacting parts. A primary goal of cognitive science is thus what Hume called a “mental 
geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind,” which may enable us to 
“discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is 
actuated in its operations” (Hume 1748, 1.1, SBN 13–14). 
A theory of mental architecture (or “geography”) should specify what the simplest parts of 
the mind are, how they operate, and how they interact with one another. At the heart of 
mainstream contemporary approaches to mental architecture lies the notion of representational 
mental states, or mental representations. Mental representations are states that have content—that 
                                                          




are directed at things beyond themselves—and that may be manipulated in ways that instantiate 
mental processes such as thinking, acting, remembering, imagining, and perceiving, as well as 
more low-level processes such as stereoscopic depth computation or parsing the syntactic structure 
of a sentence. A standard way of understanding mental representations in philosophy and 
cognitive science is to construe them as functionally individuated mental particulars and to 
construe mental processes as instantiated by computational operations on those mental particulars 
(e.g., Fodor 1975; 1987; 2000; Chomsky 1980; Marr 1982; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 1988; Pylyshyn 
1984; Pinker 1997; Rock 1997; Palmer 1999; Prinz 2002; Carey 2009; Frisby and Stone 2010). 
Below I will often refer to mental representations, mental processes, and mental systems. 
A representation is a contentful state. Mental processes are operations performed on 
representations. Processes tend to transform representations in a fashion that realizes a particular 
rule-governed input-output function; that is, mental processes tend to be computational. Perhaps 
not all mental processes are genuinely computational but I will assume that the processes under 
discussion here are computational unless the evidence demands otherwise. A mental system is 
harder to define but I will understand a system as an organization of processes that maps onto an 
explanatorily useful division at the level of mental architecture. 
One way of understanding divisions between systems is that a particular system consists of 
a process or group of processes together with their shared resources and information that those 
processes use to compute their outputs, whether that information be stored in the form of explicit 
symbols or be simply built into the processes themselves (i.e., in the form of rules). The object-




(Pylyshyn 2007). That information is used in individuation and tracking processes, which 
(respectively) construct representations of objects and update them as those objects move. This 
information is shared across processes and representations used in one process might be used in 
another as well (e.g., the output of the individuation process is the object representation used for 
tracking). On this notion of systems object individuation and object tracking are part of the same 
object-perception system.  
There are doubtless other joints at which one could carve the mind but the distinction 
between systems, processes, and representations will prove useful.  
Some theorists adopt anti-realist or instrumentalist positions about mental representations 
generally (e.g., Churchland 1981; Dennett 1987; 1991) or about perceptual representation in 
particular (e.g., Gibson 1979; Campbell 2002; Noe 2004; Brewer 2006; Martin 2006). Others accept 
that mental states represent but deny that they can be given functionalist identity conditions or 
that they figure in computational processes (e.g., Searle 1983; 1992). Still others accept that there 
are functionally individuated particulars that figure in computational processes but deny that they 
have contents (e.g., Stich 1983, Chomsky 2000). I assume on the contrary that mental 
representations are real, have contents, and figure in computational processes. I will not attempt 
to justify these assumptions except by demonstrating their usefulness in theorizing about the mind. 
Such a demonstration is arguably as good a justification as one could hope for in the realm of 
theoretical posits. 
Some realists about mental representation adopt a globalist attitude toward mental 




systems and/or that a small number of mental processes are psychologically ubiquitous and explain 
all or most mental phenomena. A classic example of this is unreconstructed associationism, 
according to which all mental processes are reducible to associative connections between 
representations (though interestingly Hume seems to endorse robust distinctions between mental 
systems despite his associationism).  
Another family of globalist theories currently en vogue is the motley crew of Bayesian and 
predictive coding approaches to the mind, according to which all mental processes are probabilistic 
computations. On the strongest versions of this view architectural borders between mental systems 
should be replaced by a free flow of hierarchies of information processing replete with top-down 
and bottom-up influences (e.g., Clark 2013; 2016; Hohwy 2013; Lupyan 2015). 
Another stripe of theorist accepts architectural borders between systems but denies a 
plurality of representational kinds. These anti-pluralists argue that all mental representations are 
couched in the same “common code” and that any apparent differences are to be explained by 
appeal to architectural borders between systems or differences in the kinds of processes that 
operate on representations in this common code. One prominent anti-pluralist is Zenon Pylyshyn 
(1984; 2003). Pylyshyn argues that all mental representation takes place in an amodal language of 
thought and that processes like mental imagery and perception differ from ordinary thought only 
in respect of the computations they perform and the systems in which they take place.  
Another anti-pluralist is Jesse Prinz (2002). Prinz endorses a form of concept empiricism 
according to which concepts are stored copies of perceptual states and perception differs from 




different perceptual modalities). Prinz (2006; unpublished) also seems to endorse a mitigated form 
of globalism that denies architectural borders but allows for a thin distinction between processes 
by appeal to functional decomposition. 
I’ll argue later for a view that is both anti-globalist—in that it recognizes borders between 
systems and a diversity of mental processes—and pluralist—in that it recognizes multiple types of 
representations. For now, however, I simply flag that globalist and anti-pluralist views are not 
mandatory and no such framework will be assumed here.  
With respect to the border between perception and cognition most of the debates I will be 
engaged in are in-house disputes between anti-globalists (which is of necessity given that globalists 
typically reject the border in question). Among anti-globalists, there are two general strategies for 
distinguishing perceptual systems from central cognition: the representational strategy and the 
architectural strategy. The representational strategy seeks to show that perceptual representations 
are distinct from the representations used in thought (Dretske 1981; Tye 1995; Smith 2002; Carey 
2009; Burge 2010a; 2010b; 2014a; 2014b; Block 2014; unpublished). The architectural strategy on 
the other hand seeks to show that perceptual processes(/systems) are distinct from cognitive 
processes(/systems) (Fodor 1983; Pylyshyn 1984; 1999; Firestone & Scholl 2016). 
The representational strategy commits to pluralism about mental representation generally 
but it commits to an anti-pluralism about perceptual representation—no perceptual 
representations can, on this strategy, be type identical to those used in thought. The architectural 
strategy makes no such commitments. It allows for domain-general anti-pluralism (Pylyshyn 1984; 




architectural strategy allows for perceptual pluralism, or pluralism about the representational 
forms used in perception.  
This dissertation is a defense of perceptual pluralism. My central goal is to provide a 
detailed and well-motivated characterization of some of the outputs of perceptual processing 
particularly insofar as the nature of the outputs of perception informs more general questions 
about mental architecture. I will not defend the architectural strategy directly, though later in this 
chapter I will sketch a promising version of it and point out ways in which some cross-talk from 
cognition to perception is compatible with architectural borders. However, the representational 
strategy is not compatible with the form of perceptual pluralism I will defend. If the perception–
cognition border is to be defended it should therefore be defended through the architectural 
strategy or perhaps some other strategy entirely.  
For the rest of this chapter I’ll explore some basic questions about mental architecture as 
they relate to the border between perception and cognition. These include the vehicle-content 
distinction (Section 2), translation between perception and cognition (Section 3), and the nature 
of informational encapsulation and its potentially fundamental role in mental architecture 
(Sections 4, 5, and 6). 
§2. Representations as Vehicles for Content 
2.1—Representations and dispositions. In the previous section, systems were framed partly in terms 
of processes and processes were framed partly in terms of representations. This framing 




architecture. The view that mental representations are metaphysically more basic than mental 
processes has a checkered past. 
Jerry Fodor writes that the “characteristic doctrine of twentieth century philosophy of 
mind/language” (2004, 29) is that having concepts requires having epistemic dispositions. Many 
analytic philosophers have held that one could not count as having concepts if one could not 
perform inferences with those concepts (e.g., Sellars 1956; Quine 1960; Davidson 1967; Dummett 
1973; Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992; Brandom 1994; Burge 2010a—and possibly Wittgenstein). 
Others, most prominently Fodor, have insisted instead that concept possession is simply a matter 
of being able to deploy a certain kind of mental representation and does not require inferential 
capacities. 
I don’t intend to step into this debate. I do however want to target a metaphysical 
assumption that is often intertwined with the “characteristic doctrine,” viz., the rejection of the 
metaphysical priority of representations. One could endorse the claim that a representation counts 
as conceptual only if it plays a role in inferences but also insist that representations are 
metaphysically prior to inferential processes. Endorsing the necessity of inferential capacities for 
concept possession does not entail that mental representations are mere dispositions of the thinker 
to engage in inferences. This point applies to mental processes generally: stipulating that mental 
representations always figure in processes does not entail that representations are mere 
dispositions for processes to occur. 
The thesis that mental representations are mere dispositions of the creatures that have them 




satisfying causal-mechanical explanations.2 Causal-mechanical explanations of behavior in 
perceptual psychology involve the following sort of causal chain: some process takes transduced 
stimulation as input and delivers a mental representation as output; this mental representation 
enters into computational processes the end result of which is an action (such as the pressing of a 
button or a verbal report). It is an essential feature of these explanations that token mental 
representations are concrete particulars that cause other token representations and behavior. 
Saying that a mental representation is a mere set of dispositions—such as dispositions of 
the organism to behave in some way or dispositions to have thoughts on the basis of perception—
precludes this kind of explanation (Strevens 2008). A set of dispositions is not a concrete particular 
that can be an input to a causal computational process. Reducing mental representations to 
dispositions to engage in inferences or other mental processes thus precludes a causal-mechanical 
explanation of those processes. One could retain a causal-mechanical explanation of processes on 
a dispositionalist view by holding that the categorical bases of dispositions have causal powers. 
However, on the view on offer those categorical bases could not be mental representations (since 
mental representations are ex hypothesi mere dispositions). Instead the categorical bases must be 
neural, in which case there is no psychological-level causal-mechanical explanation (see Quilty-
Dunn & Mandelbaum unpublished a). For there to be psychological-level causal-mechanical 
                                                          
2 I don’t intend to take on a full-bore commitment to causal-mechanical explanation as the essence of scientific 
explanation (cf. Salmon 1984; Strevens 2008). All I claim here is that satisfying explanations in the special sciences 
typically invoke causal mechanisms of some sort and specifically that computational-representational explanations in 




explanations, mental representations can’t simply be dispositions for mental processes to occur; 
they must be particulars that figure causally in mental processes.3 
A related worry that pushes toward the same point is that computational processes are 
characterized in terms of the representations they operate on. If that’s true, then the view that 
representations are mere dispositions for processes to occur cannot be formulated coherently 
without circularity (Fodor 2004). 
This is not to deny that functional roles can be constitutive of types of mental 
representations (e.g., Lewis 1972; Fodor 1975; Dretske 1981). But however functional role figures 
in individuating representations, a representation cannot be nothing more than the disposition for 
some process to occur. I will discuss other ways of individuating representations below. That 
discussion, however, will presuppose the distinction between vehicles and contents, to which I turn 
now.  
2.2. The vehicle–content distinction. Token representations should be understood as concrete 
mental particulars that have content and figure in mental processes. Moreover, just as 
representations don’t reduce to the processes they figure in, they also don’t reduce to their 
contents. It’s obvious that representations in the ordinary sense (e.g., pictures, maps, sentences) 
are not identical to their contents. Consider the following sentences: 
(1) Snow is white. 
(2) Schnee ist weiss. 
                                                          
3 This argument really targets “superficial” versions of dispositionalism (Schwitzgebel 2013); there may be 





(1) and (2) ostensibly have the same content, viz., that snow is white. Nevertheless, (1) and (2) are 
not two tokens of the same sentence. Moreover, a photograph of snow might represent it as white 
and thus seemingly carry the same content while still being identical to neither (1) nor (2). A 
representation therefore does not reduce to its content. These quotidian examples establish a 
distinction between contents and vehicles. A representation is a vehicle with content; or as is 
sometimes said, a symbol with an interpretation (Pylyshyn 1984). (1) and (2) share content but 
have distinct vehicles for that content. 
The vehicle–content distinction applies to mental representations as well. For example, one 
can represent a red apple in thought or in visual imagery. Both these mental representations 
arguably share the content <red apple> but represent that content via distinct vehicles. I’ll discuss 
the experimental literature on mental imagery in some detail in Chapter 2. But for now, an intuitive 
example may suffice. Consider the following question: what color is a bumblebee’s head? You 
might be an expert on bumblebees and have the representation BUMBLEBEES HAVE BLACK HEADS 
stored in central cognition.4 But if not, you might answer this question by forming a mental image 
of a bumblebee and inspecting its head, realizing thereupon that the head is black (Kosslyn 1980, 
113). In both cases the content that bumblebees have black heads is stored but the vehicles for that 
content seem to be different, similarly to how a photograph and a sentence can carry the same 
content via distinct vehicles. Exactly how these representational formats differ will be a major topic 
of the rest of this dissertation but at present we can simply note that the difference seems to be at 
                                                          




least partly in the vehicles of the representations—an intuition that will be given much more 
substantiation in later chapters. 
Another family of examples are known as “Frege cases.” A person might have a mental 
representation of the original host of the reality show The Apprentice and a mental representation 
of the 45th president of the United States and fail to realize that those are, bizarrely enough, the 
same man. Since these mental representations have distinct computational roles in that person’s 
mind they plausibly constitute different vehicles for the same referential content (Fodor 2008). 
In both sorts of cases one might find it plausible that there is also a difference at the level 
of content. Frege cases in particular have motivated Fregeanism about content, according to which 
differences in cognitive significance like those just mentioned involve different Fregean senses, 
which are ways of presenting referents. For Fregeans these modes of presentation constitute the 
semantic values of linguistic and mental representations. I don’t intend to assume here that 
Fregeanism is false (my thoughts on this topic change with the winds). Even if Fregeanism is true 
the differences in content in these examples also need to involve a difference in vehicles for those 
contents.  
An extreme Fregean might balk at this claim and instead hold that all structure invoked in 
representational psychology is in terms of content and deny that vehicles have any explanatorily 
significant structural features. There are two ways of articulating this extreme Fregean view. 
The first holds that all vehicles of content are unstructured atoms and that the only 
structure in the mind is present in Fregean senses. That is, the content of the belief that a is F might 




into a whole propositional content (though specifying this last part is no mean feat—Jespersen 
2012). But the vehicle is on this view an unstructured entity that is marked only by its carrying this 
Fregean content. It is not always clear when this view is being endorsed, but it may be at least 
implicitly present in the work of Gareth Evans (1982) and Christopher Peacocke (1992).5 
The second version of extreme Fregeanism simply denies the vehicle-content distinction, 
and asserts instead that there are only types and tokens of structured Fregean content. On this 
view, there are no non-semantically individuated properties of mental representations (aside from 
representationally irrelevant properties of tokens, e.g., blind neural properties). It is again not clear 
when this view is endorsed, but on one reading it is present in Burge (2010a)—see the following 
two chapters for more discussion on the vehicle–content distinction in Burge’s work. 
Neither of these views should be accepted. It is plausible that content is at least typically 
wide, i.e., it depends on causal relations to the environment. Computation requires the 
computationally efficacious properties of a mental representation to be accessed by the relevant 
computational process. Those properties must therefore be local, i.e., internal to the computational 
system. If contents are typically wide then computational systems typically do not have access to 
contents; thus computational systems must be able to access non-semantic properties of mental 
representations. Moreover, it is hardly a coincidence that computation outside the mind is cast in 
formal, syntactic terms. The syntactic (i.e., vehicular) properties of mental representations are both 
local and non-semantically individuated and are therefore poised to be the computationally 
                                                          




efficacious properties of mental representations (for more argument see Chapter 4, ICONIC 
REPRESENTATION). 
This point is meant merely to establish the need for a vehicle–content distinction in 
computational psychology. But it does not establish the need for structural features of vehicles, i.e., 
syntactic structures. The debate about whether mental representations have syntactic structures 
has been long and hard-fought (e.g., Fodor 1975; 1987; Chomsky 1980; Rumelhart & McClelland 
1986; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988; Smolensky 1990; Prinz 2002; Carey 2009; Burge 2010a).  
The debate about syntactic structure has often been founded on systematicity, or the 
capacity to recombine thought contents systematically, and productivity, or the capacity to form 
new thoughts (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988). Arguably the dominant view explains these phenomena 
by appeal to word-sized concepts that compose into more complex concepts and into propositional 
thoughts. The challenge from the orthodoxy is to provide a satisfying explanation of these 
commonplace features of thought without adverting to syntactic structure. I will not weigh in on 
the present status of this debate here except to note the lack of a clear and widely endorsed 
alternative viewpoint. One might completely reject the Fodorian language-of-thought picture and 
nonetheless be moved to hold that concepts compose into complex representations with syntactic 
structures (e.g., Prinz 2002). There are moreover many other phenomena that can be explained by 
syntactic structure.  
One example is logical inference, which appears to utilize the propositional syntactic 
structures of thoughts (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988; Braine & O’Brien 1998; Quilty-Dunn & 




subjects with semantically odd but syntactically well-formed conditionals like “If there is a 3 then 
there is an 8” and then subliminally presented subjects with either the antecedent or the consequent 
(e.g., a 3 or an 8). They found that subliminal presentation of the antecedent facilitated the 
consequent but subliminal presentation of the consequent did not facilitate the antecedent. Effects 
like this can be explained by positing a mental logic that includes modus ponens but not 
affirmation of the consequent and pertains to the syntactic structures of propositional thoughts 
(Braine & O’Brien 1998; Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum unpublished b). 
Many other effects of concepts and beliefs can be explained by syntactic structure (Quilty-
Dunn & Mandelbaum unpublished a). One (rarely discussed) example is semantic priming. In a 
lexical decision task, for example, subjects have to discriminate a series of words and non-words 
(i.e., indicate whether ‘bread’ is a word [yes] or ‘drabe’ is a word [no]). If you read the word ‘doctor’ 
then you will later be quicker at discriminating a word like ‘nurse’ than you will be at 
discriminating words that are not semantically related to doctor (Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1971; 
McNamara 2005). Why should this be the case if all representations are unstructured vehicles for 
propositionally structured Fregean senses? The effect does not seem to go by way of propositional 
content since neither ‘doctor’ nor ‘nurse’ expresses a proposition. The explanation that thinking a 
thought like DOCTORS ARE OFTEN FOUND NEAR NURSES is necessary for every single instance of 
semantic priming is ad hoc and implausible. And even then, why should different unstructured 
vehicles that share only their abstract Fregean contents all facilitate recognition of the word ‘nurse’? 
Without some computational explanation in terms of vehicles it’s hard to see how an extreme 




A better explanation appeals to word-sized mental representations—i.e., concepts—and 
explains the effect by appeal to associative links between those concepts that need not go by way 
of propositions. Moreover, the fact that your propositional thoughts are linked to subpropositional 
stimuli (e.g., if you hear the word ‘nurse’ then you’ll be more likely to think the thought DOCTORS 
MAKE A LOT OF MONEY than you otherwise would be) is explained by positing that these concepts 
compose into propositional structures such that activating NURSE associatively causes the 
activation of DOCTOR, which then composes into thoughts like DOCTORS MAKE A LOT OF MONEY. 
These are just a few examples of the explanatory benefits of taking mental representations 
to have syntactic as well as semantic structures. Extreme Fregeanism does not have this sort of 
explanatory power and should therefore be rejected. It might be the case that different sorts of 
vehicles and their different functional roles bring along with them different Fregean contents—I 
intend to be neutral about whether the semantic values of complex mental representations are 
Fregean senses, Russellian propositions, sets of possible worlds, or something else. But the view 
that all the mental structure we need can be offloaded to semantics is not sufficient to explain the 
relevant data; we need syntactic structure. 
2.3—Individuating vehicles. The foregoing is meant to show that we need a distinction between 
contents and vehicles and that vehicles have structural features and are individuated independently 
of their contents. Earlier I argued that vehicles can’t be individuated entirely by how the creature 
is disposed to use them in mental processes. How should we individuate them? 
At least two options are available: one could individuate them in terms of functionalist 




substantive contributions to the literature on this topic nor to solve the problems of providing non-
semantic individuation criteria for mental representations. I do want to make use of the idea of 
non-semantically individuated vehicles in order to understand the outputs of perception (and 
explain the data mentioned in the discussion of extreme Fregeanism). However vehicles are 
individuated, the data arguably requires that there be some means of individuation. Rather than 
settle the question here I will merely point toward possible options that have been explored—and 
critiqued—by other philosophers. 
One option is that mental representations should be understood in terms of true 
counterfactuals. For some way W of using a representation in a mental process that is constitutive 
of that representation, a creature might lack the disposition to use the representation in W because 
of some intervening factor, and yet it could still be true that if the intervening factor were not 
present, the creature would be able to use the representation in W. That is, it might be that the 
representation is buried so deeply that the creature lacks the dispositions that stereotypically go 
along with it, but the representation is still apt to figure in the relevant processes despite the fact 
that it cannot.6 On this kind of functionalist theory, the individuation conditions of a 
                                                          
6 One might argue that dispositions are mutable in this way (Lewis 1997). But in the dispute between dispositionalists 
and representationalists in cognitive science, dispositionalism is not typically understood to allow dispositions to 
figure in processes to be buried this deeply. Eric Schwitzgebel, for example, argues that his dispositionalist view of 
belief rules out cases where beliefs are buried so deep in the mind that they do not occurrently dispose the believer to 
use the belief in certain ways (2013, 83). What matters is not that representations can fail to actualize their dispositional 
properties but rather that their stereotypical dispositions are completely buried due to extrinsic architectural facts. The 
version of dispositionalism critiqued above is thus, like Schwitzgebel’s, a “superficial” dispositionalism (which I 
marked by calling representations on this view “mere dispositions”), while the attenuated and “deep” version of 
dispositionalism that allows for these sorts of counterfactuals to suffice for a mental representation to be tokened are 
compatible with the arguments made in this chapter. What matters is that token representations are not mere 
dispositions; perhaps certain deep dispositional properties can suffice for token representations qua mental 




representation are metaphysically tied to its being usable in W, but this disposition need not be 
actually present in order for the token representation to maintain its identity. This functionalist 
theory thus seems to avoid claiming that representations are mere dispositions while still allowing 
that the processes a representation is apt to figure in play a role in individuating its type. 
A problem for this view is that functional roles might seem to change over time. Aydede 
(1998) and Prinz (2002) point this out, arguing that “functional roles are ineluctably holistic” 
(Prinz 2002, 97), in which case two mental representations in two people’s minds or in the same 
mind over time cannot be type identical. But this objection could be avoided if there is a principled 
way of hiving off the right functional role and considering it from a counterfactual rather than 
actual perspective. For example, it might be that what individuates a type of mental representation 
is the kind of role that it would have independently of performance errors, abstracting away from 
changes in architecture and other representations housed in the same mind.  
Much of the functional differences between my concept DOG and yours are arguably due to 
differences in our beliefs about dogs and the associations we have with dogs (e.g., with images and 
episodic memories as well as with other concepts). It does not seem ad hoc to control for differences 
in functional role that arise from relations to other stored representations. The individuation 
conditions for types of vehicles are an aspect of the architecture. Pylyshyn’s (1984) influential 
characterization of architecture as the aspects of cognition that remain constant despite changes 
in the information stored in the mind would thus seem to legitimize the move of abstracting away 





Suppose moreover that, were I to come to have all the same beliefs about dogs and 
associations with dogs, then the vehicle for my concept DOG would have the same functional role 
in my mind that yours does in your mind. The truth of this functionalist counterfactual may be 
sufficient for the mental representations to be tokens of the same type of vehicle even when we 
don’t actually have all the same beliefs, associations, and dispositions. One would have to also 
abstract from other architectural variations, e.g., differences in working memory and long-term 
memory capacity, from performance errors, and perhaps other ceteris paribus-violating properties 
as well. But it is not obvious that some such functionalist counterfactual story would inevitably fail 
to individuate vehicles without succumbing to Aydede and Prinz’s holism objection. Or perhaps 
there is some privileged set of computational processes that functionally individuate symbols 
(Schneider 2009). 
Another option entirely is that mental representations should be understood as 
psychologically primitive. That is, there is some property that is not explicable in psychofunctional 
terms that marks each type of mental representation. In response to the question of what 
distinguishes two atomic representations, Fodor (2008) writes: 
I don’t care. Type distinctions between tokens of primitive mental representations 
can be distinguished by anything at all, so long as the difference between them is of 
a kind to which mental processes are responsive. Since, by definition, basic 
representations don’t have structures, type identities and differences among 
primitive Mentalese tokens are bedrock from the computational point of view. 
Tokens of primitive Mentalese formulas are of different types when they differ in 
the (presumably physical) properties to which mental processes are sensitive. 
Perhaps it’s how long it lasts that determines whether a brain event is a tokening of 
[one concept] rather than of [another concept]. (I doubt that it is; but given the 
utter lack of a neuroscience of Mentalese, that guess seems about as good as any.) 




Fodor casts the view in neural terms, which is problematic given the lack of any plausible 
neural candidates for individuating concepts (a problem to which “I don’t care” is a less than 
satisfying answer). But the primitivist view need not be cast in neural terms. It is arguably plausible 
that there are levels of computation that mediate between the level of concepts and the level of bare 
neural activity (Dennett 1978; Lycan 1987; Craver 2007). In this case, the individuation conditions 
of representations that are primitive at one level might be explicable in terms of representations 
and processes occurring at the next level down. Types of representations would therefore be 
individuated in neural terms only at the lowest level of psycho-computational reality. 
There are several advantages to this version of the primitivist view about individuating 
representations. One is that it comports with the existence of intervening levels. Another advantage 
is that it allows for representations to be multiply realizable. Casting individuation conditions in 
exclusively neural terms rules out the possibility of token representations in non-neural systems 
being type identical to representations realized in human brains.7 Positing a multiplicity of psycho-
computational levels allows for representations at the level of propositional attitudes (e.g., 
concepts) to be type-individuated by computational facts at the next level down; since this next 
level is not characterized in neural terms, it could be implemented in another physical substrate 
and thus allow two representations realized in neural and non-neural systems, respectively, to be 
tokens of the same type. 
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this move just asserts that there is a solution to the problem without actually solving it. And in any case, Fodor does 




Here is a toy example. It might be that neural activity implements a connectionist network 
and that the connectionist network implements a language of thought architecture (Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 1988; cf. Smolensky 1990). This scenario so described contains three levels of 
representational ontology: a neural level, a connectionist level, and a symbolic language-of-
thought level. Distinct nodes in the connectionist network might be realized by types of neural 
activations and some symbol in the language of thought might be realized by a certain pattern of 
weighted connections in the network. A connectionist network with the same weighted 
connections might be realized in a non-neural system with distinct physical properties 
individuating nodes, but with the same patterns of weighted connections between those nodes. 
Though the primitive representations in these two connectionist networks would be type distinct 
(since one would and the other would not be characterized in neural terms) they both implement 
the same symbol in the language of thought due to the functional equivalence of their weighted 
connections.  
As long as there are relations of functional equivalence across systems with distinct physical 
realizations (and thus across distinct physically individuated primitive representations), those 
systems can in principle implement type-identical representations at a higher level of 
computational reality. It is crucial to the coherence of this story that the functional equivalence of 
these systems (and a fortiori the identity conditions for primitive vehicles at a higher level of 
computational reality) can be stated in terms that abstract away from the identity conditions of 
their primitive representations. Fortunately, this does not seem impossible. A connectionist 




them. A connectionist network with a completely different physical implementation might also 
consist of n nodes with the same weightings. What individuates nodes in the first network are 
neural properties; thus what makes it the case that the same node persists despite changes in 
weights will be the persistence of those neural properties. The individuation and persistence 
conditions of primitive representations in the second network will be different and so to that extent 
the two networks are type distinct—in other words, the difference is not merely a difference in 
implementation but is also a difference in the primitive symbols that figure in the two systems.  
The systems nonetheless share properties characterized in the vocabulary of connectionist 
network, viz., the number of nodes and the weights between them, which are thereby multiply 
realizable properties. As long as it is the latter sort of property that is responsible for the 
individuation and persistence conditions of symbols at a higher level, then the two networks can 
implement type-identical symbols at a higher level (e.g., in the language of thought) despite 
differing in both their physical implementation and in the individuation and persistence 
conditions of symbols or nodes at the connectionist level. A full characterization of the two 
networks will not regard them as wholly type identical given the difference in primitive 
representations but the fact that they share some functional properties allows them to implement 
type-identical primitive representations at a higher level. 
In a review of Fodor (2008), Prinz (2011) points out the implausibility of finding neural 
individuation conditions for vehicles. He also points out the lack of a clear and substantive 




does not constitute a detailed theory. Nonetheless, it points the way forward for a detailed theory, 
the development of which lies far beyond the scope of this dissertation.8 
This section has raised more questions than it has answered. Moreover, I have not selected 
either of these solutions over the other (or ruled out other solutions), in part because they are too 
programmatic and the empirical details will likely play a decisive role in how we individuate 
vehicles. I confess to doubts about the coherence of both proposals, the former because of its 
potential for representations to collapse into mere dispositions and the latter because of its failure 
to provide a substantive characterization of the individuation conditions for mental 
representations. The latter seems less open to devastating, in-principle objections. It also allows for 
the total priority of representations to computational processes at the same level, which is 
preferable for providing substantive causal-mechanical explanation. I thus tentatively prefer the 
view that mental representations are psychologically primitive and should be cashed out in terms 
of multiply realizable functional properties of computations at a lower level (except at the lowest 
level, at which point vehicles are cashed out in neural or other non-representational terms).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, what matters is that mental representations 
have rich syntactic as well as semantic properties. One of the outstanding goals of philosophy of 
                                                          
8 It is worth pointing out that Prinz’s (2011) claim that concepts comprise a wide array of information used for 
categorization including prototypes, exemplars, and theories seems to face a similar problem: what are the 
individuation conditions for the vehicles that make up the prototypes and other representations that constitute a 
concept? Any theory that appeals to mental representations arguably requires a vehicle–content distinction, and thus 
requires non-semantic individuation conditions for vehicles. One could invoke neurofunctionalism and empiricism 
and say that types of neural activations in perceptual cortical areas individuate types of vehicles—a constellation of 
views that comes with its own costs, of which the lack of multiple realizability is only one. The problem Prinz isolates 
is particularly pressing for Fodor given Fodor’s claim that the syntax of concepts is proprietary and amodal. But 
anybody who thinks the vehicles of mental representation are both locally individuated and multiply realizable faces 




perception is therefore to provide a syntax and semantics for perceptual representation. The bulk 
of this dissertation is a contribution to this project. Little in what follows will hang on any particular 
view about the individuation conditions of mental representations. Before moving on to the syntax 
and semantics of perceptual representation in the following chapters, however, it will be helpful to 
clarify more foundational questions about mental architecture. 
§3. The Representational Strategy, or: How Perception Talks to Cognition 
3.1—The representational strategy and its translation problem. Much philosophical inquiry on the 
relation between perception and cognition concerns whether cognition affects perception, and if 
so, how. A comparatively neglected and arguably more central question is how perception affects 
cognition. It is as obvious a truism as any other that what we see affects what we think. A completed 
cognitive science should therefore be able to explain how perception can deliver information to 
cognition that allows us to update our beliefs and rationally plan action quickly and systematically. 
An account of how perception talks to cognition needs to be informed by a theory of the 
syntactic and semantic properties of perceptual representations. If general anti-pluralism is true 
and all mental representations are couched in the same code, then perception delivers the very 
same sorts of representations that are used in thought (Pylyshyn 1984; Prinz 2002). In that case, 
whatever processes cognition uses to operate on perceptual representations may be general 
processes used in cognition to operate on cognitive representations. The question of how 




perception and cognition speak the same language. There is, on this view, no special problem of 
how perception feeds into cognition so easily. 
If instead one pursues the representational strategy for distinguishing perception from 
cognition then this problem cannot be so easily discharged. The representational strategy posits a 
difference in the kinds of representations used in perception and cognition. The view thus entails 
that perceptual processes output representations that are in some way nonconceptual and 
therefore distinct from representations used in cognition. This gives rise to a translation problem. 
If perception does not speak the same language as cognition, it can’t talk directly to cognition; there 
must be some intermediating process proprietary to cognition that takes nonconceptual percepts 
as inputs and delivers conceptualized states as outputs (Mandelbaum forthcoming). Only once the 
translation process has finished can cognition act upon the (now syntactically reformulated) 
information delivered by perception. 
All theories require a notion of sensory transduction, whereby physical magnitudes are 
transformed into syntactic magnitudes that can function as inputs to perceptual processes (see 
Pylyshyn 1984, Chapter 6 for an illuminating discussion). Though proponents of the 
representational strategy rarely acknowledge it, their approach also posits a sort of cognitive 
transduction whereby percepts are transformed into representations usable by cognition. Fodor 
foresaw this problem, writing that the function of perceptual modules is to “provide the central 




format cognitive processes demand of the representations they apply to” (1983, 39). On Fodor’s 
architectural approach, there is no need for a second layer of transduction.9 
The severity of the translation problem depends on just how different percepts are from 
concepts. A greater degree of difference requires a greater amount of work to be done by the 
translation mechanism, and thus a more severe translation problem. We therefore need to know 
precisely what it means to say the outputs of perception are nonconceptual.10 
3.2—Nonconceptual content and nonconceptual vehicles. The past two decades have generated a 
vast and stultifying literature on what is known as “nonconceptual content.” The first clear 
formulation of the thesis that there is nonconceptual content in perception is often credited to 
Gareth Evans (1982). Nonconceptual content is supposed to be a type of content that differs from 
the content of cognition. However, what this means precisely has often been unclear, typically 
because of a lack of clarity concerning the vehicle–content distinction. 
Richard Heck (2000) distinguished between the “state” and “content” versions of the appeal 
to nonconceptual content. The state version holds that the vehicles of perceptual representation 
are distinct from the vehicles of cognitive representation. The content version holds that the kind 
                                                          
9 This discussion runs over a fine point of Fodor exegesis, namely that Fodor (1983) does not identify perceptual 
systems with modules. But this addendum relies on two almost entirely unargued-for assumptions: that perception 
eventuates in the fixation of belief and that the fixation of belief is unencapsulated from background knowledge. I 
think the former is not a universal truth since some perceptual processes deliver unconceptualized icons and the latter 
is in fact false—see Quilty-Dunn 2015. Fodor should therefore have counted modules as perceptual systems even when 
they fail to deliver beliefs and he should have also counted some processes that output perceptual beliefs as modular. 
10 I should add that the pluralist and anti-globalist architectural strategy I commend does not entirely avoid the 
translation problem. As will become clear in the next chapter, I think some perceptual processes output icons which 
are then conceptualized post-perceptually; the translation problem therefore arises for my view as well. However, there 
is reason to think that only early perceptual processes output icons while a great deal of the content of perception is 
couched in a discursive conceptualized format. The translation problem for a perceptual pluralist view is therefore far 




of content that occurs in perception cannot be the content of a cognitive state like a belief, where 
the content of belief is often fleshed out in terms of structured propositions. I will use 
“nonconceptual content” to refer to content rather than vehicles (a practice which is unfortunately 
not uniform in the literature). 
The nonconceptual content thesis has been defended by authors such as Heck (2000), 
Peacocke (2001), and Burge (2010a). It has been challenged by authors such as Speaks (2005) and 
Byrne (2005), who wonders how any content could not possibly be the content of a belief. I will 
not jump into this debate (though see Chapter 4). I will instead note that the question of whether 
perception has a distinct type of content is not obviously relevant to mental architecture in general 
or the translation problem in particular.  
For example, many who accept that the content of perception is conceptual may 
nonetheless accept that the vehicles of perception are not concepts. They may hold that the content 
of both perception and cognition is a Russellian proposition (e.g., perhaps, Byrne 2005) or a set of 
possible worlds (Stalnaker 1998—though, in a testament to how confused and tacitly pro-
structured-propositions this debate is, Stalnaker points out that given extant formulations of 
conceptual content, his view of propositions entails that both perception and cognition have 
nonconceptual content). However, commonality at the level of abstract contents does not solve the 
translation problem if the vehicles of that content have different general types of syntactic 
structures, i.e., different formats (see Chapter 2). If central cognition computationally transforms 
representations in response to their conceptualized (and perhaps propositional) syntactic 




whether or not the input and output of the translation process share the same content (e.g., the 
same Russellian proposition). 
Conversely, it does not seem impossible a priori that a vehicle in the format used by central 
cognition could carry nonconceptual content. Perhaps only concepts that are deployed in a 
stimulus independent fashion could count as having conceptual content (Camp 2009—though see 
Chapter 3, SEEING OBJECTS: A CASE STUDY IN THE UNDER-INTELLECTUALIZATION OF PERCEPTION). In 
that case, the visual system might in principle output representations that are syntactically type 
identical to representations used in cognition despite having different sorts of content. This view 
would avoid the translation problem, since computational processes in central cognition could 
operate on the outputs of perception just as well as on cognitive representations despite the 
difference in content. 
From the perspective of mental architecture, therefore, it seems that the vehicles of 
perception are what matter, not what sorts of abstract contents are instantiated in those vehicles. 
That is not to say that the nonconceptual debate is not important for other reasons, e.g., for 
epistemology, phenomenology, or philosophy of language. Moreover, it is possible that a difference 
in format and functional role brings along a difference in content (Block unpublished). In any case, 
I will primarily consider the representational strategy insofar as it commits to type-distinct vehicles 
in perception and cognition. 
Chapter 2 will contain a critique of the representational strategy so considered. While there 
are conceivably a variety of ways one might hold that the vehicles of perceptual representation are 




format of perceptual representation is iconic or image-like while the format of thought is discursive 
or language-like (Carey 2009; Burge 2010a; 2014a; 2014b; Block 2014; unpublished). The next 
chapter will provide a critical evaluation of this view. 
Before considering this view, however, I will sketch what I see as the most promising 
version of the architectural strategy. 
§4. The Architectural Strategy 
Perception cannot, I will argue, be distinguished from cognition by appeal to representational 
format.  
Some architectural theorists distinguish perception from cognition by endorsing a full-
fledged modularity thesis according to which perceptual systems are wholly immune to any 
substantive cognitive influence (Firestone & Scholl 2016). The form of perceptual pluralism 
defended in this dissertation requires that the border between perception and cognition is 
diachronically porous such that learning processes can push concepts into perception. I will not 
provide a theory of how this learning takes place nor what timescale separates synchronic from 
diachronic effects. Nonetheless, Chapters 2 and 3 will provide strong evidence for diachronic 
learning that pushes concepts into perception. Thus a full-fledged modularity thesis that denies 




Instead, I think the most promising version of the architectural strategy argues that 
perceptual processes are (i) dependent on stimulation and (ii) synchronically informationally 
encapsulated from cognition to some interesting degree.11  
There are likely to be more fine-grained differences as well, e.g., differences in the 
algorithms that are implemented. For example, it is unlikely that the algorithms implemented in 
deriving shape from shading in the visual system are implemented anywhere else in the mind.  
I am not providing any argument here that perception is in fact always stimulus bound and 
informationally encapsulated. Instead, I want to sketch one way the joint in nature between 
perception and cognition (see Block unpublished) may be understood in light of the truth of 
perceptual pluralism (and, therefore, the fecklessness of the representational strategy). I will 
however seek to clarify these criteria, especially informational encapsulation, in a way that makes 
this version of the architectural strategy more plausible and empirically tractable. 
4.1—Stimulus dependence. Perception starts with the transduction of proximal stimulation and 
outputs representations of distal stimuli. Part of what intuitively marks perception is its 
responsiveness to sensory transduction, while paradigm cases of propositional thought (e.g., 
planning to move to a new apartment) are unbound from present stimulation. Stimulus 
dependence as I interpret it requires that perceptual processes cease when proximal stimulation 
                                                          
11 Interestingly, these map onto the two of Fodor’s original nine criteria for modularity that have been most discussed: 
domain specificity and informational encapsulation. Prinz (2006) points out that domain specificity is hard to 
articulate in a plausible way given that few perceptual processes operate directly on sensory transductions. Perhaps, 
however, a modularist could appeal to hierarchically nested modules, the outputs of modules at one level serving as 
inputs to the next. In any case, the notion of stimulus dependence is slightly different; what matters is that perceptual 
processing in non-pathological cases will cease when stimulation ceases, not that all perceptual processes operate on a 




ceases, barring pathology (and controlling for the time that mediates the occurrence of proximal 
stimulation and the running of the relevant process). 
Some argue that stimulus dependence is the essence of perception. In particular, some 
theorists have argued that concepts are deployable independently of stimulation and perceptual 
representations are not (Prinz 2002; Camp 2009; Burge 2010b). Since I will ultimately argue that 
concepts are deployed in perceptual systems, I will not take this line—and I will critique this view 
of concepts in Chapter 3. Moreover, I do not think that being dependent on stimulation is 
sufficient for perception, since there may be processes that are stimulus bound and post-perceptual 
(e.g., certain forms of categorization and demonstrative thought).  
There are some cases of perception-like processing that are free from stimulation, notably 
hallucination and mental imagery. However, hallucination is pathological and thus not at issue. 
Mental imagery is not pathological, but it is also not perception—though it does share resources 
and some aspects of representational format, as I will argue in Chapter 2.  
Bence Nanay (forthcoming) argues that much of online perception involves mental 
imagery. Nanay’s notion of imagery is quite broad however, encompassing any processing that is 
not completely determined by stimulation such as filling in the blind spot and representing three-
dimensional surfaces. This processing is still dependent on present stimulation in the sense used 
here, since it is controlled by stimulation and ceases if stimulation ceases. 
There is also the question of how different perceptual modalities respond to different 
stimulation. Differences in types of stimulation alone (e.g., retinal stimulation) do not seem 




unpublished). However, a theory of what distinguishes perception from cognition does not 
necessarily furnish us with a theory of what distinguishes each perceptual modality. The appeal to 
stimulus dependence here is not intended to make any claims about what distinguishes visual 
processing from processing in other perceptual modalities. 
The notion of stimulus dependence is not particularly deep, but it is arguably required to 
distinguish perceptual systems from encapsulated systems in central cognition, such as the cheater-
detection module (Cosmides et al. 2010). Distinguishing encapsulated perceptual systems from 
encapsulated cognitive systems is the sole theoretical reason for which I appeal to stimulus 
dependence. Informational encapsulation is the more substantive criterion, so I turn to it now. 
4.2—Informational encapsulation. There is a prodigious amount of philosophical and empirical 
research into the topic of cognitive penetration (e.g., Pylyshyn 1984; 1999; Levin & Banaji 2006; 
MacPherson 2012; Stokes 2014; Briscoe 2015; Brogaard & Gatzia 2016; Firestone & Scholl 2016). 
The basic idea of cognitive penetration is enshrined in Pylyshyn’s famous formulation: 
[I]f a system is cognitively penetrable then the function it computes is sensitive, in 
a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be 
altered in a way that bears some logical relation to what the person knows[.] 
(Pylyshyn 1999, 343) 
Fodor developed another influential notion, the notion of informational encapsulation. 
According to Fodor, processing in “input systems” (i.e., encapsulated perceptual systems) “does 
not have access to all of the information that the organism internally represents; there are 
restrictions upon the allocation of internally represented information to input processes” (1983, 




later—I don’t think it’s obvious that they are deeply related. For now, however, I will try to 
characterize encapsulation more fully. 
Encapsulation is a matter of information access. Saying that System A is encapsulated from 
System B means that A is constrained (in some way to be spelled out later) from accessing 
information in B (Scholl 1997). The notion of information access is foundational to the 
computational theory of mind. Every computational system must have some information available 
to it. Computational systems transform inputs into outputs, and what determines the relevant 
input-output mappings is the information available to the system together with the algorithms it 
implements. What distinguishes computational processes from mere transductions is that the 
former do, and the latter don’t, bring stored information to bear on their computational 
transformations such that the output is not merely a slavish registration of the input (e.g., Pylyshyn 
1984, Chapter 6).12 
As an illustrative example, take visual “shape from shading,” a process that uses 
information about the shading of an object’s surface to derive its three-dimensional shape 
(Ramachandran 1988). The system that implements this process seems to “assume” that light 
comes from above and slightly to the left (Sun & Perona 1998). Somehow, the information that 
light comes from above and to the left guides the mapping from shaded two-dimensional surfaces 
to three-dimensional shapes performed by the shape-from-shading system. Talk of the system 
                                                          
12 Burge (2010a) appeals to a similar distinction between information registration and genuine representation, but also 
allows for computation to consist in (e.g.,) mere weighting or averaging of registrations and thus going beyond 




making an “assumption” is a metaphorical way of stating that a certain piece of information 
structures the relevant computations. 
This structuring can take place either explicitly or implicitly. In the explicit case, a 
representation with the content <light comes from above and slightly to the left>—or, more likely, 
some much more precise specification—is stored in a manner that makes it accessible to the shape-
from-shading system. When the system is fed its inputs, it accesses this representation (and other 
stored information) and derives its outputs in accordance with whatever algorithms it implements. 
The notion of access involves the activation of a token representation and its functioning directly 
and without independent intervention in the relevant processes; a representation that is accessed 
by some process is computed over by that process. 
In the implicit case, on the other hand, there’s no such representation stored anywhere. 
Instead, the algorithms implemented by the system accord with the principle that light comes from 
above and to the left. That information isn’t available for use by any process; it’s merely implicit 
(or “embodied”—e.g., Devitt 2006, 45) in the operations of the system (Shea 2014). For this piece 
of information to be “accessed” is simply for it to accurately describe the transformations 
demanded by the relevant algorithms. 
Note that ‘explicit’ in this context does not mean ‘conscious’. Some (e.g., Fodor 1981b) 
argue that rules of grammar are explicitly stored in the language faculty and are accessed in 
deriving the syntactic properties of linguistic expressions, but would nonetheless deny that these 
representations are ever conscious. The present use of ‘explicit’ thus differs from the use of that 




and conscious attitudes. On a view like Mandelbaum’s (2016), for instance, implicit biases are 
explicit in the sense that they are realized by mental representations that are directly available for 
use in various mental processes, and are implicit only in the (very different) sense that they are 
unconscious.13 
We can loosely use the term ‘proprietary store of information’ to describe both the 
explicitly and implicitly stored information used by a system to structure its input-output 
mappings. This term is loose in that implicitly stored information, unlike explicitly stored 
information, is not literally stored anywhere. Similarly, implicitly stored information, unlike 
explicitly stored information, is not literally accessed while running computations within the 
relevant system. Nonetheless, it’s part of the set of information that shapes the processing of a given 
system, and can thus be counted as part of the proprietary store of information.  
It’s useful to have a neutral way of talking given how routinely difficult it is to determine 
whether a piece of information is stored explicitly or implicitly. The case of light coming from 
above and to the left demonstrates this methodological problem. Is that information an explicit or 
implicit part of shape-from-shading processing? This is not a rhetorical question, but it’s difficult 
to know how to go about answering it. Another illustrative case is generative grammar (e.g., 
Chomsky 1980; Devitt 2006; Pietroski 2008). Critics notwithstanding, generative linguists believe 
                                                          
13 Though ‘implicit’ in the sense of being unconscious does not entail ‘implicit’ in the sense of being unavailable for 
use in any mental process, the latter will entail the former given the reasonable assumption that only token 
representations can be conscious. Any token representation fails to be implicit in the latter sense, and thus the scope 




that the rules of grammar are part of the language faculty’s proprietary store of information. There 
is, however, no consensus on whether this information is explicitly stored. 
With all this in the background, we can give a more precise characterization of 
encapsulation: System A is encapsulated from System B when A’s proprietary store of information 
excludes information stored in B. While operating on its inputs to produce its outputs, A can only 
access a certain limited domain of information, and a piece of information held in B—even if it’s 
semantically highly relevant to the processing in A—simply fails to fall within that domain, and 
thus cannot be accessed by A. Encapsulation in this sense underwrites the modularist explanation 
of recalcitrant perceptual illusions: despite the fact that a piece of information in cognition is 
semantically relevant to the illusory percept (e.g., one knows that the stimulus is illusory), that 
information falls outside the proprietary store of information available to perception, and thus the 
illusion persists. 
A primary reason encapsulation matters for mental architecture is that it provides a good 
reason for positing distinct systems. If two processes occur in the same system, then semantically 
relevant information that is accessible to one process should typically be accessible to the other as 
well. For example, guessing where a person is from and deciding whether to ask them for directions 
are distinct cognitive processes, but a single piece information (e.g., that they only speak Finnish) 
can be relevant to both processes. In this example, when told that the person speaks Finnish you 
might form only a single representation, that person only speaks finnish, which is stored in central 
cognition and is accessible to both processes (e.g., it might lead you to guess that they are from 




would provide a compelling reason to think that the processes of guessing where a person is from 
and deciding whether to ask them for directions both take place in the same central-cognitive 
system. 
If, on the other hand, two processes cannot access the same store of information, then there 
is good reason to think they don’t take place in the same system. It’s for this reason that Firestone 
& Scholl, for example, take the idea of widespread violations of the encapsulation of perception 
from cognition to threaten the idea of “a salient ‘joint’ between perception and cognition” (2016). 
Some theorists on the other side of the debate agree. Clark, for example, writes that the putative 
prevalence of violations of encapsulation “makes the lines between perception and cognition fuzzy, 
perhaps even vanishing” (2013, 190). Others, such as Block (unpublished), argue that violation of 
encapsulation is widespread but that perception is nonetheless distinct from cognition, appealing 
to factors like differences in representational format.  
There has been a sustained attack on the thesis that perception is encapsulated from 
cognition in the experimental and philosophical literature (Prinz 2006; unpublished; Proffitt 2009; 
Balcetis & Dunning 2010; MacPherson 2012; Clark 2013; Mole 2015; Lupyan 2015; 2016; Block 
unpublished), along with replies from proponents of encapsulation (Durgin et al. 2009; Deroy 
2013; Firestone & Scholl 2016).  
Much of the debate has concerned nitty-gritty details of experimental design (Durgin et al. 
2009; Proffitt 2009; Gantman & van Bavel 2014; Firestone & Scholl 2014). I will not jump into this 




Firestone and Brian Scholl (2016) have usefully pointed out a series of methodological flaws that 
make much of the extant experimental literature hard to evaluate. 
Instead, I will discuss a more a priori point of contention. Many theorists (Lupyan 2015; 
Clark 2016; Block unpublished; Prinz unpublished) have claimed that attention can be a vehicle 
for widespread violations of encapsulation. Even some who are otherwise committed to 
encapsulation have expressed sympathy for this objection, including Firestone and Scholl (2016). 
I will instead argue for an extreme thesis: no effect of attention, either on the inputs to 
perceptual processing or on perceptual processing itself, constitutes a violation of the 
encapsulation of perception. 
§5. Attention, Encapsulation, and Impenetrability 
5.1—Attention and perception. Attention is a form of modulation of perceptual processing that is 
typically taken to involve the selection or prioritization of information (though how this should be 
understood is a matter of debate—see, e.g., Nanay 2010; Mole 2011; Prinz 2012; Wu 2014). 
Attention can consist in some information being processed rather than other available 
information, or in constrained forms of modulation, such as increasing “gain,” i.e., signal strength, 
and “tuning,” i.e., noise reduction (Ling et al. 2009). Attentional modulation can increase spatial 
resolution (Carrasco & Barbot 2014), boost perceived contrast (Carrasco et al. 2004), and warp 
perceived distance (Vickery & Chun 2010).  
In the visual system, attention comes in three broad forms. Spatial attention selects 




overt, as when you move your eyes to change your gaze, or covert, as when you maintain fixation 
on a single point but attend to something in your periphery. Feature-based attention selects 
representations of certain features and inhibits others; for example, you might search for your 
favorite red shirt in your drawer and attend to red over the other available colors. Finally, object-
based attention selects representations of certain objects; for example, you might watch a flock of 
birds and attend to a particular bird, tracking it as it moves. 
Cognition can direct all three varieties of visual attention. For instance, you might attend 
to a certain location because you expect something to appear there; you might attend to a certain 
feature because you want to find your shirt; and you might attend to a certain object because it’s a 
bird you intend to track. One might be tempted to conclude that these are all instances of cognition 
violating the encapsulation of perception.  
Firestone and Scholl (2016) argue instead that at least some forms of attention merely 
constitute changing of inputs to otherwise encapsulated perceptual systems. An example would be 
when you choose to change where your eyes are fixated; though this is a cognition-driven change 
in perception, it operates not by violating encapsulation but instead by moving the eyes to change 
the inputs to perception. Though covert spatial attention doesn’t literally involve moving the eyes, 
it’s intuitively the same sort of effect and thus changes perception only by changing inputs (see also 
Deroy 2013). 
Macpherson (2012) raises the possibility that feature-based attention directed by cognition 
seems to violate encapsulation (see also Mole 2015; Block unpublished). Unlike spatial attention, 




processing (e.g., it seems to require processing of red in order to attend to the red things in the 
room). A modularist may reply that attention does not only select sensory inputs, but also selects 
representations as inputs for downstream processing, even if those representations were the result 
of earlier stages in a hierarchy of modular processing. 
Others argue that attention has widespread effects on perceptual processing that are not 
limited to selection and modulation of inputs (e.g., Mole 2015; Lupyan 2016; Clark 2016). Even 
Firestone and Scholl only take their argument to save encapsulation from “peripheral” forms of 
attention, and say they are “sympathetic” to an attack on encapsulation that focuses on non-
peripheral forms of attention. They object only that such proposals have at present remained too 
abstract relative to the experimental evidence, thus leaving encapsulation-based theories of 
perception vulnerable to detailed accounts of non-peripheral forms of top-down attention. 
5.2.—Attention and encapsulation. A methodological problem arises here: how do we determine 
which attentional effects might, and which might not, violate encapsulation? The debate, so stated, 
threatens to become about warring intuitions. The idea that covert spatial attention fails to violate 
encapsulation seems to rest on an intuitive parallel with overt spatial attention (e.g., Macpherson 
2012, 28). Theorists like Macpherson (2012), Prinz (unpublished), and Block (unpublished) invite 
us to have the opposite intuitions about feature-based and (in Prinz’s case) object-based attention, 
since these forms of attention seem to involve a tighter connection between the contents of our 
intentions and the contents of our resultant perceptual states. Indeed, Pylyshyn's classic 
formulation of cognitive penetration is of a “semantically coherent” causal relation between 




without intuitions. For example, feature-based attention to red things that alters perception of 
redness in response to thoughts about redness seems to instantiate a causal, semantically coherent 
relation (MacPherson 2012; Block unpublished). 
Pylyshyn’s influential formulation of cognitive penetration in terms of semantically 
coherent causal relations between thought and perception thus threatens to make mundane forms 
of attention into examples of cognitive penetration. Note, however, that the presence of a 
semantically coherent causal relation between a thought and the output of some perceptual process 
says nothing about stores of information. For all that Pylyshyn’s informal definition of cognitive 
penetration says, there could be semantically coherent causal relations between thoughts and 
percepts that don’t involve a change in the proprietary store of information available to the relevant 
perceptual process. 
Semantically coherent effects mediated by attention would constitute just this sort of 
relation. If a representation is held in a system’s proprietary store, it’s directly available to be 
accessed in running computations. No additional process is necessary for it to affect processing. 
Every computational system can immediately access its proprietary information store either 
implicitly—i.e., running algorithms that accord with it—or explicitly—i.e., activating the 
representation and having it enter into the online computational process. Access of proprietary 
information is direct or immediate in the sense that there’s no intervening process except the 
activation of the stored representation.  
Consider, for example, the access of a belief stored in long-term memory in central 




accessed (which, since it’s explicitly stored, amounts to activating the representation), it will enter 
into central cognitive processes like inference (Braine & O’Brien 1998) and facilitating lexical 
recognition (Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1971). The fact that representations stored in a system 
currently running a computation are immediately entered into computations via access explains 
why, to reuse an example mentioned earlier, subliminally presenting the minor premise in a modus 
ponens argument after consciously presenting the major premise results in acquisition of the 
conclusion (Reverberi et al. 2012). Assuming that modus ponens describes an algorithm 
implemented in central cognition, then once the major premise (e.g., ‘If there’s an X then there’s a 
Y’) is represented in central cognition, activating the minor premise (e.g., ‘There’s an X’) is causally 
sufficient to yield the conclusion as output (e.g., ‘There’s a Y’). The representation, once accessed, 
is integrated with currently running processes to yield an output. 
It should be clear at this point why an effect of cognition on perception mediated by 
attention cannot violate encapsulation: it is not a form of information access. A state in cognition 
may cause an attentional effect on perceptual processing and thereby alter the output of perception. 
Moreover, it may do so in a semantically coherent way, such that the output of perception is 
semantically related to the state in cognition. But the state in cognition isn’t thereby just another 
representation housed in the perceptual system’s proprietary store of information. Instead, it can 
only exert an influence on the perceptual system by way of attentional selection and modulation. 
If a representation in cognition can only affect perceptual processing via attention, that 
immediately separates it from representations in the relevant proprietary information store; the 




via attention are thus never part of the store of information proprietary to a perceptual system, and 
so don’t violate the encapsulation of perception from cognition.14 
Take Fig. 1, which to an innocent eye may appear to contain a chaos of dots. However, 
upon learning that the image depicts a Dalmatian, the dog may become visible. Suppose that this 
effect works through activating your concept of Dalmatians and using conceptual knowledge of 
what they look like to guide which locations and features you attend to. It’s thus not the case that 
this cognitive information is accessed in the relevant perceptual processes. The cognitive states 
instead guide processes of spatial, feature-based, and, ultimately, object-based attention that 
modulate perceptual processing. The store of information proprietary to the relevant perceptual 
system is left intact.  
                                                          
14 One can also think of information access as defined by the array of parameters that can be set in a computation. For 
example, distance perception may contain a parameter for whether the perceived object is desired (Balcetis & Dunning 
2010)—e.g., if the object is desired, then the parameter is set to YES. Effects mediated by attention don’t involve a 





Figure 1—Top-down attention at work 
Similarly, Mole (2015) cites Kravitz and Behrmann (2011) as providing experimental evidence for 
top-down attention operating within (rather than before) perceptual processing. Kravitz and 
Behrmann found effects of attentional cues on a letter-discrimination task that were driven by the 
shape, color, and location of previewed objects. A cue would improve letter discrimination not 
only if the letter appeared at the same location or in the same object as the cue, but also if it 
appeared in the location of another object that shared features (e.g., shape or color) with the object 
in which the cue appeared. Mole (as well as Kravitz and Behrmann) argues that spatial, feature-
based, and object-based attention interact to organize perceived scenes and guide perceptual 
discriminations. Mole argues further that this interaction can be sensitive to learned categories 
such as letter identities (2015, 230–231). 
As mentioned above, a modularist could reply that these interactions of attentional effects 
take place at the output-input interfaces of hierarchically nested modules. But the point presently 




Attention is the selection and modulation of perceptual signals, not a form of information access. 
Selection and modulation within modules may, for example, affect which stored information is 
accessed in online perceptual processing by biasing competition between signals for 
“representation, analysis, or control” (Desimone & Duncan 1995, 194; see Mole 2015, 231ff). The 
cognitive states that drive such attentional effects, however, aren’t thereby among the information 
accessed in the relevant perceptual processes.  
One might object that attention simply is perceptual processing. Mole, for instance, writes 
that attention is “inherent to the basic structure of the neural architecture” of perception (2015, 
233). Perhaps, in that case, cognitively driven attention is ipso facto a case where a perceptual 
process accesses cognition. But this claim, depending on how it’s meant, is either trivial or false. If 
the claim is merely that attention (qua perceptual process) accesses information in cognition, then 
it’s trivial; nobody on any side of the debate about encapsulation would deny that attention can be 
driven by (and hence can access) cognitive states. If, on the other hand, the claim is that the 
perceptual states and processes selected and modulated by attention thereby access information in 
cognition, then it’s false. There is a clear asymmetry between (i) a process that accesses 
representation R and (ii) a process that’s affected by a separate process that accesses R. My 
argument thus does not require arguing that attention is a separate system from perception, but 
only that attention is not identical to the processes (e.g., distance perception) it modulates. Since 
attention modulates such processes, it cannot be identical to such processes, even if it is genuinely 




Consider a putative case where a cognitive state is genuinely accessed by perception. For 
example, suppose that a visual subsystem that implements perception of distance can access a 
desire for the perceived object and thereby make it appear closer (Balcetis & Dunning 2010). In 
that case, the store of information accessible to the distance-perception system includes desires 
stored in central cognition. Suppose instead, however, that the desire guides attention such that 
you attend more to things you want, and the perceptual signal is thus boosted (even, we can 
stipulate, within the relevant perceptual process rather than at the input stage). Boosting the signal 
then causes the object to appear larger and closer. In the second case, there’s no explanatory reason 
to say the desire is part of the store of information accessible to the distance-perception system. 
The only “perceptual process” to which the desire is accessible is the deployment of attention. 
It turns out that Firestone and Scholl’s question of whether attention is merely a changing 
of inputs is largely beside the point. Even if top-down attention operates within the processing of 
a module, it doesn’t violate the encapsulation of that module. The module can still retain a 
proprietary store of information that affects its outputs without being mediated by attention or 
any other mechanism (aside from information access). There can thus, in principle, be widespread 
effects of top-down attention on “every stage and level of processing” (Clark 2016) without 
violating the encapsulation of perception.  
5.3—Encapsulation and impenetrability. Both proponents and detractors of cognitive penetration 
have tied the notion of cognitive impenetrability to the notion of informational encapsulation. 
However, as came out in the discussion of attention, the two notions are quite different. To say 




character of the effect, viz., that it is semantically coherent (Pylyshyn 1999). To say that an effect 
of cognition on perception constitutes a violation of informational encapsulation is to describe the 
mechanism of the effect, viz., that it is an instance of information access (Fodor 1983; Scholl 1997). 
A state in cognition could in principle have a semantically coherent effect upon perceptual 
processing without being accessed by that processing. For example, a state in cognition might cause 
the formation of a mental image, and the mental image might alter the percept; every link in this 
causal chain respects the content of the representations involved, so the effect seems to be 
semantically coherent (MacPherson 2012). Nonetheless, it need not be the case that the perceptual 
process that is so affected actually accesses the cognitive state. Instead it seems that only the image 
is a candidate to be an actual constituent of the perceptual processing rather than the cognitive 
state.  Attention, I have argued, can modulate perceptual processing without the perceptual process 
accessing cognitive states and thereby constituting a violation of encapsulation. It may therefore 
count as another kind of semantically coherent effect of cognitive on perception (i.e., cognitive 
penetration) that does not violate the encapsulation of perception. 
Some proponents of cognitive impenetrability build in the requirement that cognitive 
penetration must be not only semantically coherent but direct, such that effects mediated by 
imagery and attention don’t count (Gross 2017; Block unpublished). But why should directness 
matter? If what matters is that the character of the effect is semantically coherent, whether the 
effect is direct is irrelevant. If instead what matters is information access—that is, if informational 
encapsulation is at issue rather than cognitive impenetrability—then directness does matter. A 




not accessed. This is the case whether or not that piece of information has an effect on the process, 
and whether or not that effect is semantically coherent. 
I’ve argued that a cognitive state can penetrate perceptual processing without violating 
encapsulation. This dissociation also goes the other way—a cognitive state could in principle 
violate the encapsulation of a process without cognitively penetrating it. This possibility arises 
from the fact that informational encapsulation is a computational and therefore syntactically 
specifiable notion whereas cognitive penetration as defined by Pylyshyn is specified in terms of 
semantic relations between representations. Consider a process that can output any of an array of 
symbols S1…Sn, including two symbols S2 and S3 that are semantically equivalent but are 
syntactically distinct—they might be in distinct formats, or the system might be built in some 
peculiar fashion such that it has a semantically redundant store of atomic symbols. Suppose that 
on a particular occasion, the input to this process causes it to output S2. Suppose further that some 
state gets tokened in cognition and is thereupon accessed by the process, and computing over the 
cognitive state causes the system to output S3 instead of S2. This is a clear violation of encapsulation, 
since the state in cognition is accessed, computed over, and alters the output of the process. 
Nonetheless, since the content of the output was not altered, there was no semantically coherent 
effect and thus no cognitive penetration. This example may seem exotic, but it points out that 
cognitive penetration is in principle doubly dissociable from the violation of informational 
encapsulation. 
For the purposes of mental architecture, informational encapsulation is arguably more to 




encapsulated from cognition even if cognition has massive impacts on perception that are not via 
information access. The question of whether cognition impacts perception in a semantically 
coherent way might be important for questions about epistemology and consciousness, but it is 
not obviously a foundational question for theories of mental architecture. 
§6. Dimensions of Encapsulation 
Before concluding this chapter and moving on to discuss the syntax and semantics of perceptual 
representation, it will help to clarify one more aspect of informational encapsulation. Whether 
perceptual systems are encapsulated seems like a yes-or-no question—either perception can access 
information in cognition or it cannot. Then again, writers in the literature on modularity often talk 
about modules as being encapsulated to some degree (e.g., Pacherie 2008; Burge 2010b; Shea 2014; 
Butterfill & Apperly 2016).  
I have said I think that a promising version of the architectural strategy holds that 
perceptual systems are stimulus driven and synchronically encapsulated from cognition to some 
interesting degree. As far as I am aware, nobody has tried to provide a detailed taxonomy of the 
ways in which encapsulation can come in degrees as opposed to being a binary yes-or-no 
phenomenon. I will now try to sketch such a taxonomy. There is no method that underlies this 
taxonomy, but it does group somewhat into families of dimensions of encapsulation.  
These dimensions do not necessarily commensurate with one another. That is, there may 
be no fact of the matter whether a process that is highly encapsulated along dimension A and 




encapsulated along A and highly encapsulated along B. Moreover, I will refrain from drawing out 
the various ways in which these dimensions might combine (which they surely can). In many cases 
it is plausible that a system that is not perfectly encapsulated along one dimension will fail to be 
perfectly encapsulated along others. 
A final caveat: as just argued, indirect effects and merely semantically coherent effects of 
cognition on perception do not constitute even a weak violation of encapsulation. Thus a 
taxonomy of graded dimensions of encapsulation should exclude such cases. 
6.1—Number. One group of dimensions of encapsulation has to do with the amount of states or 
processes involved. 
6.1.1—Number of processes. Perhaps the simplest grade of encapsulation is the number of 
perceptual processes involved. Philosophers sometimes talk of the entire visual system as a single 
module, but that is a misleading way of talking. Instead, the visual system comprises a plethora of 
distinct processes. Thus one way in which encapsulation might come in degrees is the number of 
perceptual processes that can access states in cognition. A perceptual system made up of 50 
processes only three of which can access cognitive states is more encapsulated than a perceptual 
system made up of 50 processes nine of which can access cognitive states. This is ceteris paribus, of 
course, since the second system might be far more encapsulated along other dimensions—I will 
hereafter drop the ceteris paribus qualifications. 
This dimension is strange, since encapsulation should typically be understood at the level 
of processes rather than systems; nonetheless, the tendency to ask whether the visual system is 




6.1.2—Number of parameters. With respect to a single process, the process could have more or 
fewer parameters set by accessing states in cognition. For example, one process might have a 
YES/NO parameter for whether the object is desired while another process might have that 
parameter as well as a parameter for whether the object is believed to be large. The second process 
is less encapsulated than the first because it has more parameters to be set by states in cognition. 
6.1.3—Number of states. The mind might be constructed so that only a certain number of beliefs 
and desires are accessible to perception at one time. A perceptual process that can access a greater 
number of cognitive states is thereby less encapsulated than a process that can access fewer 
cognitive states. This dimension might be shaped by the types of cognitive states in question, which 
is mentioned below. 
6.2—Strength. Another group of dimensions of encapsulation has to do with strength.  
6.2.1—Strength threshold. It is plausible that beliefs vary in strength. For example, I believe that I 
live in Brooklyn and I believe that Lee Harvey Oswald killed JFK alone, but I believe the former 
more strongly than the latter. Strength is often equated with subjective probability (e.g., Pettigrew 
2013), though there may be reason to doubt that strength qua recalcitrance correlates very well 
with strength qua subjective probability (Mandelbaum 2010). 
Desires also seem to have degrees of strength as well. For example, one might want to 
complete one’s dissertation and one might want to play video games, and the latter desire might 
be stronger than the former. 
One dimension along which encapsulation might come in degrees is the strength required 




and up, while another process might access beliefs with strength .6 and up, and still another might 
access beliefs with strength .2 and up. The second process is less encapsulated than the first, and 
the third is even less encapsulated. 
6.2.2—Strength sensitivity. Another way in which strength might grade encapsulation is the 
sensitivity of the perceptual process to the strength of the cognitive state. For example, take the 
Balcetis and Dunning (2010) experiment purporting to show that the process of perceiving 
distance computes over desires. The process of distance perception might have a simple YES/NO 
parameter for whether the object is desired; if the object is desired, then it modulates the perceived 
distance according to some set function (e.g., the object is represented as 5% closer). Or instead 
the process might access not only whether the object is desired, but also the strength of the desire, 
and modulate the perceived distance as a function of the strength of the desire. For example, if the 
object is weakly desired, it might be seen as 2% closer, and if it is strongly desired, it might be seen 
as 10% closer. This second process would be less encapsulated than the former since it not only 
accesses the cognitive state, it accesses and is modulated by the degree of strength of that state. 
6.2.3—Strength of effect. A third way in which strength might grade encapsulation is the strength 
of the effect on the perceptual process. Here ‘strength’ is used somewhat differently. For example, 
the function by which distance perception is altered by the presence of a desire could be greater or 
lesser. If an object is desired, one process might represent the object as 1% closer while another 
process might represent it as 5% closer. The latter system is less encapsulated than the former since 





Note that this dimension is distinct from the number-of-parameters dimension, since a 
process with fewer parameters set by cognition might nevertheless have its computations altered 
to a greater degree than a process with more parameters set by cognition. 
6.3—Type. Another group of dimensions of encapsulation concerns the types of states and 
processes involved. 
6.3.1—Types of processes. At the level of the perceptual system, we can ask not only how many 
processes in that system are encapsulated, but also which types of processes are encapsulated. For 
example, early visual processes might be encapsulated while later ones are not (Pylyshyn 1999), or 
vice versa. Or perhaps perceptual processes that operate on one format are encapsulated while 
processes that operate on another format are not. This dimension is particularly vague, and it is 
not obvious how to render this a graded phenomenon, but it is nonetheless a dimension of 
variation of encapsulation at the level of systems. It may become more obviously graded in 
interacting with other dimensions, e.g., number of processes. 
The rest of the dimensions in this category concern the types of cognitive states that are 
accessible to the process in question. 
6.3.2—Types of attitudes. One process might only be able to access desires, while another could 
access hopes, intentions, and desires, and a third could access those states as well as beliefs. The 
third process is the least encapsulated, followed by the second and then first, because it has access 
to the most diverse array of cognitive states. 
6.3.3—Types of formats. Cognitive states might vary in format. A perceptual process might be able 




access states in a few formats or only one format. This difference tracks a difference in degree of 
encapsulation. 
6.3.4—Peripherality. Some states are more “peripheral” than others because they concern 
perceptible phenomena (Quine 1960). A process might be able to access peripheral beliefs like the 
belief that bananas are yellow but not more “central” beliefs like the belief that 3+4=7. A process 
that can access more central as well as more peripheral beliefs is thereby less encapsulated. 
6.3.5—Conscious accessibility. Many putative examples of violations of encapsulation involve 
consciously inaccessible states (e.g., implicit biases), while many putative examples of 
encapsulation involve conscious beliefs (e.g., known illusions). A process that can access conscious 
as well as unconscious states is thereby less encapsulated than a process that can only access 
unconscious states. 
6.4—Gateways. A fourth group of dimensions of encapsulation concerns what I will call 
“gateways.” A mind might be constructed such that perception typically cannot access beliefs, say, 
unless the belief that p is tokened, in which case perception can thereupon access other beliefs. In 
this sort of case, the belief that p functions as a gateway, since it razes the border between systems 
and allows previously inaccessible states to become accessible. I am not sure whether any mind in 
fact works this way, but I include gateways here in the interest of mapping out the logical space. 
6.4.1—Number of states needed. The gateway might be the belief that p, or it might be the belief 
that p and the belief that q. A process that requires more states to be present in order to facilitate 
access is more encapsulated since it is more restrictive about the conditions under which 




6.4.2—Strength of states needed. Another gradation can be due to the strength needed. For example, 
a process that requires the belief that p and the belief that q both at strength .8 is more encapsulated 
than a process that only requires the beliefs to have strength .2 to facilitate access. 
6.5—Summing up. This taxonomy is not intended to be anything like an exhaustive one. 
Nonetheless, it is important to understand how encapsulation might come in degrees, and these 
are 13 distinct dimensions along which a system or process can be more or less encapsulated. The 
hypothesis that perceptual processes are encapsulated from cognition “to some interesting degree” 
can be fleshed out along these (and perhaps other) dimensions. 
§7. Conclusion 
This chapter was intended to clarify some of the background issues concerning mental architecture 
and the vehicles of mental representation. The rest of the dissertation will concern the syntactic 
and semantic properties of the outputs of perception. I will defend the thesis that perception 
delivers multiple representational forms, including those used in thought. We thus cannot 
distinguish perception from cognition by appeal to differences in the vehicles deployed. In this 
chapter, I have tried to sketch an architectural strategy for distinguishing perception from 
cognition that appeals to stimulus dependence and some degree of synchronic encapsulation. This 
dissertation is not a defense of this strategy, which would require its own dissertation. Nonetheless, 







“Discursive representations do, but iconic ones do not, impose principles of 
individuation on the domains in which they are interpreted. I don’t want to talk 
about this at length because I’m scared to.” 
—Jerry Fodor15 
“Perceptual psychology assumes an iconic format for perceptual representation.” 
—Tyler Burge16 
Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal 
stimuli. A central goal for philosophy of perception, therefore, is to characterize the 
representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are 
in some way proprietarily perceptual, and differ from the representational format of thought. Or 
it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in one common code. This chapter 
rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a 
multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. 
                                                          
15 Fodor 2007, 109. 





Most philosophical writing on the nature of perceptual representation focuses on content. For 
example, philosophers have debated whether perception has conceptual content (McDowell 1994; 
Byrne 2005) or nonconceptual content (Evans 1982; Heck 2000; Peacocke 2001), high-level 
content (Bayne 2009; Siegel & Byrne forthcoming) or low-level content (Brogaard 2013), and rich 
conscious content (Dretske 2004; Block 2011) or sparse conscious content (Cohen & Dennett 
2011), just to name a few disputes. 
This preoccupation with content, though fruitful in some respects, is peculiar. Elsewhere 
in philosophy of cognitive science, it has been common to examine the vehicles of content—mental 
representations themselves, and how they, rather than their contents, are structured. For example, 
debates about whether there is a language of thought (Fodor 1975; Dennett 1978; Fodor & Pylyshyn 
1988; Smolensky 1990), whether some thought is map-like (Camp 2007; Rescorla 2009a; Blumson 
2015), representations in the language faculty (Chomsky 1980; Devitt 2006), and the nature of 
mental imagery (Pylyshyn 2003; Kosslyn et al. 2006) all primarily concern the structures of 
representational vehicles.  
There is good reason for this focus on vehicles throughout cognitive science. Mental 
representations are the elements of mental computational processes. It is in virtue of their vehicular 
or “syntactic” properties rather than their contents or “semantic” properties (which may be such 
exotic entities as sets of worlds or Fregean senses) that representations have the particular 




mental representations function in the mind and produce behavior thus requires an understanding 
of their (syntactic) structures. 
In a discussion of cognitive maps as alternatives to propositional thoughts, Michael 
Rescorla laments that philosophical research on perception “generally emphasizes content rather 
than the vehicles of content. Participants in the debate seldom even mention mental 
representations” (2009a, 380). As a result of this focus on content, there is comparatively little 
philosophical discussion about what kinds of mental representations are constructed by the visual 
system.  
Nonetheless, in recent years a movement has been building that seeks to characterize the 
structure of perceptual representation as a way of distinguishing perception from cognition. If the 
vehicles of perceptual representation (i.e., percepts) are structured differently than the vehicles of 
cognitive representation (i.e., thoughts), then we may be able to draw the perception–cognition 
border by appeal to such differences. 
Susan Carey (2009, 8), Tyler Burge (2014a, 488; 2014b, 574), and Ned Block (2014, 560; 
unpublished) all argue that perceptual representations are to be individuated at least partly in 
virtue of their format. More specifically, they claim that the format of perceptual representation is 
iconic while the format of thought is discursive. This chapter is a critical evaluation of this thesis. 
I will argue instead for the pluralist thesis that perception delivers both iconic and discursive 
representations.  
First I will clarify the notion of representational format and the distinction between iconic 




iconic representation, arguing that there is defeasible but abductively valid reason to posit iconic 
representation in perception; this section will also function to empirically validate the notion of 
iconic representation outlined in Section 2. In Section 4, I will argue that object perception delivers 
representations in a discursive, non-iconic format. I will respond to various objections to the claim 
that perceptual object representations are discursive in Section 5. Finally, I will gesture toward 
other possible cases of non-iconic perceptual representation in Section 6 before concluding. 
§2. Representational Format 
2.1—How to think about format. The word ‘bed’ looks sort of like a bed. Thus the very same item 
can be used to pick out a bed in two different ways: linguistically and pictorially. For instance, 
suppose someone writes a short note whose contents are simply: ‘I bought a new bed’. The typical 
interpretation would be that she’s using ‘bed’ as a word, and so expressing the thought I BOUGHT A 
NEW BED in words. But suppose that in fact she has a peculiar lapse in memory and forgets the word 
for bed, deciding instead to write ‘I bought a new’ and then draw a picture of a bed (a picture that 
looks just like this: bed), so expressing her concept of a bed with a picture. 
What is the difference between the linguistic item ‘bed’ and the picture ‘bed’? The biggest 
semantic difference is that the pictorial use of ‘bed’ represents spatial properties and relations that 
aren’t explicit in the linguistic use of ‘bed’. But even a detailed linguistic description of all these 





The key difference consists in how the parts of the representational vehicle are used. In 
particular, the difference lies in the relations between parts of the representations and parts of the 
represented thing. Consider ‘bed’ as a picture. Parts of the picture represent parts of a bed: the 
vertical lines at the left and right ends represent a headboard and a footboard, and the tops of the 
curved lines represent the mattress (and the middle of the picture represents the middle of the 
mattress, the parts on either side of the middle of the picture represent the parts on either side of 
the middle of the mattress, etc.). Now consider ‘bed’ as a word. No part of the word represents part 
of a bed: the ‘b’ does not represent anything, let alone a headboard or part of a mattress. 
This case provides a toy example of representational format in action. The difference 
between the pictorial and linguistic uses of ‘bed’ is not fundamentally a semantic one; rather the 
difference consists in the structure of the vehicle and how it is exploited.  
Formats are general types of vehicular structures. The sentence ‘This is a tiger’ and a picture 
of a tiger differ in representational format. The phrases ‘brown cow’ and ‘large yawning tiger’ have 
distinct vehicular structures but do not differ in format, since they are both instances of English 
phrases—the difference in vehicular structure is not significant enough to mark a difference in 
format. Different formats are akin to different languages, such that representations that are 
couched in different formats typically cannot compose together (though new hybrid formats, like 
hybrid languages, can arise through convention). Examples of distinct representational formats 
include maps, graphs, diagrams, sentences, photographs, hieroglyphs, and blueprints. Some of 




structures of relevant representations and compose those representations that they each constitute 
a distinct format. 
2.2—Iconic vs. discursive. Perhaps the most influential and fundamental distinction between 
formats in cognitive science is the distinction between iconic and discursive representations. 
According to the mainstream cognitivist viewpoint in the past half century, beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes are discursive (Fodor 1975; 1987; Chomsky 1980; Pylyshyn 1984; Prinz 
2002; Carey 2009; Burge 2010). The systematic and productive ways that concepts seem to 
recombine into thoughts, the formal/logical character of deductive inference, and the word-sized 
associative links involved in semantic priming all call for a theory of propositional thought as 
literally structured like a sentence or proposition and breaking down into smaller parts that are 
syntactically concatenated with one another (Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum unpublished a; 
unpublished b). I will therefore assume that at least some thoughts are discursive. 
Many who believe that thought is discursive also believe that there are mental icons, 
endorsing a pluralist view about mental representation generally (Fodor 1975; Kosslyn 1980; 1994; 
Dretske 1981; Kosslyn et al. 2006; Fodor 2008; Carey 2009; Rescorla 2009a; Burge 2010; Kulvicki 
2015a; Block unpublished). Before surveying the empirical evidence in favor of iconic 
representations in perceptual systems, it will be useful to characterize the distinction between 
iconic and discursive formats. 




The first is that parts of icons correspond to parts of what they represent, while this need 
not be true of discursive representations. Typically, there are also distance relations between parts 
of icons that correspond to distance relations in what is represented.  
The second difference is that icons encode properties and individuals holistically, and not 
by means of a canonical decomposition into constituents that stand separately for distinct 
individuals and distinct features (see Green & Quilty-Dunn unpublished). 
Consider the difference between a picture of Bob Dylan wearing a checkered shirt (Fig. 2) 
and the sentence  
(1) Bob Dylan is wearing a checkered shirt.  
 
Figure 2—Dylan wearing a checkered shirt 
One can segment the picture arbitrarily and preserve semantic significance. While we may find it 
natural to draw a line around Dylan, the picture does not come pre-segmented in that fashion. 





Figure 3—Dylan segmented 
The segmented parts are each representations of some part of the scene, as is any other 
segmentable portion. This is why Stephen Kosslyn, for example, writes of mental images that “a 
‘part’ can be defined arbitrarily, cutting up the representation in any way; no matter how you cut 
it, the part will still correspond to a part of the object” (1994, 5). Furthermore, distance relations 
between these parts track distance relations in the scene. Point simultaneously at the part that 
represents the top of Dylan’s head and the part that represents his chin; now instead of pointing at 
his chin move downward to a part that represents his chest. There is now more distance between 
the two parts you’re pointing at on the surface of the image, and this increase in distance tracks an 
increase in distance between the two represented parts of Dylan. Finally, any part of Figure 3 that 
you are pointing at represents not only some spatial part of Dylan (or of the tree behind him) but 
also values along color dimensions like lightness and dimensions of shape, size, and perhaps 




As a contrast, the syntactic structure of (1) precludes free segmentation. (1) has a right way 
of carving it up, viz., into ‘Bob Dylan’, ‘is’, and ‘wearing a checkered shirt’, which themselves 
decompose down to individual words. One could segment out the part ‘Dylan…wearing’, but this 
is not a meaningful representation that composes according to some compositional semantics to 
generate the whole sentence. Or one could carve it up so that one of the parts is ‘ob Dyla’, which 
involves no meaningful representation at all. The sentence thus has at least one canonical 
decomposition, or right way of carving it up, and many wrong ways of carving it up. The parts that 
are individuated by a canonical decomposition are constituents. Thus discursive representations, 
unlike iconic representations, always either have constituents or are compositionally efficacious 
atomic representations like individual words or concepts. Icons have parts but typically lack 
constituents in this technical sense of the term (Fodor 2007).  
Pure icons like Figure 2 (i.e., which do not have labels or any other explicit discursive 
apparatus amended to them) arguably always lack constituents; there are other hybrid icons, like 
maps and graphs, that do have constituents (Camp 2007; Rescorla 2009a, 2009b).  
Distance relations among parts of (1) also do not track distance relations in what is 
represented. And finally, some parts of (1) represent individual items or properties without being 
holistically bound up with other items or properties. For example ‘checkered’ represents a surface 
texture without representing the object that has that texture, its shape, its location in the scene, etc.  
One might object that many or all icons at least have privileged decompositions. For 
example, perhaps Rothko intended his shapes to be perceptually segmented separately from one 




not obvious that in these cases we should read the privileged boundaries into the syntax of the icon 
rather than offloading it onto the discursive mental states of artists and consumers. Nonetheless, 
even if we grant this idea, it will be true that, within each segmented part, individuals and properties 
are represented holistically. Thus even granting privileged spatial decompositions, icons still do 
not represent an individual as having multiple properties by means of a canonical decomposition 
into separate constituents standing for (i) the individual and (ii) for each represented property. 
The core difference between iconic and discursive formats is that the latter do, and the 
former do not, break down into recombinable parts each of which can stand uniquely for a 
particular property or individual. Any part of Figure 3 that you touch will represent a certain spatial 
location in the scene, and will represent various color values at that location (as well, perhaps, as 
shape values, higher-level properties, and individual objects). In an icon, features compose with 
one another and with individuals in a holistic fashion, i.e., not in virtue of combining distinct 
constituents (see Chapter 4, ICONIC REPRESENTATION). 
2.3—Icons and complex demonstratives. Before moving forward, it is important to clarify the 
dialectic. The term ‘iconic’ has been used for decades in cognitive science to refer to representations 
with the properties just mentioned, as is most clearly articulated by Stephen Kosslyn and Jerry 
Fodor, as well as Ulric Neisser’s (1967) introduction of the term to cognitive science to describe 
Sperling’s (1960) results (see the following section for discussion). These properties play a 
foundational role in Kosslyn’s influential theory of mental imagery (e.g., Kosslyn 1980, 34), perhaps 
the most important and detailed theory of iconic mental representation in cognitive science. It 




representations with these properties without providing an alternate theory of iconicity. It is often 
unclear to what extent anti-pluralists use the term in the standard way. An exception is Carey, who 
explicitly characterizes icons as representations whose parts correspond to parts of the scene (2009, 
452) and seems to endorse the claim that icons encode properties holistically (2009, 459; cf. Block 
unpublished).  
Burge suggests that perceptual states represent in a fashion akin to complex demonstratives, 
e.g., “that brown body” (Burge 2010b, 40). Since complex demonstratives have canonical 
decompositions—in the case of ‘that brown body’, into ‘that’ and ‘brown body’, and again into 
‘brown’ and ‘body’—this may suggest that Burge is committed to canonical decomposition in 
perceptual representation and denial of holistic binding. Complex linguistic demonstratives, 
however, are not iconic in any sense at all, so it would be misleading to draw that analogy in 
characterizing the format of perceptual representation. Partly for this reason, Burge may be best 
read as discussing the contents of perceptual representations, and not their syntactic properties 
(indeed, his use of underlines in the quotation above is meant to denote contents).  
Burge’s writings on perception are sometimes ambivalent as to whether he is discussing the 
structure of the vehicles of perceptual content or the structure of content itself. As I read Burge, this 
is because he in fact rejects the standard distinction between vehicles and contents.  
Burge claims that vehicles cannot be individuated by their internal functional role and that 
(anti-individualistic) contents are constitutively ‘part of the individuation conditions of perceptual 
states in a way that renders the vehicle-content distinction problematic (Burge 2010a, 95n45). He 




linguistic as merely a “useful idealization” (Burge 2010a, 95n45).17 In light of this aspect of his 
theory, I think Burge cannot be understood as quantifying over separate representational vehicles, 
                                                          
17 Burge does not provide extensive argument for this position, and it seems inconsistent with cognitive science both 
in practice and at its foundations. Cognitive science requires a characterization of the syntactic features of mental 
representations in a way that abstracts away from their content to explain all sorts of mental phenomena, such as 
deductive inference (e.g., Braine and O’Brien 1998, Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum unpublished b). The fact that 
content is a core part of psychological explanation does not mean that we cannot discuss the internally individuated, 
computationally efficacious syntactic features of mental representations. One fundamental reason for needing syntax 
is that, as Burge would agree, contents typically supervene on relations to the distal environment. Mental 
representations, and indeed any computationally efficacious symbols, are causally efficacious within the mind and 
therefore must be operated on in virtue of their locally individuated features. Mental representations are symbols 
whose local properties are independent of their wide contents, and whose internal computational role is determined 
by those local properties. These local properties minimally include the structural features of the symbols themselves, 
i.e. syntactic properties. Moreover, computation is fundamentally a syntactic notion, and Burge does not provide 
reasons to overthrow the standard syntactic characterization of computational processes (cf. Rescorla 2012). 
Burge says we may “search textbooks and articles in perceptual psychology in vain to find mention of purely 
syntactical structures” (2010b, 96). But proponents of locally individuated vehicles and their syntactic features can 
(and almost always do) hold that those vehicles also have contents. It is not a prediction of the standard syntax-
semantics distinction for mental representation that scientists will talk only about one in isolation of the other—and, 
we might note, one will also search the scientific literature in vain to find mention of purely semantic properties that 
are not instantiated in mental symbols.  
If, instead, Burge means to claim that perceptual psychologists never describe the syntactic features of the 
mental representations in their theories, then there are many significant counterexamples. To name just a few: 
Kosslyn’s (1980) theory of mental imagery, Biederman’s (1987) theory of recognition by components, Pylyshyn’s 
(2003; 2008) theory of visual indexing, and Carey’s (2009) theory of core cognition and its relation to perception are 
all cast in explicitly syntactic (as well as semantic) terms. Indeed, the entire imagery debate could hardly be more 
explicitly about the syntactic features of mental representations (see, e.g., the explicit distinction between the syntax 
and semantics of iconic representations in Chapter 1 of Kosslyn et al. 2006). To pick a textbook at random, Bruce et 
al. (2014) describe the idea of “structural descriptions” as a kind of “representational format” used in pattern and 
object recognition that involves mental analogues of “propositions” which are “symbolic” though not couched in 
natural language (2014, 272). And it is common in textbooks as well as theoretical books and articles to oppose this 
kind of view of object recognition to a non-discursive template-based one, a difference in syntactic structure (e.g., 
Ullman 1996). Outside of perception and imagery, scientific appeals to syntax in describing the structure of 
propositional thoughts abound (e.g., Braine and O’Brien 1998; Johnson-Laird 2006). As Burge would insist, all of these 
theories quantify over contents; but they clearly quantify over syntactic structures of vehicles as well. 
Aside from its inconsistency with cognitive science, ruling out any locally individuated syntactic features of 
mental representations creates two foundational problems for Burge’s approach to perception. First, it is not clear on 
this purely semantic theory how contents are realized in the mind. On a broadly Fodorian picture, contents are 
instantiated in independently (and locally) individuated vehicles, but on Burge’s picture, vehicles lack independent 
individuation conditions. Without content-independent vehicles that have contents, Burge’s theory lacks an account 
of how abstract contents are realized in concrete minds. Second, it is not clear how computational processes can 
operate on purely semantic entities, particularly when we suppose that contents have wide conditions of individuation 
that are thereby inaccessible to internal computational systems. Again, the standard picture easily avoids this problem 
by appealing to locally individuated syntactic features. It is therefore unsurprising that, in both of these cases, Burge 
regards it as simply “primitive” (2010b, 96) that mental states have representational contents and that computational 




one pointer-like demonstrative symbol and another attributive symbol, when making the analogy 
to complex linguistic demonstratives. Given his view about the relation between contents and 
perceptual states, I do not think he can properly be understood as discussing representational 
format at all—at least not in the standard, essentially syntactic sense that cognitive scientists and 
philosophers like Fodor (1975), Kosslyn (1980, 1994), Pylyshyn (2003, 2008), and Carey (2009) 
have in mind. For example, Burge (2005) claims that photographs contain singular elements, but 
unlabelled photographs obviously do not involve syntactic demonstrative items.  
One might try to supplement Burge’s theory with a realist, content-independent approach 
to syntactic properties such as representational formats and argue that perceptual vehicles are 
structurally similar to complex demonstratives and are also iconic. Such a project faces an uphill 
battle, since it would seem that to say that perceptual states involve stringing together discrete 
symbols into a complex, accuracy-evaluable representation just is to say that perceptual states are 
discursive.  
One could respond by arguing that the demonstrative elements of perceptual states are non-
iconic but the elements that subserve attributive contents (e.g., brown body) are iconic. But it is far 
from clear how a non-iconic representation can be syntactically concatenated with an iconic 
representation, given that they are in different formats. At first glance (and without a spelled-out 
account), it seems that to suppose that a representation in one format could be occurrently 
concatenated with another in a single, accuracy-evaluable structure threatens to be incoherent. For 
two representations to have different formats is for them to have syntactically divergent forms, to 




of an overarching interpretation of the separate symbols, will produce gibberish.18 Nonetheless, this 
version of the view will be considered in Section 5. 
Perhaps a clarification of the structure of perceptual vehicles on Burge’s theory or modified 
versions of it is forthcoming. We have good reason to be pessimistic that such a clarification can 
both be coherent and preserve the claim that perceptual representations are iconic.  
Fortunately for dialectical purposes, Burge explicitly endorses the claim that icons and 
perceptual states both compose features holistically:  
Visual perceptual representation has a structure relevantly like that of pictorial 
representation—supplemented in various ways. Take a visual representation of an 
environmental edge—the border of a surface. Imagine that the representation has 
the form of a drawing of the edge. The drawing is a line. Such a drawing would 
represent not only the edge, but also its shape, length, and orientation—all as such. 
[…] Just as one cannot draw a line without drawing its length, shape, and 
orientation, one cannot visually represent an environmental edge as such without 
representing its length, shape, and orientation, as such. 
(Burge 2014b, 493) 
I will therefore continue to assume in what follows that parts of icons (and their distance relations) 
correspond to parts of scenes (and their distance relations) and that icons encode properties 
holistically.19 
                                                          
18 One might argue that examples like the ‘bed’ example at the outset of this section are counterexamples. But the ‘bed’ 
case only works because the drawing functions like a word in the context of the sentence, and because the author puts 
the picture in that position in the sentence with the intention of indicating to her reader that he should read the referent 
of the picture as linguistically represented in the sentence. Such cases of format-switching require some such 
metalinguistic interpretation of the symbols and recognition that they are being used in an unusual fashion, and that 
sort of factor is not available in an account of the format of perception. If the symbols in question were systematically 
concatenated without need for such interpretation, then they would fail to be in different formats (compare emergent 
languages such as “Spanglish”). 
19 In this chapter, I will not consider “maplike” format as something separate from iconic format (Burge and Block 
seem to use these terms interchangeably). I will address this issue in Chapter 3 and argue that maps are simply 
complexes of icons that represent a certain spatial terrain combined with discursive symbols that predicate features of 




2.4—Other aspects of iconic representation. There are other claims often made about iconic 
representations. Some claim that icons are isomorphic, in some deep sense, to what they represent 
(e.g., Kulvicki 2004), or relatedly, that they resemble what they represent. There is a clear sense in 
which this is true: if each part of an icon represents a part of the scene and distance relations among 
parts of the icon track distance relations among parts of the scene, then while there may not be a 
perfect one-one correspondence between icon-parts and scene-parts, there is surely some 
meaningful sense in which the structure of the scene is mirrored in the structure of the icon. This 
structure-preserving relation between icons and scenes may be the intuitive fact underlying 
isomorphism-based and resemblance-based accounts. Goodman (1976) argues, however, there is 
no reason to suppose icons must resemble their scenes in some more substantive sense, e.g., that 
the resemblance relation is symmetric or transitive (cf. Greenberg 2013).  
Shepard and Cooper (1982) describe iconic computations as exhibiting a second-order 
isomorphism with respect to the represented scene, since there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between stages in computational manipulations of icons and stages in the physical transformations 
described. The best example is mental rotation, which will be described in detail below; stages of 
mental rotation map onto stages of physical rotation so that there is a second-order isomorphism 
among images and what they represent. 
Another claim is that icons are analog, as opposed to digital, representations (Haugeland 
1998, 75–88, Dretske 1981, 135–141). The term ‘analog’ is used to mean different things (see 
                                                          
present purposes, it should be enough to note that maps satisfy Fodor’s (1987) minimal criteria for the language of 




Chapter 4, ICONIC REPRESENTATION). Sometimes it means that the representation is continuous, in 
the sense that there are no gaps between representational parts, and that this continuity 
corresponds to some continuity in the scene (Haugeland 1998, 82–83). Lewis (1971) argues, 
relatedly, that analog representations use magnitudes to represent magnitudes. This sense of 
‘analog’ is at work in Carey’s (2009, 118–135) discussion of the “analog magnitude system” for 
representing approximate cardinality. Analog representations in Lewis’s sense need not be 
continuous (and so need not be analog in Haugeland’s sense). Dretske uses ‘analog’ to describe a 
purported feature of perceptual representation according to which it always carries both nested 
information about abstract features (e.g., a perception of some determinate shade, e.g., red241, 
“nests,” and thus implicitly represents, red as well as simply color), as well as non-nested 
information (e.g., a perception cannot represent red without also representing some shape), while 
“digital” representations like thoughts carry no non-nested information except what is explicitly 
represented (Dretske 1981, 136ff). Kulvicki (2004), using Dretske as a jumping-off point, argues 
that the nesting of information in analog representations is sufficient for them to be isomorphic to 
what they represent.  
Dretske’s condition on analog representations carrying non-nested information arguably 
captures the fact that icons compose features holistically; if each part of an icon represents multiple 
properties at once, then representation of one feature will have to also represent another feature, 
and thus will necessarily carry non-nested information. Something very much like Dretske’s 





Briscoe (2016; see also Hopkins 1998) argues in favor of a resemblance-based account. 
According to Briscoe, a two-dimensional pictorial surface determines a virtual three-dimensional 
“model” that resembles a three-dimensional scene in virtue of triggering similar visual experiences. 
This account is harder to push into the mind and apply to mental icons, as Briscoe notes (2016, 
76–77). The usefulness of positing iconic representations in mental imagery (see the following 
section) therefore mandates formulation of a notion of iconicity that is less restrictive. 
Gabriel Greenberg (2013), who rejects resemblance-based accounts, has instead argued for 
a projection-based account of pictorial semantics, according to which the content of a picture is 
the set of possible scenes (which are, for Greenberg, worlds indexed to a perspective) that can be 
geometrically projected from the picture in accordance with some convention of projection. If a 
projection-based account is correct, then perhaps it is constitutive of icons that they are projectible 
to some set of possible scenes according to projection conventions—though as with Briscoe’s 
account, it’s unclear whether this account could transfer to mental representations, where notions 
of projection and convention may not apply. 
Despite their considerable interest, I won’t delve into these issues here (though I will discuss 
them again in Chapter 4, ICONIC REPRESENTATION). The defining features of iconic representations 
as articulated by Kosslyn, Carey, Fodor, and others, is that there is a correspondence relation 
between parts of the icon and parts of the scene, and that parts of the icon encode multiple 
properties at once—i.e., icons compose features holistically. This minimal sense of iconicity will be 
at issue in what follows. Perhaps perception lacks some of the more robust properties attributed to 




be made on those grounds. But the current project is to show that some perceptual representations 
are iconic in this minimal sense, and some are not. 
The best way to substantiate the claim that parts of icons correspond to parts of the scene 
and represent multiple features holistically is simply to show its explanatory usefulness. In the 
following section, I will survey multiple forms of evidence that support the thesis that perceptual 
systems output mental representations that are iconic in this sense. 
§3. Evidence for Perceptual Icons 
I’ll now argue that there is considerable non-demonstrative evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that at least some of the representations outputted by perceptual systems are iconic (i.e., are 
‘perceptual icons’, for short). It’s important to note at the outset that the empirical evidence 
mentioned below in favor of perceptual icons does not necessitate that all perceptual 
representation is iconic. Even such a staunch defender of iconic format in perception and 
perceptual imagery as Stephen Kosslyn still affirms that “there are two sorts of representations 
underlying images, one ‘perceptual’…and one discursive” (1980, 142), the latter constituting “a list 
of facts in a propositional format” (1980, 144). While the considerations below do suggest that 
some perceptual representations are iconic, they do not decide in favor of the anti-pluralist view 
that perception is wholly iconic. I will ultimately argue for perceptual pluralism, according to 
which perception outputs both iconic and discursive representations. 
3.1—Mental imagery. Arguably the strongest evidence in favor of iconic mental representations is 




raging since the early 1970s, with Kosslyn, Shepard, and others defending the iconic interpretation, 
and Pylyshyn, Dennett and others defending the discursive interpretation. Phenomena like mental 
rotation (e.g., Shepard and Metzler 1971) and image scanning (e.g., Kosslyn et al. 1978) seem to 
show that differences in processing speed are proportional to spatial differences in what is 
represented, suggesting that the processing involves manipulating or “scanning” iconic mental 
images with functional analogues of the spatial properties of the represented scene.  
In Finke and Pinker 1982, for example, subjects were shown a picture containing four dots; 
then the picture disappeared and was replaced by an arrow pointing in a specific direction, and 
subjects were asked whether the arrow was pointing at one of the previously presented dots. 
Reaction times increased proportionally to the degree of distance between the arrow and the dot. 
Furthermore, though subjects were not instructed to form mental images, when asked afterward 
how they completed the task, all but one of the twelve subjects reported using mental imagery. The 
iconic interpretation of this effect is that the subjects held an iconic perceptual representation in 
memory and imaginatively superimposed the arrow on it. The proportionality between distance 
and reaction time is explained by appeal to the functional–spatial structure of the icon itself. 
This explanation invokes iconic representations with parts that correspond to parts of the 
scene and that encode properties holistically. In order for subjects to systematically take longer 
when reporting on greater distances between the arrow and the dot, subjects must need to access 
intermediate location values one after another such that a greater number of intermediate location 




locations in the scene such that scanning over a longer distance requires scanning over more parts 
of the image.  
Moreover, parts of the representation not only correspond to parts of the scene, they also 
encode both the location and any shape present at that location. The functional relationship 
between the part of the representation that represents the arrow and the parts that represent each 
dot is explained by the fact that each of those parts also represents a certain location value, thus 
situating representation of shape within a larger functional–spatial array. Iconic explanations of 
image-scanning therefore invoke the holistic character of icons. 
The same is true of iconic explanations of mental rotation. In mental rotation cases, 
subjects see a pair of objects and have to determine whether they are different objects or the same 
object but merely rotated at different orientations. Successfully identifying a match takes longer if 
the degree of rotation is greater. This suggests that there is an operation of mental rotation that is 
functionally analogous to physically rotating an object, where transitioning from a representation 
of an object at rotation angle Am to representing it at angle An requires representing it at all or 
many of the angles between Am and An.  
On an iconic explanation the representations that are mentally rotated have a functional 
organization that recapitulates the spatial structure of the imaged objects, and must therefore have 
parts that correspond to spatial parts of those objects.  
Furthermore, parts of the image that represent parts of the object must also represent 
properties like shape, size, and orientation that are used to detect whether the object is the same. 




relative locations of parts of the object; if it could, then the shape could simply be recovered and 
matched to the other object without taking extra time corresponding to the degree of rotation. 
Iconic explanations of mental rotation therefore invoke the holistic character of icons as well. 
The mental imagery literature thus not only provides good evidence in favor of iconic 
representations, it also vindicates the notion of iconic representation used in this dissertation. 
Pylyshyn (2002; 2003) has objected strenuously to iconic interpretations of mental imagery, 
though even he admits that Kosslyn’s iconic model “can be taken as the received view in much of 
the field” (2002, 181). Pylyshyn often explains effects like these in terms of experimenter demand 
(i.e., subjects guessing that experimenters want them to take more time for longer distances, for 
example) or tacit propositional knowledge of what objects look like. I will not engage at length with 
his arguments here. However, like other discursive models of mental imagery, his explanations of 
these experiments are post hoc—first the effect is observed, then a proposed explanation is that 
subjects might have, e.g., simply drawn on tacit knowledge or guessed what experimenters were 
up to. But this sort of post hoc explanation is always possible in a scientific field in which the 
evidence dramatically underdetermines the underlying mechanisms, a methodological 
conundrum that can be observed in nearly every nook and cranny of cognitive science. It is 
important in these cases that proposed explanations cannot merely be cooked up in response to 
the evidence, but also that they predict new evidence in systematic ways. Iconic models of mental 
imagery drove results like Kosslyn’s and Finke and Pinker’s in the 1970s and 1980s, while 




presented. The fact that iconic models led the experimental research by making predictions that 
were consistently vindicated points in favor of those models over post hoc alternatives. 
The argument presently on offer is that there is good reason to think that visual images are 
iconic, and that if there is good reason to think visual images are iconic, then there is good reason 
to think that at least some representations in visual perception are iconic. This is perhaps a peculiar 
way of arguing, since it is often just assumed by proponents of the iconicity of mental imagery that 
representations in imagery are of a piece with representations in early perceptual processing, which 
are in turn assumed to be iconic. According to Block, this is assumed widely enough that the 
putative similarity of perception and imagery is often erroneously taken to be just what’s at issue 
in the imagery debates (1981, 9). Though it isn’t per se what’s at issue, some defenders of the 
iconicity of imagery build the recruitment of perceptual representations into their account of 
imagery as iconic. Kosslyn et al., for instance, stipulate that their use of the term ‘mental image’ is 
such that “a mental image occurs when a representation of the type created during the initial phases 
of perception is present but the stimulus is not actually being perceived; such representations 
preserve the perceptible properties of the stimulus and ultimately give rise to the subjective 
experience of perception” (2006, 4). Kosslyn is at times even stronger, writing, “All 
characterizations of imagery rest on its resemblance to perception” (1995, 267). It is thus built into 
prominent models of visual imagery that representations in the same format are delivered by early 
perceptual processes. 
The relatedness between perception and imagery is often cast in two ways: first, that 




phenomenologically related to conscious perception. Assuming mental imagery is iconic, we can 
identify two separate but connected arguments for the iconicity of (at least some) perception. 
Recruitment argument: 
(1) Mental imagery is iconic. 
(2) Mental imagery recruits representations from early perceptual systems. 
(C) Representations in early perceptual systems are probably iconic. 
Phenomenological argument: 
(1') Mental imagery is iconic. 
(2') The phenomenology of mental imagery reflects its iconicity.  
(3') Representations in imagery have the same type of phenomenology as some 
representations in perception (i.e., what it’s like to visualize a candy cane and what 
it’s like to see a candy cane are phenomenally similar). 
(C') Some representations in perception are probably iconic. 
Premises 1 and 1' were addressed earlier and will be assumed for the sake of argument. 
Premise 2 in the recruitment argument is an empirical hypothesis, based in part on neuroscientific 
evidence about which cortical areas are used in perception and imagery (Kosslyn et al. 2006, 
chapter 5). One simple justification is well known, viz., that vision and visual imagery compete for 
resources, in both cortical and psychofunctional terms (Pearson et al. 2015). When trying to 
visualize something, people often close their eyes or look up, effectively reducing salient input. One 
classic explanation of this is that the same psychological systems that underlie visual perception 




open and looking straight ahead) will suck up resources and thus hinder the production of visual 
mental images; once the eyes are closed or looking away from salient stimuli, visual resources are 
freed up to be used for imagery. If this simple explanation is correct, then since the same systems 
(viz., early visual systems) are used for vision and visual imagery, the types of representations used 
are probably the same. So, if visual images are iconic and visual imagery uses the same systems as 
early vision, then the outputs of early vision are probably iconic. 
Another example of the commonality between perceptual representations and mental 
images involves perceptual learning. Subjects who merely imagine relevant stimulus properties 
become better at discriminating those properties. Grzeczkowski et al. (2015) presented subjects 
with three vertical lines, and asked them to indicate whether the line in the middle was offset to 
the right or left (see Fig. 4). In one condition, the subjects trained by seeing a series of stimuli in 
which the middle line was not offset at all, and they were instructed to imagine the middle line as 
offset to the right upon hearing a 1000hz tone and to imagine it as offset to the left upon hearing a 
700hz tone. These subjects showed enhanced discrimination after this training despite the fact that 
it was merely imagined (see also Tartaglia et al. 2009). This experiment suggests a deep 
commonality between perceptual and imagistic representations, which is predicted and explained 
by the hypothesis that perceptual and imagistic representations are both couched in the same 
iconic format. 
 




middle line as offset to the right upon hearing a 1000hz tone, and to the left upon hearing a 
700hz tone. Afterwards, they showed improved performance on a task that involved judging 
whether the middle line was offset to the right or left. 
The phenomenological argument is trickier. Premise 3' of the phenomenological argument 
seems right, even undeniable, to many people. We often use perceptual terms to talk about 
imagery: we say we can “see her face now” when talking about visualizing the face of a relative, or 
that we can “taste it now” when talking about recalling a pleasant (or unpleasant) taste. Subjects 
tend to describe what they’re doing in classic imagery tasks in perceptual terms, even when 
otherwise unprompted to do so (e.g., Finke and Pinker 1982, 144). The obviousness of the 
perceptual character of the phenomenology of imagery has driven some theorists to characterize 
the imagery debate as just a debate about whether the perceptual phenomenology experienced in 
imagery tasks is “epiphenomenal” (Block 1981, 6–9; though Block points out the inaccuracy of this 
characterization).  
What is less clear is whether this commonality in phenomenology requires a commonality 
in representational format—i.e., whether premise 2' is true. One reason to think it is true is that 
the phenomenology in imagery tasks seems to track manipulations of the image in respect of its 
iconic features. Take a classic informal demonstration of mental imagery: How many windows 
were there in your childhood home? To many people, it doesn’t seem like they simply recall the 
fact that there were a certain number; rather, according to the iconic theorists, you call up a mental 




like that’s exactly what you’re doing.20 And while, according to the theory, you scan from one 
window to the next, the phenomenology changes accordingly. We need not suppose we have 
perfect privileged access to our mental imagery to recognize this (cf. Schwitzgebel 2002). It seems, 
subjectively, like the phenomenology tracks the iconicity of the representations in just the same 
ways that it shows up in behavior. So the key premises in the phenomenological argument seem to 
have some independent support. 
Many people report no perception-like imagery at all (Phillips 2014). This fact might be 
taken to undermine premises 2' and 3'. However, the phenomenological argument does not claim 
that phenomenology is responsible for iconicity or drives the relevant behavioral effects. Instead, 
the claim is that the phenomenology of imagery in typical subjects with conscious imagery both 
reflects its iconicity and is subjectively similar to perception, and that this face provides evidence 
that perception is iconic. Reports of no conscious perceptual imagery are rare, and people who 
report less vivid mental imagery still report perception-like imagery while also exhibiting the same 
behavioral effects on imagery-based tasks (McKelvie 1995). Furthermore, it is unclear whether 
non-conscious-imagers experience a distinct, non-iconic phenomenology as opposed to simply 
experiencing no imagery-based phenomenology at all. Only the former possibility, however, would 
seem to threaten the phenomenological argument (and even then, only for non-conscious-
imagers), since it is compatible with the claim that the phenomenology of imagery, when it is 
present, reflects the iconicity of imagery as well as its similarity to perception. 
                                                          
20 There is the wrinkle here that some people do not report having mental imagery. But the focus here is on those who 




Before moving on, it is worth addressing a puzzling aspect of the empirical evidence on 
these issues. One might think it’s odd to infer from the iconicity of imagery to the iconicity of 
perception since, as mentioned above, imagery theorists often cast the iconicity view in terms that 
assume early perceptual representation is iconic. That is, an argument for the iconicity of imagery 
implicit in some theories is that perception is iconic and imagery is like perception so, therefore, 
imagery is iconic. But the direct experimental evidence is arguably stronger and greater in volume 
for the iconicity of imagery than for the iconicity of perception. Why did the evidence turn out this 
way? One possible explanation is that representations in perception are not open to free 
manipulation by the subject in line with task demands—for perception, either the right stimulation 
occurs or it doesn’t. Since representations in mental imagery can be triggered in a relatively 
controlled way by subjects in the absence of stimuli, it is experimentally easier to hold the 
representation fixed and manipulate it in various ways to make its format surface in behavior. 
When you’re actually looking at your childhood home, you don’t scan a mental representation of 
it; you scan it.21 Thus it might not be so surprising that it turned out to be easier to directly 
behaviorally show iconicity in mental imagery than in perception. 
3.2—Iconic memory. One variety of short-term memory in vision is called “iconic memory” 
(Neisser 1967). The original motivation for positing iconic memory was the famous Sperling 
(1960) experiments, in which subjects are presented with (for instance) three rows containing three 
                                                          
21 The use of ‘scan’ here is loose—defenders of the iconicity of mental imagery need not posit a homunculus that looks 
at the mental image as though it were a literal picture. And when you visualize the face of a relative, the thing you’re 
most directly conscious of is typically the face, not the mental representation. But in the case of imagery tasks such as 
counting the windows, the representation is often an object of attention, whereas ordinary perception typically seems 
“transparent.” That’s arguably why counting the windows in imagery seems more like scanning a picture whereas 




letters each (see Fig. 5). When asked to report all nine letters, subjects can only provide a few of 
them. But when a row is cued after the brief presentation is gone (by an arrow pointing toward the 
middle row, for example, or a low tone indicating the bottom row), subjects can get all or nearly 
all the letters in that row, no matter which row is cued. There must be some stored representation 
that preserves most or all of the image and allows subjects to “read” letters off it despite 
outstripping what the subject can explicitly individuate at a time. This effect has often been taken 
to implicate an iconic visual representation stored in some visual memory system that, when cued, 
is available for conceptualization (e.g., Neisser 1967; Fodor 2007). 
 
Figure 5, Sperling’s (1960) partial report paradigm22 
Since icons don’t break down into separate symbols for each represented item, then an icon 
that represents a scene brings along for free an array of properties represented in that scene. Since 
parts of the icon correspond to parts of the scene and represent multiple properties simultaneously, 
there aren’t distinct symbols for each individual represented item separate from the holistic 
                                                          




binding of properties (including location). Introducing a greater number of items into the scene 
thus doesn’t require adding symbols; it just requires shifting around the properties that are 
represented at various locations in response to the properties of the new items. For this reason, 
icons can encode a large amount of information without greater cost. Thus the holistic character 
of icons can provide an explanation of iconic memory. 
Just as there is an iconic short-term memory system in vision (Sperling 1960; Coltheart 
1980; Irwin and Yeomans 1986; Becker et al. 2000; Bradley & Pearson 2012; Persuh et al. 2012), 
there are analogous iconic short-term memory systems in other modalities: “echoic” memory in 
audition (Neisser 1967; Darwin et al. 1972), tactile memory in tactition (Bliss et al. 1966), and 
possibly short-term olfactory memory (White 1998; cf. Stevenson & Boakes 2003). There are 
important differences between these systems, especially temporal capacity—e.g., visual iconic 
memory lasts for hundreds of milliseconds, and auditory echoic memory lasts for several seconds. 
But they are arguably alike in that they involve the storage of unconceptualized iconic 
representations. 
It is possible that these effects could be explained by massive parallel processing that 
delivers discursive representations into a very large memory store. This explanation is inelegant in 
that there is no independent reason to think that discursive representations can be stored in such 
high capacity, particularly given the fact that there is a very small item limit on discursive 
representations in visual and verbal working memory systems (e.g., Cowan 2001; note that this 
point does not require endorsing a “slot-based” over a “resource-based” model of working 




sharp difference between the storage capacities of iconic memory and later visual working 
memory, given the putative commonality in representational format.  
There is also independent reason to think that iconic memory stores perceptual icons. The 
sensory “informational persistence” (Coltheart 1980) that underlies iconic memory utilizes early, 
retinotopically mapped visual cortical areas of the brain (Duysens et al. 1985; Irwin & Thomas 
2008). These areas of the brain are also the loci of visual images (Pearson & Kosslyn 2015). This 
suggests that the format of representations stored in iconic memory is the same as the format of 
representations used in mental imagery, in which case we should conclude that iconic memory 
stores perceptual icons. 
Phillips (2011) aims to refute this last point. He argues against the idea that the format of 
representations stored in iconic memory are genuinely iconic by appeal to differences between 
iconic memory and visual imagery. He argues first that “subjects in Sperling’s task are not 
instructed to make, and do not consistently report making, use of visual imagery” (2011, 211). This 
argument is far from decisive given that the use of imagery does not entail reportability of such use 
(McKelvie 1995). Moreover, the storage and access of an iconic representation in online perception 
is not the same thing as the top-down formation of a mental image. Positing the same 
representational format in both cases does not require that the mechanisms by which the 
representations are formed, stored, and accessed are the same. The fact that these different 
processes utilize representations in the same format does not entail that subjects that can report 
on one process can report on the other, nor does it entail that hallmarks of one process should be 




This point undermines Phillips’ second and prima facie more substantive argument. This 
second argument relies on a study by Brockmole et al. (2002). Brockmole et al. presented subjects 
with a grid of squares wherein nearly half of the squares were filled in with dots; after a blank 
screen, subjects were then presented with another grid with different squares filled in, such that 
there is a single square that is not filled with a dot in either the first or second grid. The task is to 
identify this square. Participants are good at the task when there is no gap in time between the two 
grids (i.e., they are accurate on 79% of trials), but there is a significant decrease in accuracy with a 
100ms gap (21% accuracy). At longer durations, however, accuracy jumped back up (roughly 
between 60% and 70% accuracy). Moreover, the jump in accuracy stabilizes after 1.5 seconds, 
which corresponds to the amount of time it takes to generate a mental image (Kosslyn 1980). 
Phillips argues that, if iconic representations were stored in iconic memory, than we should expect 
a similar time-course for iconic memory; however, iconic memory exhibits the opposite time-
course, since partial-report superiority obtains well under a second and fails above a second. Thus, 
he concludes, “the imagistic account is not viable” (Phillips 2011, 212). 
This argument assumes that, on iconic models of iconic memory, the mechanisms 
underlying the generation of an icon in online visual perception and those underlying the 
generation of a visual image must be the same. This assumption is unwarranted. The generation 
of a visual image is typically a voluntary, top-down process. According to standard iconic models 
of mental imagery (e.g., Kosslyn 1980; 1994; Kosslyn et al. 2006), the generation of a mental image 
requires the prior access of discursive information that is used to voluntarily construct a mental 




icon in online visual perception, however, is not top-down and need not access stored discursive 
information. Iconic explanations of Sperling-type effects thus do not make the predictions about 
time-course that Phillips ascribes to them. 
One might still wonder why performance on the Brockmole et al. experiment improves 
after a second while performance on the Sperling experiment has tanked by that point. The view 
defended here indeed requires that both experiments involve the use of iconic representations. 
Nonetheless the tasks impose quite different demands. The icon in the Sperling case just needs to 
be attended such that a subset of its information can be transformed into reportable conceptual 
states. In the Brockmole et al. case iconic memory has been masked and thus wiped clean by the 
presentation of the second grid (which explains the drop in accuracy at 100ms). Subjects must then 
engage in top-down generation of a mental image, which takes over a second. Indeed, Lewis et al. 
(2011) replicated Brockmole et al.’s finding while explicitly instructing subjects to form mental 
images. This effect strongly suggests that the time-course of the Brockmole et al. task is due to the 
top-down formation of a mental image, and is therefore irrelevant to the question of what formats 
are deployed in online visual perception and stored in iconic memory. 
This line of response to Phillips highlights one of the core architectural principles of this 
dissertation: Whether two processes are type-distinct and whether two representations are type-
distinct are separate questions. A concept can be deployed in cognition and, I’ll argue, can be 
deployed in perception. Nonetheless, perception and cognition run distinct types of processes. 
Similarly, an iconic representation can be deployed under top-down cognitive control in mental 




be generated within 50ms. The format of a representation cannot necessarily be read off the process 
in which it is deployed. 
It is worth reiterating that these arguments for perceptual icons are not intended to be 
decisive or deductively valid. The argument is simply that these effects are best explained by 
positing perceptual icons. Laurence and Margolis (2012) argue that it is a “conceptualization 
fallacy” (304) to infer from the fact that (e.g.) the letters have to be conceptualized to get their 
identities that they were not already conceptualized (as shapes, perhaps) prior to the 
conceptualization of their identities. But the argument is not that it is impossible that the letters are 
already conceptualized; that would indeed be a fallacious inference. The argument is that the stored 
representations exhibit a very high capacity and persist when not conceptualized for report, and 
that these properties are best explained by positing an iconic format. And moreover, the mere 
possibility that the letters are conceptualized in iconic memory is uninteresting, given the lack of 
positive evidence for that conjecture. The appeal to perceptual icons might not turn out to be the 
best explanation after all, but Laurence and Margolis only raise the in-principle possibility that the 
explanation is false, which does not suffice to render such abductive arguments fallacious. 
3.3—Ensemble perception. People can only explicitly individuate about four individual objects at 
once (Pylyshyn 2003; object perception will be discussed at length below). Nonetheless, there is 
evidence that we extract statistical regularities in scenes by computing over many more than four 
objects. This capacity is known as ensemble perception.  
In a pioneering study, Ariely (2001) showed subjects as many as 16 circles of varying 




was identical to one of the 16 just seen. Subjects were more likely to answer “yes” the closer the 
diameter of the probe was to the mean diameter of the set (independently of whether the probe 
actually was a member of the set). This result requires subjects to implicitly encode the average 
diameter of the set of circles even though they do not seem to encode each individual circle as such. 
Furthermore, subjects were also above chance when asked explicitly whether a probe was greater 
or smaller in diameter than the average of the set. 
Similarly to iconic memory, ensemble perception effects like this suggests that subjects 
represent an array of items without deploying a discursive representation for each individual item 
that can be stored and used for report. If subjects deployed discursive representations for each 
individual item, then they should succeed at identifying an object as a member of the set. But Ariely 
found that “observers were unable to distinguish test spots that were in the set from those that were 
not” (2001, 159). Remarkably, this was found even when the set contained only four circles. 
This sort of ensemble coding has also been found for color, location, and even facial 
emotions as well as many other properties (see Haberman & Whitney 2012 for an overview). 
Ensemble perception can be explained by supposing that perceptual icons function as 
inputs to a process that extracts statistical averages. This explanation in terms of iconic inputs to 
ensemble coding can explain why subjects lack information about whether an individual item was 
a member of the presented set—the items were encoded iconically and were not segmented out 





3.4—Spatial representation. Another family of arguments for the iconicity of visual representation 
concerns the way in which spatial properties are visually represented. Burge has recently argued 
for the iconicity of vision by appeal to spatial perception. “Visual perception,” he writes, “occurs 
in an ego-centrically anchored, spatial coordinate system” (Burge 2014b, 488). 
The format of visual representation takes on some of the geometry of the mapping 
of light on the retina. Representation via ego-centrically anchored spatial 
coordinate systems owes much to the spatial layout of light registration by retinal 
receptors. Some of this layout of pre-perceptual registration of retinal information 
is preserved and co-opted by the perception-formation process. Of course, both the 
pre-perceptual sensory layout and perceptual content with 3-dimensional 
significance derive from mapping the projected spatial structure of the 
environment. The sensory layout is given 3-dimensional spatial content in the 
format of an ego-centrically anchored spatial coordinate system, at stages of 
computation beyond retinal registration. This format informs nearly all perceptual 
representation. 
[Burge 2014b, 494] 
The argument is somewhat obscure. It seems that Burge takes the particular way in which 
the visual system processes spatial information to involve a kind of “mapping,” which results in a 
visual representation whose parts represent spatial parts of the represented scene. Here is a 
reconstruction of the argument: 
Burge’s spatial argument: 
(1*) The geometrical structure of retinal activation registers spatial information via an 
iconic format. 
(2*) The visual system constructs representations of the scene that preserve the geometrical 
structure of retinal activation. 




Premise 1* can be assumed—characterization of retinal activation as an “image” is 
ubiquitous in psychology and neuroscience. It is less clear what grounds 2*. According to Burge, 
visual perception represents by way of egocentric 3D spatial coordinates. The format of these 
perceptual spatial coordinates is determined in some significant way by the geometrical structure 
of the retina. Thus, since the structure of retinal activation is iconic and visual spatial 
representation “preserves and co-opts” the structure of retinal activation, visual spatial 
representation is iconic. 
The idea seems to be that there is a mapping from the geometrical properties of the scene 
to the retina via reflection of light, resulting in an iconic retinal image, and there is a second, similar 
mapping from the geometrical properties of the retinal image to a spatial coordinate system deeper 
in the visual system. This spatial coordinate system could, for instance, instantiate the “scenario 
content” described by Peacocke (1992). It seems that what is doing the work in showing visual 
spatial perception to be iconic is not the relation to the retina, but rather the assumption that such 
perception is carried out via such a coordinate system. After all, one could imagine a system that 
goes straight from retinal activation to discursive conceptual representation of each portion of the 
visual field, such that the resulting representation “owes much to the spatial layout of light 
registration by retinal receptors” but is not iconic—indeed, this is presumably how conceptualist 
anti-pluralists (e.g., Mandik 2012) think space is perceptually represented. So there must be some 





One independent reason concerns the structural features of early perceptual cortical areas, 
to which I turn now. 
3.5—Topographical mapping. The idea that early perceptual representations represent via syntactic 
analogues of spatial coordinates is consistent with a neural phenomenon detailed in any 
undergraduate vision science textbook, viz., topographical mapping. ‘Topographical mapping’ or 
‘retinotopic mapping’ are terms used to describe the fact that the geometrical structure of the retina 
and hence of the scene is recapitulated in the geometrical structure of the primary visual cortex 
(see Fig. 6). Frisby and Stone, for instance, write that “adjacent regions of cortex deal with adjacent 
regions of the scene” (2010, 7). This cortical topographical mapping “preserves the neighborhood 






Figure 6, Retinotopic mapping in V123 
The retinotopic topographical mapping in V1 is of particular interest here because it seems 
to be a case where the iconic format of perception emerges directly from neural structures. V1 
looks like it subserves perceptual icons. Kosslyn writes that “neurons in the cortical area are 
organized to preserve the structure (roughly) of the retina. These areas represent information 
depictively in the most literal sense; there is no need to talk about an abstract functional space akin 
to that defined by an array in a computer” (1994, 13). Finding iconicity in neural structure does 
not entail that the structure subserves iconic mental representation (Pylyshyn 2003, 394ff), but it 
might provide some evidence. Indeed, given that columns of cells function to detect edges at 
various orientations and are organized into hypercolumns that correspond to particular locations 
on the retina, it is plausible that V1 subserves iconic representations that holistically bind edges 
                                                          




and contours to perceived locations (and similarly for other early visual cortical areas that 
represent other features via retinotopic mapping). 
Though topographical mapping seems to bolster Burge’s claim about the retinotopic 
character of visual perception, the claim is not a neurophysiological one, but a psychofunctional 
one. As Kosslyn put it, “there need be no actual picture in the brain to have a depiction: all that is 
needed is a functional space in which distance can be defined vis-a-vis the interpretation of the 
information” (1995, 282). If some visual perception represents via a spatial coordinate system, and 
that coordinate system is determined by a geometrical projection from the retinal image (and so is 
indirectly determined by a geometrical projection from the represented scene), then that gives us 
good psychofunctional reason to suppose that at least some spatial visual representation is iconic. 
The fact that iconic memory (Irwin & Thomas 2008) and mental imagery (Pearson & Kosslyn 
2015) seem to be realized in retinotopically mapped visual cortex provides independent 
verification for this claim. Thus neuroscience, perceptual psychology, and philosophy of 
perception conspire in suggesting the iconicity of early visual spatial representation. 
Clark (2009) argues against an iconic interpretation of topographical mapping. One of his 
key points is that V1 (for example) does not literally satisfy Kosslyn’s claim that distance relations 
between parts of early visual representations map onto distance relations in the scene: “If you move 
half a millimeter in one direction, you might not change the receptive field at all, but instead move 
to a region receiving input from that same receptive field, but from the other eye.” (2009, 294). But 
the claim is not that the spatial structure of V1 perfectly satisfies the conditions on iconicity; one 




structure of V1 enables realization of a functionally individuated mental representation that 
satisfies those conditions. The fact that columns of cells correspond to edge-orientations at 
particular locations, and that there are distance relations among columns that track distance 
relations on the retina, allows V1 to be exploited at the functional level in subserving perceptual 
icons. Asserting that V1 instantiates icons does not require that every aspect of the spatial structure 
of V1 reflect the icons it instantiates. This point is merely an instance of the autonomy of 
psychofunctional explanation from neuroscience, and does not undermine the evidential status of 
topographical mapping for perceptual icons. 
3.6—Richness and fineness of grain. Philosophers often talk of perceptual content as being richer 
or more fine-grained in information than what is conceptualized at any given time (e.g., Dretske 
1981, Evans 1982, Peacocke 1992, 2001, Tye 1995, 2006). One gets this impression easily in a busy 
environment, such as a city street. The intuition these philosophers exploit is that, in such an 
environment, there are many more properties visually represented than we can carve up 
conceptually in a moment, and in much finer detail. As mentioned in the discussion of iconic 
memory, since iconic representations need not segment the perceptual field and construct 
individual representations for each represented item, they easily convey a large amount of 
information to consuming processes, including quite specific information about, e.g., colors and 
shapes. Moreover, the representational apparatus exploited by icons need not be constrained by 
the discursive concepts deployable in a given creature’s mind, in which case perceptual icons might 




perception does exhibit richness and fineness of content, this aspect of perception would be 
explained by positing perceptual icons. 
3.7—Perception–cognition border and top-down effects. Larger theoretical concerns might also 
drive one to assume perception is iconic. For one thing, if perception is iconic and cognition is 
discursive, those facts may suffice for there being a natural division between perceptual systems 
and cognitive systems, even if there is systematic cross talk between perception and cognition. 
Block (ms), for instance, argues both that cognitive penetration is rampant and that there is a joint 
in nature between perception and cognition. For Block, this joint in nature is largely due to the fact 
that perception is iconic and cognition is discursive. 
Furthermore, if you are committed to the existence of a rigid functional border between 
perception and cognition (and thus deny that perception can access information stored in 
cognition), then you will likely be inclined to posit differences in the kinds of processing that occur 
in those two kinds of systems. If System A is encapsulated from System B, then it is possible that A 
and B run exactly the same types of processes and differ only in that A cannot access B’s 
information. Nonetheless, it is implausible that two systems that are encapsulated from one 
another would be otherwise exactly alike. Thus if one assumes that perception is encapsulated from 
cognition then one should increase one’s credence in other differences, especially differences in 
the types of processes implemented in the two systems. Moreover, differences in processes 
implemented in the two systems could partially explain why a system that implements process P 
cannot use information stored in a system that is unable to implement P. And differences in format 




If two systems process representations in different formats, then there will be differences 
in the nature of the processing itself. Computational processes operate on the syntactic structures 
of the representations that figure in them, and different formats are different types of syntactic 
structures. The format of representations operated on in a given system will therefore determine 
to some significant extent how processing in that system proceeds, and thus how it can be affected 
by other systems. If the format of perceptual representation is iconic and the format of cognitive 
representation is discursive, then there will be significant differences in the kinds of processing 
that occur in perception and cognition.  
Furthermore, this difference in format would make interaction in processing across the two 
systems harder to achieve (though not impossible). If perception and cognition differ in format, 
and so the computations performed by the two systems differ in fundamental ways, we should be 
a priori disinclined to expect effects of cognition on perception. For example, if processes in 
perception exclusively operate on icons, then a discursive cognitive representation cannot be 
accessed by a perceptual process. Top-down effects of discursive cognitive representations on 
perceptual processing would thus require some mediating mechanism that takes discursive 
cognitive representations as inputs and either (a) produces perceptual icons as outputs (which are 
then accessed directly in perceptual processing), (b) alters the contents of already existing 
perceptual icons (either outputs or intramodular states) without otherwise figuring in online 
perceptual processing, or (c) alters the rules according to which icons are processed in perception, 
again without otherwise figuring in perceptual processing. If representations in perception and 




simply figure directly in perceptual processing without needing a mediating mechanism to 
perform any of (a)–(c). 
To understand the relation between the format of representations in a given system and 
how those representations are processed in that system, it will be useful to dwell momentarily on 
how processing rules are built into psychological systems.24 In central cognition, there are arguably 
inferential rules built into the architecture pertaining to the constituent structure of propositional 
thoughts. For example, thinking APPLES ARE RED and IF X IS RED THEN X IS COLORED will lead, 
automatically and without the mediation of any mechanism at the intentional psychological level, 
to the thought APPLES ARE COLORED. A modus ponens rule, If P and IF P THEN Q then Q, is plausibly 
built into the architecture of central cognition: that is, central cognition is organized such that when 
representations of a certain type (e.g., having a certain constituent structure) are tokened in the 
system, then, all else equal, representations of another certain type will be tokened in the system. 
The ceteris paribus clause abstracts away from performance errors and other external interventions 
on the system. The modus ponens rule in central cognition is an inferential rule in that it pertains 
solely to the constituent structure of propositional thoughts (Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 
unpublished b).  
Since icons lack constituent structure, transitions between icons in perceptual systems 
cannot be governed by inferential rules. Assuming that such transitions are nonetheless rule-
governed, there must be noninferential rules built into the architecture of these systems, such as 
rules that pertain to the contents of the icons (e.g., for some 2D shapes a* and b* and 3D shape c* 
                                                          




a rule of the form, If a* and b*, then c*, might be used in stereoscopic depth computations). These 
implicit processing rules specify features of iconic representations. Discursive representations 
cannot, therefore, satisfy their antecedents. That might be too quick—it is possible that perceptual 
systems are constructed with disjunctive rules that take either iconic or discursive representations 
as inputs, of the form If D or e*, then f*. In that case, either tokening the concept D or forming the 
iconic perceptual representation e* would cause the perceptual system to transition to f*. But in 
the absence of an independent reason to suppose such rules are built into the perceptual 
architecture, this stipulation seems unmotivated. 
One kind of route for concepts to alter perceptual processing would be via some 
mechanism that takes concepts as inputs and delivers icons as outputs, such as in possibility (a) 
above. Macpherson (2012) makes a proposal along these lines, arguing that the mediating 
mechanism is perceptual imagination. Thinking CAUCASIAN upon seeing an apparently Caucasian 
face might cause the formation of an iconic visual image of a lighter color, which is then accessed 
by perceptual processing, yielding a perceptual representation of a face that’s lighter than the actual 
stimulus (as is argued to be the case by Levin and Banaji 2006—see Firestone and Scholl 2015 for 
a rebuttal). Alternatively, the discursive representation could modulate the icons already operated 
on in the perceptual system without creating a new icon, in line with possibility (b). 
Another kind of route would be not to alter the representations being processed, but to 
alter the processing rules themselves, as in (c) above. For example, believing that people with 
narrow nose bridges tend to have lighter skin might alter the visual system such that when icons 




will tend to represent lighter colors, and this transition is not mediated by any token conceptual 
states. In this case, for some shape g* and color h*, background knowledge has built rules of the 
form, If g*, then h*, into the architecture of the visual system. There must be some mechanism in 
this case that maps discursive thoughts to perceptual processing rules. It’s unclear what this 
mechanism might be—though perhaps, if certain radical Bayesian theories are true (Clark 2013; 
Hohwy 2013; Lupyan 2015), priors stored in cognition could determine processing in perception 
in this sort of way.  
The main moral of this discussion has been that a difference in format between perceptual 
and cognitive systems makes it the case that effects on the former by the latter should be expected 
to involve an additional mechanism of some sort, whereas a commonality of format doesn’t suggest 
that top-down effects should be mediated by such a mechanism. The difference in format therefore 
supplies a surmountable but nontrivial barrier to effects across psychological systems. Settling this 
issue is, of course, an empirical matter. It might turn out that there is some mechanism that 
accomplishes any or all of (a)–(c); and it might turn out that perception and cognition are alike in 
format but perception is nonetheless totally encapsulated. The above discussion simply suggests 
that theorists who accept a rigid perception–cognition border and deny significant “top-down” 
effects of cognition on perception will, all else equal, be sympathetic to the claim that perception 
is wholly iconic while cognition is discursive.25 
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the representations accessed in delivering those outputs may in principle be in any format. In that case, there are no 
restrictions on the way in which discursive representations can be accessed by perceptual processing. It would be a 
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On a perceptual pluralist view, if all perceptual processes are encapsulated, then 
encapsulation cannot be due entirely to perceptual icons. Nonetheless, perhaps the encapsulation 
of the early perceptual processes that output perceptual icons can be explained in terms of 
representational format. This explanation will be especially plausible if early perceptual systems 
are encapsulated to a greater degree than later ones, or if they are diachronically as well as 
synchronically encapsulated (whereas later systems might be synchronically but not diachronically 
encapsulated). 
3.8—Summing up. Taking all of these considerations together, there is good (tentative, abductive) 
reason to suppose that there are perceptual icons. But as we will see below, not all representations 
delivered by perceptual systems are iconic. 
§4. Perceptual Object Representations 
There are several good candidates for discursive format in perception, some of which will be 
discussed toward the end of this chapter. But the bulk of my case will rest on object perception.  
4.1—Object perception. Object recognition in high-level vision—e.g., recognizing something as a 
duck, or as your cousin, or as a cup—seems to be a species of cognition, and so involves the 
deployment of concepts. There is a more basic form of object perception, however, which occurs 
in mid-level visual processing. Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (1992) showed the existence of an 
“object-specific preview benefit” (OSPB). In this object-reviewing paradigm, subjects are presented 
with two objects (e.g., circles) in which features are previewed (e.g., letters—see Fig. 7). The features 




objects and subjects answer whether it is one of the previewed features or not.26 It doesn’t matter 
for the task which object the feature was originally previewed in. If, however, it is the same feature 
that was previewed in that particular object originally, subjects are quicker at identifying a match.  
For example, in Figure 7, subjects would be quicker to recognize the ‘T’ as a match if it were 
presented in the same object in both the preview and target displays. This is true even though the 
objects are qualitatively identical (thus the effect is not feature based) and move locations after 
previewing (thus the effect is not location based). The effect is genuinely object based, hence the 
name OSPB. Kahneman et al. posited the existence of “object files” to explain the OSPB (as well as 
other aspects of object-based attention—see Kahneman and Treisman 1984). Object files are 
representations of particular objects that do not represent objects via any particular feature, but 
rather cluster features depending on whether they are instantiated in the same object. 
 
Figure 7—An object-reviewing paradigm (adapted from Mitroff et al. 2005) 
Object files are linked to the “visual indexes” or “FINSTs” studied by Pylyshyn, Scholl, and 
others. While the notion of object files arose from studying the sometimes surprising ways features 
are clustered together in mid-level vision, the notion of visual indexes came from studying the 
                                                          
26 Kahneman et al.’s (1992) original paradigm ask subjects just to name the letter rather than report a match, but since 
that version of the task doesn’t actually require subjects to see the preview to perform accurately, the paradigm has 




equally surprising ways objects are tracked across space and time, unearthed in a fascinating series 
of studies regarding multiple-object tracking (MOT). In the classic MOT paradigm, participants 
foveate on a fixation cross while roughly eight objects (e.g., squares) populate the rest of the 
stimulus (Pylyshyn & Storm 1988). Some small number (e.g., four) of the objects will flash, 
indicating that they are to be tracked, while the rest are to be ignored. Participants are remarkably 
good at tracking three or four objects, even when the objects are qualitatively identical and intersect 
each other’s paths and even when they are occluded by hidden barriers. Participants cannot even 
report the spatiotemporal criteria used to individuate and track objects—though, interestingly, if 
the motion ceases and an object disappears, subjects can say where it was and what direction it was 
headed in (Scholl et al. 1999), suggesting that “participants have conscious access to a spatio-
temporal address of a currently attended object, though not always to other features of the indexed 
object” (Carey 2009, 75). 
It is plausible that visual indexes and object files involve the same underlying capacity. 
Object files need spatiotemporal addresses of objects to maintain identity over time and across 
changes, which would be supplied by a visual index. Moreover, the OSPB is boosted under 
conditions of MOT (Haladjian & Pylyshyn 2008), which strongly substantiates the claim that visual 
indexes and object files are linked. 
In order to avoid confusion, I will refer to perceptual object representations (PORs). PORs 
are representations of object that select individuals through the deployment of a visual index and 




The mere existence of PORs places pressure on a wholly iconic model of perception. Recall 
that pure cases of iconic representation do not have a canonical decomposition into constituents. 
But PORs require a segmentation of the percept into constituent PORs, and thus rule out a naïve 
view of perception on which the visual system delivers a single pure, unsegmented icon.  
This naïve view is obviously implausible, however, since other forms of segmentation like 
figure-ground segregation or other forms of perceptual grouping are incompatible with it as well. 
It would be uncharitable, therefore, to saddle anti-pluralists with this view. Instead, anti-pluralists 
can allow that the visual system segments the visual field, but still require that every output of 
perceptual segmentation processes is an icon. Carey (2009) seems to endorse a view like this about 
PORs (see Fig. 8). 
 
Figure 8—Carey’s (2009) table distinguishing discursive and iconic models of PORs. 
Carey points to a study (Feigenson, Carey, & Spelke 2002) in which infants were shown 
crackers of varying sizes deposited into different buckets and crawled toward the one with more 
total cracker, even if it was spread out over fewer crackers (e.g., one large cracker over two small 
crackers). The results “reveal the set-size signature of object-file representations” (Carey 2009, 




unpublished). However, the data shows merely that infants sum over surface area as represented 
in PORs. Surface area could be represented and summed over whether encoded in an iconic or 
discursive format; it’s not clear how the ability to sum over surface area bears on the format in 
which surface area is represented. Perhaps an iconic explanation is preferable all else equal because 
icons can more easily encode continuous variables like surface area. This argument is quite 
tentative, however, as Carey readily concedes (2009, 147). 
There is a wealth of data that does shed light directly on the format of PORs. It strongly 
suggests that PORs are not icons. 
4.2—Visual indexes. PORs incorporate an index-like representation of individual objects. The 
evidence for this hypothesis is that MOT works despite dramatic changes in features. For example, 
Zhou et al. (2010) found that changing color, luminous flux, and various shape properties did not 
disrupt MOT. Bahrami (2003) introduced a change detection task, where objects in an MOT 
paradigm moved around and became occluded by a “mud splash”—after the splash, either no 
objects changed or a single object changed its shape or color. Subjects often failed to register 
changes despite successfully tracking the objects, though detection of changes were better for 
tracked objects than untracked objects (see also Scholl et al. 1999). 
All this evidence demonstrates that, while features are bound to objects in MOT, the 
binding is not holistic. The representation of the object can persist even though features are 
changing or lost entirely. For it to be possible to lose a feature while maintaining a representation 




representation of the object. This precludes holistic binding and instead requires a distinct 
constituent that stands for individual objects apart from various features. Thus PORs are not icons. 
None of the foregoing argument requires that indexes are genuine mental analogues of bare 
demonstratives. Pylyshyn (2007) does hold that view, and it is indeed incompatible with an iconic 
model of PORs. But what matters is only that the binding between indexes and feature 
representations is not holistic. The data call for a representation of an object that comes apart from 
representations of color, luminosity, and various shape properties. This alone is sufficient to reject 
the view that a POR is an icon. An icon that encodes the color, shape, and location of an object 
does so holistically, and PORs lack this sort of holistic binding. This is true even if the indexical 
components of PORs always encode certain properties (e.g., location, trajectory, and even 
topological shape [Zhou et al. 2010]).  
4.3—Abstract features. The fact that the indexical components of PORs are not iconic may be 
compatible with features’ being encoded via an icon. The evidence tells against this view as well. 
Before looking at the evidence, however, note an a priori problem. This hybrid view holds that the 
indexical components of PORs are not iconic, and that featural components are; thus PORs 
comprise multiple formats at once. But how? If these representations are in genuinely distinct 
formats, how do they compose with one another? As mentioned above, different formats are akin 
to different languages, and should not ordinarily compose without some third language 
interpreting their relation to one another. The hybrid view therefore faces a serious a priori 




This a priori point is not necessary to defeat the hybrid view, however. The object-
reviewing paradigm can be used to determine how features are stored in PORs, which in turn can 
shed light on representational format. A series of experiments have showed abstract properties to 
be explicitly represented in PORs. Henderson (1994) found an OSPB for letters previewed in 
objects even when the letters differed in case from preview to test displays. Gordon & Irwin (1996) 
used entire words, e.g., the word ‘bread’ in all lower case appeared in the preview display and 
‘BREAD’ in capitals was used in the test display. Given that there are no letterforms in common 
from ‘bread’ to ‘BREAD’, the identity of the word must be stored in a format that abstracts away 
from shape properties.  
If features were represented iconically in PORs, then they should be bound together 
holistically. In that case, a POR should represent high-level properties like the semantic identities 
of words in a way that is bound up with representations of low-level properties—one should not 
find a high-level property represented independently of low-level properties. Tyler Burge, for 
example, who as aforementioned holds that perception is iconic, writes regarding face perception 
that “higher-level facial attributives never float free from low-level geometrical attributions” 
(2014a, 578). These object-reviewing results nonetheless show non-holistic encoding of high-level 
properties that float free from low-level properties. 
Burge (2014a) appeals to a distinction between specific and generic low-level properties 
that ground perceptual attribution of high-level properties. For example, there might be a generic 




banana. One might therefore object that the studies just cited only show high-level properties 
floating free from specific low-level features, not generic low-level features.  
A later study by Gordon & Irwin (2000) found the OSPB even when preview stimuli were 
words and test stimuli were corresponding pictures. For example, the previewed features might be 
the words ‘apple’ and ‘bread’ and the test stimulus would be a match if it were a picture of either 
an apple or a loaf of bread (see Fig. 9). Gordon & Irwin found that response times were quicker if 
the picture of the apple occurred in the same object in which ‘apple’ was previewed. There are no 
low-level features in common between the word ‘apple’ and a picture of an apple—not even highly 
generic low-level features. The POR needs to store a representation of the kind apple in a way that 
completely abstracts away from generic as well as specific low-level features. This capacity would 
be explicable if what’s being stored is a distinct symbol that has the content <apple> and is bound 
to other features of the object in a separable, non-holistic fashion. That is, the capacity is explicable 
if the feature is encoded in a discursive rather than iconic format. 
 
Figure 9—Illustration of Gordon & Irwin 2000 
If discursive representations of categories are bound into PORs non-holistically, then we 
should expect kind representations bound into PORs in one modality to be accessible by another 




features, after which objects would move to either side of the screen. Subjects then heard a sound 
come from one side and had to indicate whether the sound matched either of the previewed 
pictures. For example, suppose the previewed pictures were a telephone (in object 1) and a cat (in 
object 2), and 1 and 2 then move to the left and right, respectively. Hearing either a telephone ring 
or a meow from either side would be a match, but hearing a dog bark from either side would not. 
Jordan et al. found a OSPB in that subjects were quicker to correctly identify a match if it was heard 
coming from the same side as the object that had previewed the corresponding feature. To 
continue the example trial just mentioned, subjects would be faster if they heard a meow coming 
from the right than if it came from the left, since object 2 was previewed with a picture of a cat and 
moved to the right. The effect is not due to rehearsing lexical representations in verbal working 
memory, since subjects engaged in articulatory suppression (they repeated the words in their head 
during the study), thus loading verbal working memory. 
This result vindicates the idea that discursive symbols that stand for categories and abstract 
away from low-level modality-specific bundles of features are stored in PORs. The authors draw 
this very conclusion, hypothesizing that PORs “store object-related information in an amodal 
format that can be flexibly accessed across senses” (2010, 500).  
These results show that the thesis that PORs encode features in an iconic format is 
empirically untenable.  
4.4—Low-level features. As a last retreat, one might admit that indexes and abstract categories are 
represented discursively in PORs but hold on to the idea that low-level features are represented 




symbols are deployed by the visual system alongside icons and therefore seems to be a version of 
perceptual pluralism. The desperate anti-pluralist could still insist that this view preserves the 
claim that every output of the visual system is at least partly iconic.  
Unfortunately, even this view is not consistent with the evidence. If low-level features are 
represented in an icon in each POR, then low-level features are bound holistically and thus should 
not come apart from one another. As mentioned above, Bahrami (2003) found that subjects often 
failed to store information about the shape and color of tracked objects in an MOT paradigm 
(though not as often as they failed to store features of untracked objects). Bahrami also found 
differences in when shape and color were lost; for example, there was no difference observed in 
whether shape was stored in tracked objects between conditions with a mud splash occlusion and 
conditions without one, whereas there was a significant difference for color. Thus there were trials 
were shape was preserved and color lost in a POR. 
Green and Quilty-Dunn (unpublished) argue that low-level features are not encoded 
iconically in PORs on the basis of independent feature loss in object representations in visual 
working memory. Their key example is an experiment by Fougnie and Alvarez (2011). Fougnie 
and Alvarez showed subjects an array of colored triangles at various orientations, then took them 
away long enough to ensure that they were stored in visual working memory; subjects then had to 
use a color wheel to change a probe item to the same color as the triangle in that location, and use 
an orientation wheel to make a probe item point in the same direction as the triangle in that 
location (see Fig. 10—the order of color and orientation responses was varied). Fougnie and 




and vice versa. Green and Quilty-Dunn argue that PORs are stored in visual working memory and 
therefore that this result shows non-holistic feature binding, and thus non-iconic format, in low-
level feature representations bound into PORs. 
 
Figure 10—Independent feature failure in object representations in visual working memory 
(from Fougnie & Alvarez 2011) 
There is no compelling positive evidence for iconic format in PORs, and a plethora of 
compelling evidence against iconic format in PORs. Combined with the arguments in favor of 
perceptual icons in the previous section, there is good reason to think that the visual system outputs 
both iconic and discursive representations. In other words, perceptual pluralism is true. 
§5. Objections and Replies 
I now turn to possible objections to the arguments in the preceding section. 
5.1—PORs are not really perceptual. Perhaps the most tempting immediate response is to reject the 




system. In that case, the moniker ‘POR’ is a misnomer; thus for the rest of this subsection I will 
instead use the neutral term ‘object file’.27 
Block (unpublished) pursues this strategy. According to Block, the outputs of perception 
are iconic while object files are post-perceptual representations that are proprietary to working 
memory. Block does not explicitly concede that the arguments from Quilty-Dunn (2016) and 
Green and Quilty-Dunn (unpublished) establish that object files are discursive, but his main line 
of response is to insist that object files are post-perceptual rather than that they are iconic.  
There is no positive evidence that object files are post-perceptual, however, and there is 
substantial reason to think that they are genuinely perceptual. Since Quilty-Dunn (2016) and 
Green and Quilty-Dunn (unpublished) simply assume that object files are perceptual without 
extensive argument, I will address this question here. 
The view that object representation is always post-perceptual was famously defended by 
Elizabeth Spelke: 
Human perceptual systems appear to analyze arrays of physical energy so as to bring 
knowledge of a continuous layout of surfaces in a state of continuous change. We 
perceive the layout and its motions, deformations, and ruptures. This continuous 
layout contains no spatially bounded “things” and no temporally bounded “events”: 
Perceptual systems do not package the world into units. 
(Spelke 1988, 229) 
Spelke’s argument, however, simply assumes that perceptual representations are wholly 
iconic. Her argument would rule out any form of segmentation as being genuinely perceptual, and 
therefore seems to assume an overly impoverished view of perceptual representation. Moreover, 
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much of what drives Spelke’s argument is the fact that object files are accessible across modalities 
and represent relatively high-level properties like solidity. Similarly, Carey argues that object files 
are in “core cognition” rather than perception (though see Carey 2011) because they “cannot be 
stated in the vocabulary of perception” (2009, 63) since they do not reduce to “perceptual or 
sensori-motor primitives” (2009, 67). But the thesis that object files have a discursive format can 
explain these properties without positing that these representations are in any sense post-
perceptual. 
Carey also argues that object files have a “rich conceptual role” (2009, 94). She cites 
evidence that “infants as young as 2 months old represent physical relations between objects such 
as inside and behind, and their representations are constrained by knowledge of solidity—a 
property of real objects but not of 2-D visual objects” (2009, 103). She also mentions that infants 
expect objects to be “subject to the laws of contact causality” and that they “represent objects as the 
goals of human action” and “represent self-moving agents as the cause of motion of inanimate 
objects” (2009, 103). She concludes that object files 
are inferentially interrelated with other representations that themselves cannot be 
reduced to sensory primitives, other representations that are the outputs of 
different core systems and of domain-general learning processes. Thus, they play a 
central conceptual role, one of the hallmarks of nonmodular, conceptual processes. 
(Carey 2009, 103) 
Some of this data seems to be explained in terms of the fact that object files include 
representation of properties like solidity that influence looking times and other behavioral 
measures. The fact that an object file can encode these properties and influence behavior in doing 




all perceptual representations must reduce to transduced primitives). Other data does seem 
suggestive of genuine inferential transitions—I will return to that issue in Chapter 3. For now, 
however, note that in all these cases object files function as premises in inferences, not conclusions 
of inferences. A representation might wholly belong to the visual system and yet be fed into 
cognition to function as a premise in inferences.  
Any representation with propositional structure will be apt to function as a premise in 
inferences. An argument that a representation that functions as a premise in inferences cannot also 
be perceptual would therefore rule out the possibility of propositional structures in the visual 
system by fiat. The question of whether there are propositional structures in the visual system does 
not seem decidable in this way, however; it seems like a live empirical question (see Chapter 3). 
The fact that object files may feed into cognition in this way thus does not undermine the 
possibility that they are genuinely and fully perceptual representations. Moreover, recall the 
discussion of the translation problem in Chapter 1. It is a benefit of architectural approaches to the 
perception–cognition border that they deliver representations in the same format as cognition, 
which can then be used directly by cognition. On this conception of the relation between 
perception and cognition, at least some perceptual representations ought to figure as premises in 
inferences. I conclude therefore that the highly constrained “conceptual role” of object files does 
not suffice to show that they are post-perceptual in any sense. 
Block instead relies on the fact that object files are stored in visual working memory 
(VWM) to undermine the claim that they are constructions of the visual system. It is not obvious 




they are stored in VWM. The operationalization of representations stored in VWM involves, first, 
the disappearance of the object during a retention interval long enough to ensure that the 
representation makes it into VWM. Some kind of task is then performed (e.g., a change detection 
task, wherein an object may or may not change a feature like color or shape and the task is to 
indicate whether there was such a change). Successful performance on this task after a sufficient 
retention interval ensures that the representation was stored in VWM. 
In object-reviewing experiments, on the other hand, objects are typically in plain sight for 
the duration of the trial. This aspect of the experimental design reflects the fact that object files 
were not originally posited as items to be stored in VWM. Instead, they were posited to explain 
proprietarily visual phenomena, and were considered “mid-level” constructs of the visual system, 
after the most basic feature detection but prior to late vision or post-perceptual processing 
(Kahneman et al. 1992).  Indeed the seminal study of object-based representations in VWM was 
not done until years later by Luck and Vogel (1997). 
A well-known problem in vision science concerns the correspondence of two temporally 
contiguous and qualitatively distinct retinal inputs (Ullman 1979). Object files were posited 
partially to solve this correspondence problem by allowing changes in retinal input due to (i) the 
movement of objects, (ii) changes in the features of objects, or (iii) saccades, i.e., movement of the 
eyes, to be coherently integrated by appeal to representations of enduring objects (Kahneman et 
al. 1992, 179). Segmenting the world into coherent, enduring units that can gain, lose, or change 




Without object files, vision would be as William James imagined it to be for infants, a “blooming, 
buzzing confusion.”   
Moreover, object files were posited also to be the vehicles of object-based attention. In 
Treisman’s feature integration theory, features are bound via object-based attention, which led to 
the positing of object files by Kahneman and Treisman (1984) and then the discovery of the OSPB 
by Kahneman et al. (1992). The OSPB is itself an instance of object-based attention. 
Object correspondence, feature integration, and object-based attention are all properly 
within the scope of vision science. These are phenomena of online visual processing rather than 
post-perceptual processing and manipulation in working memory. The core theoretical roles of 
object files thus tell against a post-perceptual view. 
The main point just made is that storage in VWM is not essential to object files and was 
not why they were posited in the first place. There is nonetheless some evidence that object files 
are entered into VWM. Hollingworth and Rasmussen (2010) simply combined the basic object-
reviewing paradigm with the basic VWM change detection paradigm. Four objects were presented, 
and colors were previewed in them; then the features disappeared, 300ms passed, and the objects 
visibly moved to other locations for 500ms and were still for 200ms; next, one second now having 
passed since the preview phase, colors were shown in the objects again (see Fig. 11). In the 
“updated” condition, the colors followed the objects; this is the important condition for testing the 
role of object files in VWM. In the “original” condition, they were shown in their original locations 
(i.e., in different objects at the same location). In the “no correspondence” condition, they were 




changed. The change detection task—a standard way of probing the contents of VWM—required 
subjects to say whether or not any colors had changed. 
 
Figure 11—From Hollingworth & Rasmussen 2010 
Hollingworth and Rasmussen found that accuracy and reaction time on the change 
detection task were better for the updated condition than the no correspondence condition. That 
is, performance on the change detection task was facilitated by the use of object files. Since change 
detection after a 1000ms interstimulus interval is a standard way of probing VWM, there is good 
reason to think that object files can be stored in VWM. 
There is, however, no reason to conclude from this that object files are not constructed by 
proprietarily visual processes. Manipulation of representations in VWM is an instance of cognitive 
processing. But it does not follow that storage of representations in VWM is an instance of 
cognitive processing. And it certainly does not follow that representations stored in VWM are 
formed through post-perceptual cognitive processes. On the contrary, it is much more plausible 
that representations that are formed by the visual system can be entered into VWM, and once in 
VWM can be cognitively manipulated. Thus Block’s inference from the fact that object files can be 
stored in VWM to the claim that object files are not formed by the visual system is a non sequitur. 
The hypothesis that object files are only formed after visual processing has finished raises 
some odd questions. Are there any representations of objects delivered by visual processing? If so, 




object-reviewing paradigms—robs us of basic experimental tools for studying object perception. 
What explains visual correspondence? What are the vehicles of object-based attention? If object 
files are perceptual, these questions have satisfying answers that are unified by the same theoretical 
construct. If object files are post-perceptual, then there is no clear answer to any of these questions. 
There is a related dilemma for the view that object files are post-perceptual. Either there 
are perceptual object representations or not. If there are not, then none of the questions in the 
previous paragraph are answered. Furthermore, it is extremely implausible both 
phenomenologically and empirically that there are no perceptual representations of objects. MOT, 
for example, seems clearly to qualify as a visual phenomenon both intuitively and scientifically, as 
do object-based attention and the solution (whatever it is) to the correspondence problem. 
If there are perceptual object representations, then what are they like? How do we know 
about them? One might appeal to MOT. But MOT boosts the OSPB in object-reviewing 
paradigms, strongly suggesting that the vehicles of MOT (i.e., visual indexes) are constituents of 
object files (Haladjian & Pylyshyn 2008). This horn of the dilemma thus requires either rejecting 
that MOT is genuinely perceptual, or providing an alternate explanation of why MOT and object-
reviewing seem to be so intimately related. Rejecting that MOT is genuinely perceptual would seem 
to eliminate any way of studying perceptual object representation. And an alternate explanation of 
why MOT boosts object-reviewing may be forthcoming, but has not yet been offered. Moreover, 
storage of features of objects happens in MOT (Bahrami 2003), and the relation between MOT and 




The view that object files are post-perceptual is thus unmotivated and faces serious 
theoretical problems. But there is also more positive evidence that object files display hallmarks of 
perceptual processing. These hallmarks are (a) being informationally encapsulated from cognition, 
and (b) being integrated into clearly perceptual processes. 
One form of evidence for the informational encapsulation of object files is the divergence 
between cognitive and perceptual criteria for object individuation and tracking. For example, most 
people know that an object that shrinks down before it goes behind an occluder does not cease to 
be the same object, and should tend to continue along the same trajectory. Nonetheless, when an 
object shrinks before heading behind an occluder, tracking is severely disrupted (Scholl & Pylyshyn 
1999). For another example, most people know that adding a line (say, a piece of string) from one 
object to another does not make them the same object. Nonetheless, when a line connects two 
objects, tracking is severely disrupted (Scholl, Pylyshyn, & Feldman 2001). These are clear cases of 
informational encapsulation; the object perception system operates on its own proprietary store of 
information that excludes information stored in central cognition. Moreover, one can view the 
relevant demos for oneself and consciously experience the effect.28 This encapsulation also goes in 
both directions, since the information used for visual tracking is not accessible to cognition. It is a 
surprising result that visual tracking is limited in these ways, not a mere verification of something 
we already (cognitively) knew to be the case. 
Another, even more striking case of informational encapsulation was found by Mitroff et 
al. (2005). Mitroff et al. ran a typical object-reviewing paradigm, except the motion of the objects 
                                                          




intersected in a way that was visually ambiguous between two objects “bouncing” off one another 
and two objects “streaming” through one another (see Fig. 12). They ran an object-reviewing study 
where features were previewed before the ambiguous motion and test features were displayed 
afterward. They also asked subjects to judge whether the objects had bounced or streamed. 
Remarkably, they found a sharp divergence—the OSPB showed that the object files had bounced 
even though subjects judged the objects to have streamed through each other. This result is another 
clear example of informational encapsulation. The processes that output object files are stimulus 
driven and informationally encapsulated, and thus seem to be genuinely perceptual. 
 
Figure 12—From Mitroff et al. 2005 
Another way of arguing that a representation is genuinely perceptual is to show that it is 
integrated into perceptual processes. One example of this in object files is the demonstrated 
relationship between object files and visual indexes (Haladjian & Pylyshyn 2008). Moreover, 
object-based attention warps the perceived spatial properties of objects (e.g., Vickery & Chun 2010; 
Liverence & Scholl 2011). Given that object files are plausible candidates for the vehicles of object-
based attention, object files are therefore integrated into spatial perception. 
Another perceptual process which operates on object files is the guiding of saccades. Upon 
walking into an unfamiliar room, your eyes might wander around and thus “saccade” to various 




maintain a stable percept across saccades. This phenomenon is undeniably perceptual. It is hard 
to imagine what it would be like to visually perceive if the visual system did not maintain 
information across saccades—our percepts would be an incoherent series of snapshots.  
Episodic information used to guide saccades is referred to as “transsaccadic memory” 
(Irwin & Gordon 1998). Transsaccadic memory is exploited in low-level visual tasks like tracking 
a moving object. For example, if an animal is in your periphery and you move your eyes to focus 
on it, the animal might have moved in the time it took you to saccade; it is nonetheless quite easy 
to perform a second, “corrective saccade” and come to fixate on the animal at its new location. 
While the guidance of saccades is often (though not always or even usually) under voluntary top-
down control, the information stored about the scene is perceptual and is used in perceptual 
processes.   
There is evidence that object files are stored in transsaccadic memory (Irwin & Andrews 
1996; Irwin & Gordon 1998). For one thing, transsaccadic memory does not seem to tap into iconic 
memory. Irwin (1992) presented subjects with an array of letters at one fixation and, after 
saccading, presented a partial report cue to a subset of letters, similar to the Sperling (1960) 
experiments discussed above. Unlike in the Sperling experiments, subjects only showed storage of 
three or four letters. This suggests that iconic memory is not used for transsaccadic memory (and 
indeed suggests that icons are not stored in transsaccadic memory).  
Schut et al. (2017) argue that “corrective saccades are executed on the basis of object files” 
(2017, 138). They presented subjects with six objects around a fixation point and instructed them 




Fig. 13). A second target object (which may or may not have been the same object) would then 
briefly expand, cuing subjects to saccade to it. In some trials, the objects would rotate during the 
saccade so that fixation landed next to the second target instead of on it, in which case subjects had 
to initiate a corrective saccade. Schut et al. found that reaction time was quicker in conditions 
where the second target was the same object that had previously been fixated (i.e., the first and 
second target are the same object). They found the same effect when objects changed color after 
fixation and when objects changed location after fixation (by slowly rotating between the first 
saccade and the cuing of the second target object—not pictured in Fig. 13). The effect is therefore 
genuinely object based and taps into the same object representations that are used to track 
correspondence of objects across changes in features and locations, viz., object files. 
 
Figure 13—From Schut et al. 2017 
Like object-reviewing paradigms, tests of transsaccadic memory can shed light on 
representational format. Pollatsek et al. (1984) used a basic paradigm where subjects would fixate 
on the center of the screen with an object in the periphery, then saccade to the object and name it 
as quickly as possible. Changing the features of the object during the saccade slows down the ability 




out objects with a different exemplar of the same basic-level category, with sometimes substantially 
different low-level features (e.g., a young cat with textured fur facing forward vs. an older cat 
without textured fur facing to the left, or dogs of two different breeds—see Fig. 13). They still found 
significant facilitation in naming the object despite the change in low-level features. 
 
Figure 14—Stimuli used by Pollatsek et al. (1984) 
Rayner et al. (1980) used a similar paradigm with words instead of pictures, and found that 
words could vary in case across saccades and still facilitate naming. Pollatsek et al. (1990) used the 
same stimuli as Pollatsek et al. (1984) (e.g., the two visually dissimilar cats), but varied the location 
of objects pre- and post-saccade. They still found a significant facilitation for naming objects across 
saccades despite the change in location and low-level features. This suggests that the conceptual 
identity of the picture is encoded in transsaccadic memory without holistic binding to low-level 
features.  
There is therefore evidence for representations in transsaccadic memory encoding kinds 
just as there is for object files. This bolsters both the claim that object files are stored in 
transsaccadic memory and the claim that perceptual processes utilize discursive kind 
representations. 
Objection: These transsaccadic memory effects only show storage of what Burge calls 




The objection is correct in that (e.g.) Pollatsek et al. (1984) did not control for this 
alternative. But the independent evidence that object files are stored in transsaccadic memory, 
together with the independent evidence that object files encode kinds independently of generic 
low-level features, should bias our interpretation of these results in favor of the claim that 
representations in transsaccadic memory encode kinds. Moreover, there is evidence that which 
low-level features are used to guide object representations in transsaccadic memory is determined 
by which kinds are represented rather than merely the presence of the feature.  
Gordon and Vollmer (2010) had subjects saccade to a location between two objects, at 
which point the two objects were replaced by a single object. The task was to name this object. The 
object either did or did not match the category of one of the two previewed objects, and may or 
may not have changed color. Gordon and Vollmer found an object-specific effect: a decrease in 
reaction time for naming the object above(/below) the fixation point if that object was previewed 
above(/below) fixation. This effect was significantly reduced when color changed, but only for 
objects with diagnostic colors. Thus the correspondence between transsaccadic representations of a 
banana depended on the yellow color of the banana, whereas correspondence for transsaccadic 
representations of an object without a diagnostic color (such as a pail) did not depend on its color. 
This result suggests that the representation is not maintained merely on the basis of low-level 
properties; which low-level properties are used for object correspondence depends on their 
relation to conceptual kinds that are explicitly represented in transsaccadic memory (see also 




The fact that object files are used in transsaccadic memory bolsters the key hypothesis that 
led Kahneman and Treisman (1984) to posit them in the first place: object files are used to render 
otherwise shifting visual stimulations into coherent percepts of scenes of objects that maintain 
their integrity across changes in their features and where they are located. Pushing object files 
outside the purview of visual processing renders the coherence of visual phenomenology 
mysterious. 
We should conclude on the basis of this discussion that object files are genuinely perceptual 
object representations; thus I will continue to use ‘POR’ in what follows. 
5.2—The Berkeleyan response. One might grant that object representations are perceptual but seek 
to explain results that push toward pluralism by giving icon-based explanations. One of the key 
arguments from Section 4, as well as the discussion of transsaccadic memory in Section 5.1, 
concerns representation of abstract kind properties. Abstract contents have also long been a 
bugbear of empiricist theories of concepts—arguably for the same reason, viz., the proposed iconic 
format of the representations. A Berkeleyan response is to argue that icons can be used in ways that 
are indicative of abstract kinds without explicitly representing those kinds via a distinct symbol 
that abstracts away from low-level, iconically representable properties. 
Block (unpublished) argues that a Berkeleyan response is sufficient to ward off the 
argument from abstract kind contents to discursive format in perception; to suppose that icons 
have to represent maximally determinate properties is to commit the “photographic fallacy” (Block 




icon to fulfill a role that a pluralist would explain in terms of discursive format. He suggests that 
some of these roles are biologically preferred. 
This Berkeleyan response is not plausible. Berkeley’s preferred example was the use of 
mental image of a triangle (which must be either equilateral, isosceles, or scalene) in a way that 
functions as a representation of triangularity in general. One Berkeleyan idea is that one can attend 
to some features of the mental image and ignore others in a way that privileges uses that pertain to 
the attended features, thus simulating abstraction from the ignored features without eliminating 
them from the representation (Prinz 2002, 29). 
But the data on abstract features in object files cannot be explained this way. Consider again 
Gordon and Irwin’s (2000) finding of an OSPB despite the preview being the word ‘apple’ and the 
test feature being a picture of an apple. The problem is not that an iconic representation of an apple 
functions in respect of some iconically represented features and not others. The problem is that 
the representation of an apple in an object file is not holistically tied to any low-level features at all. 
There is nothing iconically representable in common between the word ‘apple’ and a picture of an 
apple. 
The argument for pluralism here is not that it is logically impossible that the information 
in the POR is encoded iconically. Rather, the argument is that an iconic model of PORs offers no 
explanation of this effect, whereas a discursive model nicely explains it. There’s no reason why an 
iconic representation of an apple should play the role that the POR does in Gordon and Irwin’s 




it. The claim that the role is biologically ingrained is also not plausible for kinds like apple, pencil, 
or piano, which are encoded in PORs. 
Block (unpublished) argues that discursive representations also need specific functional 
roles in order to have content, including to represent kinds, so they are no more explanatorily 
successful than icons. But this reply is unsuccessful. Discursive representations always have some 
particular interpretation in the systems in which they are deployed. The fact that discursive 
representations need not syntactically correspond to what they represent or holistically encode 
features in the way icons do frees them up to explicitly represent a wider variety of properties, 
including abstract ones (i.e., properties that are not holistically tied up with particular low-level 
features, or that don’t have spatiotemporal parts). The problem for empiricism in general and for 
iconic models of PORs in particular is that icons on their own typically do not explicitly represent 
anything more than low-level features. An icon is typically compatible with multiple high-level 
interpretations. Cases where the high-level interpretation is settled in one way rather than the other 
are best explained by positing discursive representations that specify the relevant interpretation. 
The Berkeleyan response, therefore, does no more than restate the data and offer a logical 
possibility that icons just do play the right role whereas a pluralist view provides a substantive 
explanation. 
5.3—That’s not what icons are. One might simply reject the characterization of icons used in this 
chapter. Perhaps some other notion of iconicity can avoid these objections and explain the data on 




This objection is idle unless a notion of iconicity is offered and given independent 
substantiation. Section 3 of this chapter contained a great deal of empirical substantiation of the 
notion of iconicity used here, viz., a correspondence between parts of the representation and parts 
of the scene or object, and the holistic encoding of features. Moreover, the notion of iconicity used 
here has been used throughout cognitive science and is at the heart of Kosslyn’s (1980; 1994) theory 
of mental imagery, which even an opponent like Pylyshyn says “can be taken as the received view 
in much of the field” (2002, 181). 
Block (unpublished) writes that nobody has adequately defined iconicity. One could 
quibble with this claim, given the detail and explanatory success of Kosslyn’s model of mental 
imagery. But even if nobody has adequately defined iconicity, the phenomena that are explained by 
iconicity such as mental imagery, iconic memory, ensemble perception, and low-level spatial 
perception indirectly provide a characterization. I argued above that a notion of iconicity that 
appeals to parts that represent parts and holistic binding of features and individuals explains all 
this data and therefore should form the basis of any theory of iconicity (which I’ll try to provide in 
Chapter 4, ICONIC REPRESENTATION). PORs do not have these properties. PORs therefore are not 
iconic in the explanatorily useful sense of that term. 
The opponent who rejects this notion of iconicity takes on a dialectical burden of 
articulating another notion that can explain mental imagery, iconic memory, and other key 
phenomena that perceptual icons are supposed to explain and showing how that notion of iconicity 
can also explain perceptual object representation. Since this burden has not yet been met, this 




§6. Perceptual Pluralism as a Research Program  
The visual system delivers perceptual icons as well as discursive PORs. Therefore, perceptual 
pluralism is true. There are plausibly other representations outputted by perceptual systems that 
are neither perceptual icons nor PORs. I will briefly discuss possible examples. The evidence in 
these cases is less decisive than the evidence for PORs, but it is probative nonetheless. 
6.1—Face perception. Any application of a high-level category to a distal stimulus will likely involve 
segmentation of early iconic perceptual representations and thus may involve the tokening of a 
distinct discursive representation that functions to indicate the relevant category. One possible 
example is face perception.  
Whether faces are literally perceived is a matter of some controversy, but faces are one of 
the best empirically grounded candidates for high-level perceptual content to date (see Bruce and 
Young 2000 and Little et al. 2011 for overviews), with a possible dedicated neural apparatus in the 
fusiform gyrus subserving a module for face perception (Kanwisher et al. 1997). Block (2014) has 
recently argued that faces are genuinely perceived on the basis of perceptual adaptation effects for 
faces (Butler et al. 2008, Susilo et al. 2010). I’ll assume for the sake of argument that there are 
“perceptual attributives for facial expressions” (Block 2014, 563) and other aspects of face 
perception. 
The visual system must have some mechanism(s) that take iconic perceptual 
representations (perhaps with some non-facial segmentation, e.g., into visual objects) as inputs and 
delivers representations of faces as outputs. Face perception is a multi-stage process. Prosopagnosia 




Prosopagnosics show qualitatively and quantitatively different levels of impairment at different 
stages of processing, with some unable to differentiate faces at all, and others able to differentiate 
faces but unable to access memories for purposes of recognition (Sergent and Signoret 1992). 
Prosopagnosia is typically understood as a failure of facial recognition, the capacity to distinguish 
between and reidentify faces, but a “preliminary and prerequisite” ability is face detection, i.e., the 
capacity to discriminate facial from non-facial stimuli (Lewis and Edmonds 2003, 903). Faces are 
identified on the basis of low-level features such as holistic triangular configurations of eyes and 
mouths (Lin and Fan 2001).  
The fact that face perception is triggered by holistic configurations suggests that icons are 
inputs to face processing, but perhaps at least some of the outputs of face processing (i.e., perceptual 
representations of faces as such) are discursive. It may be that face detection involves tokening a 
discursive representation with the content <face> that is not holistically bound up with low-level 
features. Face recognition might operate on discursive face detection and iconic representations of 
low-level features to deliver as output a discursive tag that marks the face as belonging to a 
particular person (which can then serve as inputs to mechanisms that store the particular face 
representation in memory and search memory for instances of the same face, etc.). Since 
prosopagnosia is not associated with low-level perceptual deficits, prosopagnosics may have the 
same early iconic representations as normal perceivers but lack the capacity to construct discursive 
face representations (i.e., failures of detection) or to store or check those representations against 




It is certainly not impossible that face perception outputs icons rather than discursive 
representations. However, a discursive view predicts the dissociation of prosopagnosia from low-
level perceptual deficits, since it posits a discrete symbol standing for the property of being a face 
(as well as the identity of an individual face) that is not holistically bound to low-level features. 
Failure of the capacity to represent faces need not involve failure of the capacity to represent low-
level features if the two capacities involve distinct representational vehicles. An iconic view can 
posit distinct mechanisms for faces and for low-level features to explain this dissociation, but does 
not seem to readily predict the distinction the way a pluralist view does. 
6.2—Ensemble perception. I earlier argued that ensemble perception provides evidence for 
perceptual icons. Now, however, I want to argue that it may also provide evidence for discursive 
representations in perception. 
The reason to think ensemble perception suggests the existence of perceptual icons is that 
the inputs to ensemble perception are iconic since they do not segment out each individual item in 
the ensemble. But what about the outputs of ensemble perception, i.e., the ensemble representation 
itself? 
Prima facie, ensemble representations seem to violate the holisticity constraint on icons. 
Ensemble perception abstracts away from other features and spits out a representation of an 
average along a particular property dimension. All else equal, one would expect a representation 
that operates on multiple properties of icons to respect the holisticity of those icons and thus 




Indeed Hubert-Wallander and Boynton (2015) found evidence that ensembles of different 
properties are computed in very different ways. They presented subjects with a series of circles one 
at a time of varying sizes and at various locations on the screen. Subjects were prompted before 
each trial to indicate the average size or the average location of the set. Hubert-Wallander and 
Boynton examined how subjects weighted each individual object in the series. They found that 
earlier objects were weighted more in the derivation of average position while later objects were 
weighted more in the derivation of average size. These results “imply that different mechanisms 
are associated with different feature domains” (Hubert-Wallander & Boynton 2015). While this is 
not logically incompatible with the claim that ensemble representations are iconic, the use of 
separate mechanisms to derive separate feature ensembles is predicted by a view on which 
ensemble representations are discursive and thus non-holistic. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that ensemble representations, like PORs, are entered into 
VWM and exhibit the same set size limitations. Im and Chong (2014) showed subjects multiple 
sets (up to five sets) of circles of varying sizes at once. Sets were delineated by color, though in one 
condition sets were also spatially grouped together. Subjects then indicated which of two probed 
sets had a larger average. Im and Chong found that “participants correctly remembered at least 2.5 
sets without [spatial] grouping and 3.5 sets with [spatial] grouping” (2014, 669). This limitation 
held whether or not there was a one-second retention interval before the probe, suggesting that the 
effect taps into VWM. Ensemble representations are entered into VWM and exhibit the same set 




are discursive and thus display the same sort of “item effect” (Fodor 2007) as other discursive 
representations like PORs. 
6.3—Going forward. There are potentially many other examples of non-iconic format in 
perception. For example, various forms of perceptual grouping and segmentation might turn out 
to be best explained in terms of non-iconic format(s). E.J. Green (forthcoming) argues that the 
visual system deploys structural descriptions of part-whole structures of objects that seem to 
require a canonical decomposition and some degree of abstraction away from low-level features. 
These structural descriptions might be genuinely perceptual and yet non-iconic.29 Moreover, 
Potter’s (2014) work on the apparently lightning-fast deployment of concepts during rapid serial 
visual presentation might push in favor of perceptual mechanisms that deploy discursive concepts 
(Mandelbaum forthcoming). 
Rather than investigate these possibilities further here, I’ll simply note that the truth of 
perceptual pluralism opens up these avenues for further research and makes more plausible the 
claim that these cases involve discursive or even sui generis representational formats. 
§7. Conclusion 
The description and motivation of perceptual pluralism in this chapter was all pitched at the level 
of representational format. In particular, I argued that perception delivers both iconic and 
discursive formats.  
                                                          
29 Green’s (2015) work on layered shape perception and the perceptual representation of affine shape in addition to 





However, perceptual pluralism proper is the thesis that perception delivers proprietary 
representations as well as tokens of the same type used elsewhere in the mind, especially including 
those used in thought. One might thus resist a fully pluralist interpretation of the evidence cited 
above by arguing that, while PORs and thoughts might both have a discursive format, the former 
are not genuinely conceptual. Thus object perception does not involve tokens of the same types of 
states deployed in thought. In the next chapter, therefore, I will argue that PORs are not only 
discursive but also conceptual and propositional. This further claim is necessary to defend 
perceptual pluralism in the strongest sense.  
We do nonetheless have reason to reject the most prominent version of anti-pluralism, 
according to which the outputs of perception are exclusively iconic. Moreover, we cannot draw the 
border between perception and cognition by appeal to the hypothesis that percepts are iconic and 
thoughts are discursive. It is thus not plausible that the perception-cognition border is based on 





SEEING OBJECTS: A CASE STUDY IN THE UNDER-
INTELLECTUALIZATION OF PERCEPTION 
Chapter 3 
“Let me see if I’ve got this straight, Prof. Skinner: you’re saying it’s a mistake to 
anthropomorphize humans?” 
—Sydney Morganbesser (as quoted by Daniel Dennett)30 
§1—Thinking and Perceiving 
1.1—Representations and mental architecture. As discussed earlier, there are at least two broad sorts 
of ways of differentiating perception and cognition: first, representational strategies posit distinct 
types of representations in perception and cognition; second, architectural strategies posit 
psychologically primitive functional borders between perception and cognition. Representational 
strategies argue that the kinds of states deployed in perceptual systems are internally unlike those 
in cognitive systems. According to one recently prominent form of the representational strategy, 
perceptual representations are iconic while cognitive representations are discursive (e.g., Carey 
2009; Burge 2010a, 2014; Block 2014).31 I argued in the previous chapter that this sort of 
                                                          
30 Dennet 2006, 109; emphasis his. 
31 I put aside questions about whether the content of perceptual states is distinct from the content of cognitive states 
(e.g., Peacocke 1992, 2001; Stalnaker 1998; Heck 2000; Byrne 2005; Speaks 2005; Burge 2010a). From the perspective 
of cognitive science, a difference in content will only make a difference if it is reflected in the state itself. It is thus state 




representational strategy fails due to the empirical fact that perceptual systems output discursive 
representations such as perceptual object representations (PORs). 
One might jettison the idea that perceptual representations are wholly iconic and insist 
instead that PORs are discursive but still nonconceptual representations that are in some way 
internally unlike the conceptual states deployed in thought. The conclusion of Chapter 2 is indeed 
neutral on this question. Once we establish that PORs are discursive, there are two possibilities: 
either they are conceptual representations (and the representational strategy fails) or they are 
nonconceptual representations in a discursive format. 
In the absence of an independent account of nonconceptual discursive representations in 
perception, the natural hypothesis would be that discursive representations in perception are the 
same as those that occur in cognition. Even if there is a reason to posit nonconceptual but 
syntactically structured representational formats in perception (perhaps Biederman’s [1987] geons 
or Marr’s [1982] viewpoint-invariant three-dimensional models; see also Green forthcoming), 
furthermore, object perception in particular may turn out to display hallmarks of conceptuality.  
My aim in this chapter is to take it as a working hypothesis that PORs are conceptual and 
see whether that hypothesis suffers any serious objections. I will run through a multitude of 
conditions for conceptuality, often modifying them as I go. My conclusion is that, once clarified, all 
appropriate conditions for conceptuality are met by PORs. Perceptual systems deploy conceptual 
representations in propositional structures to represent individual objects as such and attribute 
                                                          





features to them. If there is a border between perception and cognition, therefore, it must be 
architectural. 
1.2—How to intellectualize perception. Philosophers commonly accuse one another of “over-
intellectualizing” various mental phenomena. This accusation is nowhere more common than in 
the philosophy of perception. Robert Audi, for example, argues that “we cannot properly 
understand perception if we over-intellectualize it” (2015, 74; see also Nanay 2013, 9–10). Tyler 
Burge complains that “nearly all prominent philosophical work on this topic over the previous 
century over-intellectualized” conditions for objective perceptual representation (2010a, xi). 
Successful avoidance of over-intellectualization is sometimes cited as a reason to abandon 
representational approaches to perception altogether (e.g., Noe 2015, 1). 
There are at least two ways in which one might intellectualize perception: one might 
intellectualize perceptual processing, and one might intellectualize perceptual states. Claiming that 
perceptual processing is fundamentally the same as reasoning would be a case of intellectualizing 
perceptual processing. One could argue, for example, that perceptual processing involves the same 
exact forms of inference exhibited in rational thought, such as modus ponens; or one could argue 
that perceptual processing has access to background beliefs; or one could argue that perceptual 
processing requires intellectually demanding representation of the conditions of objective 
representation (see Burge 2010a, chapters 5, 6, and 7, for historical discussion and criticism). 
Intellectualizing perceptual states, on the other hand, would be a matter of claiming that perceptual 




be that perceptual states, just like thoughts, involve the deployment of concepts in propositionally 
structured, truth-evaluable mental representations. 
It is important not to run these two forms of intellectualism together. In particular, 
intellectualism about perceptual states—what we might call conceptualism—does not require 
intellectualism about perceptual processing—what, in one form, we might call inferentialism. One 
can endorse conceptualism, and hold that perceptual states are conceptual, without supposing that 
the perceptual processes that generate them operate according to rules of inference, have access to 
background knowledge, or depend on knowledge of conditions for objective representation. 
There are compelling reasons behind the now-orthodox rejection of unreconstructed 
inferentialism (a view traditionally associated with Helmholtz [1867]; cf. Rock 1997). While every 
claim in this neck of the woods is controversial, it is plausible that perceptual processing operates 
according to different rules than cognition. For example, knowledge about the typical sizes of 
human beings does not prevent you from seeing the woman in Figure 15 as giant compared to the 
man on the other side of the room. And learning that the image is due to an illusory environment 





Figure 15—Ames room32 
Perceptual processing, one might conclude, is fundamentally different from cognitive 
processing and even encapsulated from cognition to some degree (e.g., Pylyshyn 1999; Firestone 
and Scholl 2016). Perhaps perceptual systems operate according to a proprietary “logic” (i.e., set of 
processing rules) that specify properties like size independently of the identity of represented 
objects and scenes. Perhaps, furthermore, perceptual systems cannot be penetrated by states 
activated in cognitive systems. It does not follow from these points, however, that the outputs of 
perceptual processing are nonconceptual.  
Concepts are types of representations, and one and the same type of representation can in 
principle be deployable by a multiplicity of distinct processes. For example, you might form a 
mental image of the same particular configuration of visible properties on one occasion because 
                                                          
32 ‘Ames Room’ by Ian Stannard, taken from https://www.flickr.com/photos/ silly_little_man/5132242358 on 9 August 
2015 and altered to grayscale and size reduced. Licensed under Creative Commons License Attribution Share-Alike 




you read the words ‘metal cylinder’, on another occasion because you wanted a can of soda, and on 
another occasion because you saw the front of a car and mentally completed its hidden sides, 
including its exhaust pipe. The type identity of this representation is independent of its 
circumstances of deployment (and even the high-level and pragmatically relevant properties and 
individuals it functions to represent). Whether it is actually plausible that one would form the very 
same mental image via these various processes is immaterial; all that matters is that the situation, 
so described, is coherent. Concepts are paradigmatically deployed in cognitive processes like 
inference, but the idea that other processes might deploy concepts is not incoherent. There is no 
principled reason why a token conceptual state could not be the output of non-cognitive, 
proprietarily perceptual processes. 
I therefore propose to examine the question of conceptualism independently of the question 
of inferentialism. My conclusion will be that PORs are conceptual outputs of perceptual processes. 
Conceptualism, though once popular, has largely fallen from favor (e.g., Crane 1992; Tye 1995; 
Smith 2002; Burge 2010a, 2010b; Hopp 2011). If my arguments for a mitigated conceptualism are 
sound, then the tendency to regard perception as wholly nonconceptual in respect of both the 
processing it involves and the states they operate on is a case of under-intellectualization. Though 
perceptual processing is plausibly distinct from cognitive processing, perceptual processing 
sometimes involves conceptual states. The tendency to under-intellectualize perception misses out 
on the fact that, while perceptual systems operate differently from cognitive systems, they 




As argued in Chapter 1 it is a strength of architectural accounts of the perception–cognition 
border that they allow perceptual systems to deliver conceptualized representations to cognition 
(see also Mandelbaum forthcoming). If perception and cognition utilize wholly separate 
representational formats—that is, if they speak different languages—then it is hard to see how 
cognition can immediately operate on perceptual outputs. If, however, perception delivers 
propositional structures composed of concepts, then cognitive systems can directly use those states 
as premises in inferences, map them to lexical representations, activate associated concepts, trigger 
memories and emotions, and so on. The widespread propensity to under-intellectualize perceptual 
states robs us of this sort of explanation of the relation between perception and the rest of the mind. 
Some measure of intellectualization therefore has a priori plausibility. But more importantly, as I 
will argue, both empirical evidence and philosophical reflection on the nature of concepts support 
conceptualism about PORs. 
Many conditions for conceptuality have been proposed. Since the present project does not 
concern the normative or epistemic nature of concepts—that is, the distinctively normative role they 
play in the acquisition and transmission of justification or knowledge and in making a creature’s 
mental states assessable for rationality—I will put aside normatively loaded conditions.33 Instead, I 
focus on many of the leading conditions for conceptuality proposed in descriptive philosophy of 
cognitive science. These include systematicity, stimulus independence, amodality, inferential 
promiscuity, and composing into propositional structures. Before turning to each of these 
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simply beg the question against views on which thick kinds of normativity are constitutive of concepts, instead 




conditions, however, it will prove useful to examine general issues about conceptuality and mental 
architecture. 
§2—Concepts and Mental Architecture 
There are two crucial (and related) choice points in determining conditions for conceptuality. First, 
is a representation conceptual in virtue of its internal or relational features? Second, is a 
representation conceptual in virtue of its actual or counterfactual functional role?  
The internal/relational division might sound at odds with a functionalist mental ontology 
since, according to functionalism, mental kinds are individuated in virtue of some relational 
features, especially their relations to behavior and to other mental states (Lewis 1972, Fodor 1975). 
Nonetheless, we can distinguish between the functional role that is constitutive of a particular type 
of representation, and the role that it might acquire in virtue of some extrinsic factors. For instance, 
suppose some irrational person holds the belief that if 2+2=4, then the world will end tomorrow. 
In that unfortunate person’s mind, the belief that 2+2=4 will have the functional role of making 
them think the world will end tomorrow. It does not seem that, from that fact alone, the functional 
role of making one think the world will end tomorrow is an internal feature of the belief that 
2+2=4.34 But on the other hand, it does seem that representing 4, and having a certain constituent 
structure, and perhaps many other features, are internal to the belief that 2+2=4. The internal 
                                                          
34 On certain holistic views of cognition, this would indeed follow (e.g., Quine 1960). And on those views, it is not clear 
how an internal/relational distinction should be drawn. Indeed, it may be more accurate to say that such views simply 
reject the claim that there are any internal features of individual mental representations. That is arguably at the core of 




features of a representation are whatever features it has independently of how it might be used for 
a particular purpose at a particular time in a particular system, given other independent 
representations or architectural facts.  
It is not always clear which aspects of a representation’s occurrent causal influence in the 
mind are due to its internal features and which are artifacts of contingent intervening factors. While 
it is true that conceptual representations can play characteristic roles in inferences, for example, 
some representations will not actually be playing such a role at every particular time; they might 
not be activated at that time, or they might be activated but not participating in inferential 
transitions for some independent reason. It doesn’t seem right that the representations cease to be 
conceptual in such cases. Performance errors can also prevent representations from fulfilling their 
characteristic roles. One such reason a representation might not fulfill its characteristic role is 
because of a subpersonal malfunction, such as neural damage; another is that resources might be 
depleted because of some other mental operation (e.g., cognitive load); another might be some sort 
of Freudian repression. 
The architecture of a creature’s mind can in principle have a significant impact on whether 
a conceptual representation exerts its potential causal powers. For example, perhaps central 
cognition is fragmented into different systems of beliefs such that relations between thoughts 
operate normally within a fragment but not across fragments (Lewis 1982, Egan 2008, Quilty-Dunn 
2015, Mandelbaum 2016, Elga and Rayo ms). Fragmentation is typically posited to explain the 
persistence of contradictory beliefs. Given that human beings tend to eliminate contradictions 




1957), contradictory beliefs that persist without resolution must be encapsulated from each other 
in some way. Fragmentation is supposed to provide diachronically flexible but synchronically rigid 
architectural barriers between “fragments,” i.e., systems of beliefs and the concepts they comprise 
(Mandelbaum 2016). Some sort of fragmentation story is especially necessary if Spinozan theories 
of belief formation are true, according to which it is not psychologically possible for humans to 
entertain a proposition without believing it, in which case contradictory beliefs are ubiquitous 
(Gilbert 1991, Egan 2008, Mandelbaum 2014, Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn 2015). 
Fragmentation is a revision of the naïve Quinean view that one’s beliefs are all interconnected in a 
coherent “web”; instead, fragmentation theorists propose an architecture consisting of disparate 
and internally coherent but mutually inconsistent micro-webs, or fragments. 
Suppose that the thought P is in fragment a and the thought IF P THEN Q is in fragment b. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that typical inferential connections, such as modus ponens, are 
constitutive of the thought P. The thought P should normally interact with the thought IF P THEN Q 
to produce the thought Q; but, given the fragmentation of the two premise thoughts, the conclusion 
thought isn’t formed. It does not seem that any representation’s status as conceptual is thereby 
threatened. The representation is still the conceptual representation P in virtue of its internal 
features. It may also be conceptual partly in virtue of the truth of the following counterfactual: If 
the relevant thoughts were in the same fragment, then they would inferentially yield the thought Q.  
One more example: Suppose that a certain cognitivist view of the psychological reality of 
syntactic rules is true, such that a given rule is part of an individual’s I-language because that 




representation is quite isolated from conceptual representations in central cognition, it could still 
be true that they are concepts linked together in propositional structures. If this description is even 
conceptually coherent, then it is possible for a representation to be conceptual despite quite strict 
circumstances of architectural isolation. 
The relation between conceptuality and mental architecture will be crucial in evaluating 
various proposed conditions for conceptuality, to which I turn now. 
§3—The Varieties of Systematicity  
3.1—Evans and the Generality Constraint. Evans (1982) famously argued that concepts obey a 
“Generality Constraint”—that is, thinkers who possess the singular concepts A and B and the 
predicate concepts F and G must be able to think the thoughts A IS F, A IS G, B IS F, and B IS G. The 
point of the Generality Constraint is that concepts are recombinable constituents of more complex 
concepts and propositional thoughts. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) emphasized what they called the 
systematicity of thought, which also asserts that thoughts involve systematically recombinable 
constituents. Though Evans had different purposes in mind than Fodor and Pylyshyn (see note 4, 
for example), I will treat systematicity and the Generality Constraint as picking out more or less the 
same feature of concepts. 
Consider the most liberal possible form of the Generality Constraint: 
PURE SYSTEMATICITY: A representation R belonging to a creature A must be able freely to 
combine at any time with any other concept in A’s mind for R to be conceptual.35 
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Almost everyone in the literature on concepts—including Evans—would argue that the kind of 
unconstrained and totally domain-general systematicity encoded in PURE SYSTEMATICITY is much 
too strong a condition for conceptuality.  
The Generality Constraint functions in contemporary philosophy of mind in a manner akin 
to religious scripture: it is very widely accepted as true, often without argument, but there is a 
preponderance of inconsistent commentary on the primary text and vehement disagreement on 
how it should be interpreted and applied in particular cases. 
As a footnote to his original statement of the Generality Constraint, Evans claimed that 
systematicity is constrained by whether the putative connection between the relevant concepts 
meets some semantic condition of appropriateness (1982, 101n17). Gauker provides an intuitive 
example: “A capacity to judge that John fell in the lake need not entail a capacity to judge that the 
lake fell in John” (2011, 4). Camp (2004) argues convincingly against this sort of semantic 
constraint. Since semantic appropriateness will not cut ice either way in what follows, however, I’ll 
simply drop that qualification from here on out. 
Carruthers (2009, 96ff) distinguishes between weak and strong systematicity. The weak 
systematicity requirement is that the relevant representation can (in the metaphysical, rather than 
logical or conceptual sense of ‘can’) combine with some other concepts that the creature could 
possess, whereas the strong requirement is that it can combine with all other concepts the creature 
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could possess. Carruthers argues for weak systematicity as the appropriate form of the Generality 
Constraint. 
Peacocke (1992, 42–43) mentions that neural factors or Freudian repression can constrain 
systematicity. This point is much underappreciated and has significant consequences, as I’ll argue 
below. As an example of Peacocke’s point, consider the case of Kevin: it turns out that repression 
triggered by some traumatic childhood event causes Kevin’s concept of his childhood nursery, 
which he does not consciously remember, to be isolated from some other concepts he possesses. 
Despite its repression, it does not seem right to say that the representation should thus fail to be 
conceptual. It is appropriate to talk about repressed beliefs and desires, and it is arguably a necessary 
truth that those states are conceptually structured, even if they are architecturally stored in a way 
that prevents them from exhibiting unrestricted combinatorial and inferential causal powers. 
Reflecting on the possibility of repression, fragmentation, and other architectural divisions 
in central cognition illuminates a distinction between two kinds of systematicity. Systematicity is 
exhibited by a cognitive system and the particular battery of representations it contains; if two 
systems are encapsulated from each other, then systematicity will only be actualized within each 
system, not across systems. For instance, if the concept MORAL AGENT only figures in a fragment 
involved in moral judgment, and the concept ALPHA CENTAURI is stored in another fragment, then 
the thinker will be unable to think the thought ALPHA CENTAURI IS A MORAL AGENT. Call 
systematicity within a cognitive system with respect to the representations in that system local 
systematicity; call systematicity with respect to all representations in the mind, irrespective of 




would actually exhibit local systematicity within its fragment, and would only counterfactually 
exhibit global systematicity; if the relevant fragments were merged, then the thinker could think 
ALPHA CENTAURI IS A MORAL AGENT. 
Carruthers’ weak–strong dichotomy is different from the local–global dichotomy I 
proposed above. His concern is with what combinations are metaphysically possible. He argues 
convincingly that the capacity to syntactically recombine some representations seems to be 
sufficient for the conceptuality of those representations, so the extra requirement that every 
conceptual representation that could be tokened in a given mind be so connectible to every other 
is too strong. Carruthers thus seeks to deny that it need be even metaphysically possible that all the 
concepts in a creature’s mind could combine.  
The global systematicity condition is not about what is metaphysically possible, but instead 
requires that the creature be in a position, holding its cognitive architecture fixed, to combine all 
its concepts. Even if we add in Evans’s proviso that the requirement should be limited to categorial 
appropriateness, the global systematicity condition is still much too strong. The existence of 
fragmentation or other architectural divisions in central cognition, which would prevent the 
combination of representations in one fragment or system with those in another, together with the 
global systematicity requirement would jointly entail that adult human beings lack concepts. Since 
this conclusion is absurd, the global systematicity requirement should be rejected. Instead, 
systematicity should be localized within cognitive systems. We can still ask whether local 
systematicity should be weak or strong in Carruthers’s sense, or whether strong systematicity 




to draw is that local systematicity is what matters in deciding whether discursive perceptual 
representations are conceptual. 
One should accept the foregoing argument even if Freudian repression and belief 
fragmentation are not psychologically real. The point would still stand conceptually: the mind 
might have been fragmented, and yet there still would have been concepts in the various fragments. 
Similarly, if Freudian psychoanalysis is a flawed theory, it is not because it is metaphysically 
impossible for beliefs, desires, and other conceptually structured states to be repressed. Since we 
are only interested in the constitutive conditions of conceptuality, these mere possibilities suffice to 
establish the point at hand: we should not take functional properties that arise purely from such 
architectural constraints to be constitutive of concepts as such.  
I propose that we shave the Generality Constraint down to the following principle: 
LOCAL SYSTEMATICITY: It must be metaphysically possible for a representation R in a 
subsystem S of creature A to combine with other concepts in S for R to be conceptual, 
whether or not R can combine with concepts elsewhere in A’s mind. 
Relativizing systematicity to subsystems allows LOCAL SYSTEMATICITY to express a deep truth about 
concepts—viz., that they compose with each other—while also recognizing the capacity of 
architectural borders to sharply constrain a concept’s compositional scope.  
Do discursive perceptual representations satisfy LOCAL SYSTEMATICITY? When tracking 
multiple objects, we can perceptually represent one object, O1, as a white square labeled “A” in the 
top left of the visual field, and another, O2, as a red circle labeled “B” in the bottom right. The 
empirical literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, shows that these sorts of representations figure in 




could be represented as a white square labeled “A”, or a red square labeled “A”, or a white circle 
labeled “B”, etc. Not every concept the organism possesses is available to be used in object 
perception, so PORs do not display global systematicity. But they do appear to display local 
systematicity, in that any predicate applicable to visual objects can be applied to any visual object 
in various combinations. 
3.2—Semantic systematicity and syntactic systematicity. One might object that even iconic 
representations exhibit systematicity in this sense. After all, as Mohan Matthen notes in criticizing 
Evans’s Generality Constraint, “if one is able to entertain, in visual imagination for instance, images 
of a blue circle and of a red square, then one is able to entertain visual images of a blue square and 
a red circle” (2005, 80). This pushes us to yet another distinction: the difference between semantic 
systematicity and syntactic systematicity.  
Semantic systematicity is the capacity of a representational system capable of representing 
multiple features together to represent different configurations of those features. Matthen’s 
example is an instance of semantic systematicity. Syntactic systematicity is the capacity of a 
representational system to combine representational vehicles into larger syntactic structures. In an 
iconic representation of a blue square, since the representation has no constituent structure, it is 
not the case that there is one vehicle representing blue and another one representing square—one 
and the same syntactic part of a photograph of a blue square represents both the color and shape of 
the object. Since icons lack such constituent vehicles, icons cannot display systematicity of vehicles. 
Instead, they exhibit the capacity to coordinate contents in different ways without recombining 




syntactic systematicity is a better guide to conceptuality than semantic systematicity; the former, 
but not the latter, requires separate vehicles to be recombined into larger structures, and this sort 
of syntactic recombinability is a hallmark of propositional thought. 
I argued above that PORs are locally systematic, but that argument only sufficed to 
demonstrate semantic systematicity. To see whether PORs exhibit syntactic systematicity, we have 
to see whether PORs involve separate vehicles for each attributive element of representational 
content. It’s not easy to determine an answer to this question. As noted above, however, we have 
independent reason to think that PORs are discursive. The semantic systematicity exhibited by 
iconic representations does not point toward syntactic systematicity, because icons lack 
constituents and are thus necessarily incapable of being syntactically systematic. But in the case of 
discursive representations, which have constituents, it is plausible to think that they represent 
distinct features via distinct types of constituents. Thus, showing semantic systematicity for 
discursive representations gives us good (defeasible) reason to think both that their constituents 
exhibit syntactic systematicity and also that the systematicity exhibited by those constituents 
explains the systematicity exhibited at the level of content. 
Furthermore, while no positive evidence has been presented to think object files encode 
any features in an iconic format, there is good empirical reason to think object files encode at least 
some features in a discursive format. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (and Quilty-Dunn 2016), object 
files encode basic-level categories like piano and fish in an abstract, amodal format such that there 
is an object-specific preview benefit for fish even when the preview is the word fish and the probe 




encode information in that way without a discrete symbol (i.e., representational vehicle) for fish. In 
that case, not only is the argument-term in a POR a discursive label-like indexical constituent, but 
at least some of the predicate-terms are as well. In that case, given that those predicate-terms can 
obviously apply to other objects, there is very good empirical reason to think that PORs exhibit not 
only semantic systematicity but syntactic systematicity as well. 
§4—Stimulus Independence 
Elisabeth Camp (2009) argues that mere systematicity is insufficient for genuine concept 
possession, and that systematicity must be exhibited in a way that is independent of present 
stimulation for the systematically deployed representations to count as legitimate concepts. 
Systematicity-displaying representations that are beholden to stimulation are “so cognitively 
minimal that they encompass a type of engagement with the world that is more like passive 
triggering than active understanding” (Camp 2009, 303).36 Stimulus-independent systematic 
representational capacities, on the other hand, are active in that the creature can deploy and 
combine concepts in a way that is not slavishly tied to what stimulation the creature is subjected to 
at a given moment. Since discursive perceptual representations are perceptual, and thus intimately 
tied to stimulation, perhaps they do not count as conceptual after all. Or perhaps, on the other 
hand, a representation’s being conceptual isn’t tied to its being cognitive, and conceptual 
representations can figure in perceptual as well as cognitive processes. 
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This debate gives off a faint odor of terminological quibbling. We need a taxonomy of 
different kinds of mental representations in accordance with different criteria of individuation; 
which ones we grant the honorific label ‘conceptual’ is not a serious theoretical issue unless it is 
tied to an explanatorily useful taxonomy. Furthermore, the claim that concepts are deployed in 
perception is compatible with the idea that such deployment is “more like passive triggering than 
active understanding.” Indeed, if the perception–cognition border is architectural rather than 
representational, then we would expect that type-identical representations may be deployed both 
as a matter of passive triggering and as a matter of active understanding, depending on the context. 
On the other hand, it does seem of theoretical interest whether perception ordinarily involves 
conceptual representations. An approach that rules out the possibility by fiat should thus be put 
aside. 
For debates about the role of concepts in perceptual systems to be substantive, we need to 
be able to distinguish the question of whether a representational vehicle is conceptual from the 
question of whether a mental process or system is cognitive. In answering the question of whether 
a vehicle used in some non-cognitive, perceptual system is conceptual, we should therefore ignore 
factors that are merely artifacts of the system’s being perceptual.  
This method of determining whether perceptual representations are conceptual is an 
instance of the following principle: 
ARCHITECTURAL INDEPENDENCE: If tokens of one type of representation, R1, occur in 
cognitive system S1 and tokens of another type, R2, occur in system S2, R1 and R2 are the 
same type of representation iff the difference in their functional roles can be explained 




ARCHITECTURAL INDEPENDENCE presupposes that representations can preserve type-identity across 
architectural divides. The mere possibility of belief fragmentation, again, suggests that 
representations can be conceptual even when they occur in different cognitive systems (recall the 
coherence, if not the empirical plausibility, of the Freudian repression thesis). Furthermore, it seems 
conceivable that two tokens of the thought that p might occur in two distinct fragments, even 
though their functional roles are quite different in the different fragments. So if the difference 
between two apparently distinct kinds of representations can be explained away simply by their 
occurring in distinct cognitive systems, then it seems fair to conclude that the representations are 
of the same kind.  
One might grant that the difference is due to architectural factors but object that the two 
representations are thereby instances of distinct kinds, particularly if architectural factors bring 
along stark differences in functional role. In particular, the functional role of a representation in 
perception might be so different from that of paradigmatically conceptual representations in 
cognition that we might be tempted to deem the former representation nonconceptual even in cases 
where those functional differences are entirely explained by appeal to architectural differences. But 
in that case the debate at hand threatens to become merely verbal: one theorist decides to use the 
term ‘conceptual’ in a way that abstracts away from architectural divisions, and the other does not. 
To prevent the debate from becoming verbal, we should assume ARCHITECTURAL INDEPENDENCE 
and see whether the difference between discursive perceptual representations and those that can 
be deployed independently of stimulation is merely architectural or requires positing differences 




It does indeed seem to be a prominent feature of cognition that whether a representation is 
deployed is not determined solely by what stimulation the creature is currently experiencing. But 
that feature of cognition is due to facts about cognitive systems and the kinds of processes that 
figure in them, not necessarily due to any additional facts about the representational vehicles 
themselves. It seems possible that representations with all the same internal features as those that 
occur in stimulus-independent reasoning could occur instead in a system that only deploys 
representations given certain stimulation. One might balk at labeling those representations 
“conceptual” when they occur in stimulus-dependent systems, but the relevant difference seems to 
be entirely reducible to facts about cognitive architecture. In that case, the representations would 
be type-identical according to ARCHITECTURAL INDEPENDENCE.  
Consider belief fragmentation in central cognition once again. Suppose that a certain 
fragment houses only implicit racist attitudes about a particular group, which attitudes are 
fragmented because they are incompatible with explicit egalitarian beliefs held by the same subject. 
Suppose that representations in the racist fragment are only deployed upon perceiving people of 
the relevant racial type. This possibility seems (a) entirely explained by architectural facts, and (b) 
entirely compatible with the representations’ being conceptual. Indeed, Mandelbaum (2016) and 
Elga and Rayo (unpublished) argue that fragments are individuated by the contexts that elicit the 
accessing of their stored beliefs. This hypothesis supposes the beliefs stored in different fragments 
to be conceptual despite their activation being passively determined and thus “at the mercy of 
[thinkers’] environments” (Camp 2009, 290). Stimulus independence is thus not only explainable 




conceptual from the nonconceptual. And to reiterate a point from earlier, it doesn’t much matter 
whether these fragmentation stories are actually true; it just matters that they describe coherent 
states of affairs in which representations maintain their status as conceptual despite being 
architecturally housed in such a way that they are only deployed in response to the satisfaction of 
certain elicitation conditions. 
Stimulus independence is an architectural factor, and is best suited for theories that take the 
difference between perceptual representations and concepts to supervene entirely on where in the 
mind they occur. It makes perfect sense that a concept empiricist like Jesse Prinz (2002), for 
example, takes stimulus independence to be the basis of the distinction between nonconceptual 
perceptual representations and concepts. For Prinz, concepts simply are perceptual representations 
that are stored in long-term memory and become available for deployment outside their original 
perceptual contexts. In terms of the internal features of the representations, especially their format, 
there is no difference between concepts and perceptual representations on Prinz’s theory. It is clear, 
therefore, why he employs a criterion for individuating perceptual representations from concepts 
that is purely architectural and allows perceptual and conceptual representations to be internally 
alike. The same motivation for stimulus independence might hold for a sort of pure language-of-
thought view (Pylyshyn 2003 may be an example, particularly given his apparent opposition to 
positing iconic representations at any stage of perceptual processing), according to which all 
representations in central cognition and perceptual systems are amodal discursive representations. 
But for those who reject concept empiricism and pure language-of-thought views, we must 




concepts—differences that do not just reduce to facts about where in the mind they occur. Stimulus 
independence may be a good way of distinguishing perceptual systems from cognitive systems 
(though it may not do justice to the evidence in favor of central modules and belief fragmentation). 
But that architectural division does not necessarily map on perfectly to the distinction between 
nonconceptual and conceptual representations, particularly if we reject views like those discussed 
in the previous paragraph. Distinguishing nonconceptual perceptual representations from concepts 
by appeal to differences in format is far more congenial to mainstream non-empiricist accounts of 
concepts than doing so by appeal to stimulus independence.  
Recall, furthermore, the dialectic between representational and architectural approaches to 
the perception-cognition border. The project at the outset of this chapter was to see whether the 
representational strategy can be resisted by arguing that the discursive outputs of perceptual 
systems are type identical to concepts deployed in cognitive systems. The foregoing discussion 
suggests that stimulus independence is an irrelevant criterion for that project, since stimulus 
independence is consistent with concepts and percepts being internally type-identical (as Prinz 
would argue). Stimulus independence is thus not an adequate condition to appeal to in evaluating 
the representational strategy for distinguishing perceptual from cognitive systems. 
Finally, Gordon and Irwin (2000) showed that object files incorporate symbols standing for 
abstract properties like fish that are primed by words (e.g., ‘fish’) and tested by pictures (e.g., a 
picture of a fish). Are these symbols type-identical to the concept FISH? Note how unhelpful the 
criterion of stimulus independence is for answering this question. PORs are stimulus dependent 




processes in response to stimulation. It follows that the deployment of the token symbols in a POR 
is stimulus dependent. The question at hand, however, concerns whether those token symbols are 
of the type FISH. Assuming stimulus independence as a criterion on conceptuality, the question 
becomes whether the symbol tokened in perceptual contexts is the same type of symbol tokened in 
non-perceptual, paradigmatically cognitive contexts (as in, for example, when one wonders what 
kind of fish live at the bottom of the Atlantic). In this case, however, stimulus independence is 
unilluminating. We need to have independent criteria on conceptuality in order to answer the 
question of whether token representations that figure in PORs are type identical to token concepts 
that figure in thought. Even if we accept stimulus independence as a criterion on a (type of) 
representation’s being conceptual, it is unhelpful in determining whether conceptualism about 
perception is true. 
§5—Amodality 
One might object that concepts are constitutively amodal (Fodor 1975), and that PORs are modality 
specific and so nonconceptual. The supposed amodality of concepts is controversial (Prinz 2002), 
but we can assume for the sake of argument that concepts are constitutively amodal only to make 
the case against the conceptuality of object representations even stronger. PORs, however, do not 
obviously fail to meet this criterion. 
There are two ways in which a representation can be modality specific. A representation is 
extrinsically visual if it is visual only insofar as it is deployed in the visual system. A representation 




conditions in which it is deployed. An example of a representation of the second kind might be a 
visual iconic representation. Visual iconic representations not only exhibit neural retinotopy 
(Frisby and Stone 2010; see Chapter 2 of this dissertation), but they also coordinate color with shape 
and location in a way that no representations in other modalities do (see Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation). Visual icons lack separate constituents for shape and location but instead have 
selfsame iconic parts that determine locations along quality dimensions of both color and location; 
arguably, visual iconic representations are intrinsically visual because they coordinate color with 
location/shape in this fashion, while auditory iconic representations are intrinsically auditory 
because they coordinate pitch, volume, etc., with location in a similar fashion. Moving outside the 
head, a painting is intrinsically not an auditory representation, but a visual one, and this is arguably 
due in part to the way it coordinates color with shape and location without contingent syntactic 
concatenations of representations of those features. Since discursive perceptual representations are 
not iconic, they do not exhibit this kind of intrinsic modality specificity.  
Perhaps PORs, due to their architectural position in mid-level vision, are ipso facto 
(extrinsically) modality specific. If so, their apparent nonconceptuality might reduce to 
architectural factors. It’s not clear in that case that extrinsic amodality should be taken to be 
constitutive of conceptuality. As argued in the discussion of stimulus independence above, mere 
architectural isolation of a representation is compatible with its being type-identical to conceptual 
representations in central cognitive systems, and thus should not be regarded as a sufficient 
condition for that representation’s being nonconceptual. The same point applies here with respect 




It is far from clear, however, that representations in mid-level vision or later in visual 
processing are really encapsulated within vision. Indeed, Spelke (1988) argues that the capacity to 
represent objects is independent of a particular modality on grounds that object representations 
exhibit systematic crossmodal effects (cf. Scholl and Leslie 1999). Carey (2009) also argues that 
object representations are not distinctly visual because they persist despite occlusion. Scholl and 
Leslie (1999) argue against claims by developmental psychologists like Spelke that object 
representation is totally non-perceptual and “maximally central” (26). Instead, they defend what 
they call the “object-indexing framework” where the representations responsible for Spelke’s (and 
others’) results are the same as those responsible for multiple-object tracking and object files, i.e., 
mid-level visual object representation. But even Scholl and Leslie articulate the apparent lack of 
modality specificity of object representation: 
An interesting challenge to the object-indexing framework comes from cross-modal 
aspects of the object concept[.]…Some contact-mechanical aspects of the object concept, 
at least, do seem to be cross-modally sensitive…and the same may hold for spatiotemporal 
aspects[.]…The apparent conflict lies in the fact that mechanisms of object-based attention 
have primarily been proposed to function over only a visual domain and to be somewhat 
distinct from other modalities: it has often been noted that visual and auditory processing, 
for instance, share several surprisingly similar mechanisms[.]…In addition, although it is 
the visual aspects of Pylyshyn’s visual-indexing framework that have received the most 
experimental attention, visual indexes are primarily intended to be part of a visuo-spatial 
system, and Pylyshyn’s model explicitly includes a proprioceptive component[.]…It is 
possible that object indexing operates in a single cross-modal space, but this is not a 
necessary aspect of our model. 
(Scholl & Leslie 1999, 59; citations omitted) 
More recently, Jordan et al. have shown that the object-specific preview benefit (Kahneman 
et al. 1992) works cross-modally—specifically, object files formed through vision can be accessed 




object, such as a piano, and the target information, which participants had to confirm or disconfirm 
was a “match” with the preview information, was a corresponding sound, such as the sound of a 
struck piano key. Subjects exhibited an object-specific preview benefit for sounds that matched the 
visual preview information, even when resources for verbal rehearsal were depleted by a load task 
in which they had to silently verbally repeat a string of numbers in inner speech. They conclude 
that “object files can operate across visual and auditory modalities” (2010, 501; emphasis theirs).  
PORs enable access to encoded representations from multiple sensory modalities, encoding 
kinds like piano in a way that is not limited to the visual appearance or sound of pianos, which 
belies the claim that they are distinctly and intrinsically visual. PORs are not modality specific in 
any substantive sense: they are not iconic; as mentioned above, they encode non-vision-specific 
properties of objects; and despite functioning in visual processing and being commonly referred to 
as constructions of “mid-level vision,” they do not appear to be architecturally limited to vision 
alone. Jordan et al. conjecture that object files “store object-related information in an amodal 
format that can be flexibly accessed across senses” (2010, 500). It appears that PORs, like conceptual 
representations, are not only discursive but intrinsically amodal. 
§6—Inferential Promiscuity 
A representation is inferentially promiscuous if it can figure as a premise in an inferential transition 
(Stich 1983).37 Since inferences are a paradigmatic case of a process that operates on conceptual 
                                                          
37 One might reserve the term ‘premise’ for a proposition that is logically related to the other elements of an argument 
rather than a mental representation, in which case the text should say “premise-representation” or something similar 




representations, inferential promiscuity is a promising criterion for conceptuality (see, e.g., 
Peacocke 1992). 
Carey (2009) and others (e.g., Scholl and Leslie 1999) argue that PORs in adults (i.e., visual 
indexes and the object files they are linked to) involve the same underlying capacity to represent 
objects that is studied in developmental psychology (e.g., Spelke 1988). Carey (2009) and Spelke 
(1988) argue based on the developmental literature that infants use object representations as 
premises in inferences. For example, a POR might represent an object as solid and cause the infant 
to infer on that basis that the object will not go through a solid shelf when dropped, thus generating 
surprise (as measured by an increase in looking time) when the object is revealed to be below the 
shelf (Spelke et al. 1992; see also Carey 106ff). Perhaps, in that case, PORs are indeed inferentially 
promiscuous. 
Despite being intuitive, however, this form of explanation is not mandatory. One could 
reasonably object that the computations responsible for looking-time effects like these do not 
constitute genuine inference. This example illustrates how hard it is to show that a given 
representation is inferentially promiscuous in a non-question-begging way. Every time we might 
point to an apparently inferential transition that the representation initiates, an opponent could 
reply that the transition isn’t really inferential. For instance, Helmholtz (1867) took all perceptual 
processing to involve inference, but today many theorists regard much of perceptual processing as 
non-inferential computation (e.g., Burge 2010a). Merely showing that a process transforms one 




show that the process is inferential. To better understand inferential promiscuity as a criterion on 
conceptuality, therefore, we need to understand what constitutes an inferential process. 
First, however, it will help to get clearer about the modality of ‘can’ in characterizing an 
inferentially promiscuous representation as one that “can” figure in inference. Does this criterion 
require occurrent inferential promiscuity such that the concept-holder presently has the ability to 
use it in inference? Or does it require merely that the representation is the type of representation 
that could figure in inferences, even if it never actually does?  
Some philosophers have argued that concepts simply are inferential roles (e.g., Peacocke 
1992). In that case, inference is metaphysically prior to conceptuality. It follows that a 
representation cannot be a concept unless the creature who possesses it also possesses the occurrent 
capacity to use it in inference. Inferential-role accounts of conceptuality therefore seem to entail 
that occurrent inferential promiscuity is a necessary condition for a representation’s being 
conceptual. 
Fodor (2004) argues that inferential-role accounts of conceptuality are left without a 
substantive theory of what inference is. Moreover, I argued in Chapter 1 that at least a superficial 
(in Schwitzgebel’s [2013] sense) form of dispositionalism that casts representations in terms of 
occurrent dispositions for processes to take place is not feasible. A computational account of mental 
processes construes such processes as causal operations on mental particulars and thereby enables 
a substantive causal-mechanical explanation of behavior. Inferential-role accounts cannot construe 
inferences as operations on mental particulars, since concepts, on such accounts, simply are 




particular, it is a fortiori not a mental particular on which some computational process can operate 
(cf. Peacocke 2004). Thus computational theories of mind, even those that otherwise bear little 
resemblance to traditional language-of-thought theories (such as Prinz 2002), are united in their 
commitment to concepts’ being mental particulars. 
If inferential-role views of conceptuality are false, then a representation might not need to 
be occurrently disposed to figure in inference to be conceptual. Instead it might be that concepts 
are symbols that are constitutively apt to figure in inference. There is some independent reason to 
think this is the case. Some beliefs might be quarantined via repression or fragmentation, for 
example, such that, even though qua beliefs they are apt to function as premises in inferences, the 
architecture prevents this capacity from being exercised. Here as elsewhere it seems that the 
important constitutive question is whether a representation is apt to perform a certain function 
rather than whether it happens to be situated in a mind that enables it to do so. Indeed, if 
computational approaches to inference are correct, then understanding the nature of inference may 
require understanding the structures of conceptual states rather than vice versa. For 
computationalism assumes that inference, like other computational mental processes, is a certain 
kind of operation on certain kinds of symbols. In that case, knowing which kinds of symbols figure 
in inference and how their structures enable them to play the roles that they do is necessary for an 
adequate understanding of inference. Characterizing inferential transitions, on this approach, 
requires first characterizing the states involved in those transitions. 
Computationalist views thus invite a “representation-first” approach to concepts, while 




metaphysical question of which properties are constitutive of conceptuality; the epistemological 
question of what constitutes good evidence for a state’s being conceptual is a separate one. One can 
adopt a representation-first approach to concepts while also taking the apparent presence of 
inferential capacities to be very good evidence in favor of judging a representation to be conceptual. 
And one can adopt an inference-first approach while also taking the apparent presence of an 
amodal discursive format, for example, to be very good evidence in favor of judging a 
representation to be conceptual (though it is not as clear how to understand format on an inference-
first approach).  
When considering the metaphysical question of conceptuality from a computationalist 
perspective, we should first consider the kinds of states that are constitutively apt to function as 
premises in inferential transitions. From a computationalist perspective, the leading candidates for 
the states involved in paradigmatic conceptual inference are propositionally structured mental 
representations (e.g., Fodor 1975; 1987; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988; Pylyshyn 1984; Braine & O’Brien 
1998).38 Inferential transitions, on a promising version of this view, are transitions between 
propositionally structured mental representations in virtue of their constituent structure alone, in 
accordance with some built-in formal rule of mental logic such as modus ponens (Quilty-Dunn 
and Mandelbaum unpublished b). Since PORs are discursive and thus have constituent structures, 
                                                          
38 Camp (2007) and Rescorla (2009a) argue that creatures can think and draw inferences by means of maplike 
representations. Like them, I assume that at least much of paradigmatically cognitive inference in humans involves 
non-maplike, propositionally structured representations figuring in logical inference. I reserve the term ‘concept’ for 
constituents of such propositional structures. One might insist that the constituents of maplike representations in 
cognition count as conceptual. Dialectically, however, appealing to this looser notion of conceptuality would seem to 
be unfair to anti-conceptualists about perception. I therefore assume the stricter notion of conceptuality that demands 




then they may be constitutively apt to function as premises in structure-sensitive inferential 
transitions. The question turns on the specific sort of discursive format instantiated by PORs. 
To sum up: inferential promiscuity requires propositional structure. It is because thoughts 
of the form A IS F have the propositional structure they do that they combine with thoughts of the 
form IF A IS F THEN A IS G to inferentially yield the conclusion A IS G. We can therefore make headway 
on the question of whether PORs are apt to function as premises in inferential transitions by seeing 
whether they exhibit propositional structure. 
§7—Propositional Structure 
The format of PORs is discursive, but it does not necessarily follow that it is propositional. For 
instance, maps have a discursive format, but are not syntactically propositional (Camp 2007; 
Rescorla 2009a) and also contain non-discursive, iconic elements (Kulvicki 2015b). One can 
imagine taking an aerial photograph of a public park and putting discursive symbols on it (e.g., a 
‘B’ to mark a bathroom, and ‘F’ to mark a water fountain) and thereby composing a map. And maps 
differ in format from graphs, blueprints, hand gestures, and other types of representations that may 
be discursive without being propositional and wholly non-iconic. 
Propositional structure constitutively involves a kind of relation between representational 
vehicles that mirrors a predicative relation between their contents, thereby enabling the complex 
vehicle to express predication. As Camp puts it, “some sort of functional relation among syntactic 




those constituents” (2007, 157).39 We can call this feature of propositional representations syntactic 
predication, since it is directly analogous to, and functions to express, semantic predication (see 
Chapter 4 for further discussion of syntactic and semantic predication).  
The mere attribution of a property to an individual is not sufficient for syntactic 
predication, since property attribution can be accomplished without complex syntactic structure. 
A picture of a red barn, for example, may attribute redness to the barn, but it does not possess 
separate vehicles for the barn and its color—one cannot cut out the part that represents the barn 
but leave the part that represents its redness, or vice versa. Moreover, some philosophers might 
separate mere attribution of properties from semantic predication and argue that iconic 
representations accomplish the former but not the latter (e.g., Burge 2010a), in which case icons a 
fortiori fail to instantiate syntactic predication. 
Even representations that have semantically predicative propositional contents do not 
necessarily instantiate syntactic predication. For example, suppose one quail hunter yells “Quail!” 
to another. This utterance arguably has a propositional content like <There is at least one quail 
nearby> or <That is a quail>, but it is syntactically atomic; the semantic predicative relation is in 
no way made explicit in the syntax of the linguistic token (cf. Quine 1960, Chapter 2).  
                                                          
39 Camp’s formulation seems more favorable to Russellian rather than Fregean accounts of propositions. Her 
formulation takes the distinctly proposition-like structure of propositional representations to consist in a mapping of 
syntactic structure  onto logical/metaphysical relations among the extensions of their constituents. This makes the 
most sense if one takes the constituents of propositions to be those extensions. If the constituents of propositions are 
Fregean senses, on the other hand, then the mapping relation that marks a representation as propositional should be 
between its syntactic structure and the semantic relations among the constituent senses of the Fregean proposition. I 
will describe the mapping relation as between the way constituents are syntactically ordered and the way their contents 
are semantically ordered, intending thereby to remain as neutral as possible between Fregean and Russellian accounts 





Another illustrative example comes from maps and the markers they contain. Maps involve 
iconic representations of the spatial layout of the represented terrain. They also, however, involve 
markers that function non-iconically. Markers are discrete symbols that are deployed to predicate 
the instantiation of some property at a location corresponding to their location on the map (such 
as the ‘B’ to predicate the presence of a bathroom at some location in the example above).40 Even if, 
as a matter of fact, the marker is an icon—e.g., a picture of a house that marks the presence of a 
house—it functions as a discrete symbol relative to the rest of the map. To predicate the presence 
of treasure at a location on a map, one might write the sentence, ‘The treasure is here.’ ‘The treasure 
is here’ exhibits both semantic and syntactic predication, since there are separate vehicles for the 
property and the location represented, and there is a syntactic relation between the two that mirrors 
the semantic relation between their contents. Instead, however, one might simply draw an “X”. The 
“X” predicates the presence of treasure at the corresponding location in the terrain, and thereby 
has the propositional content <there is treasure here>. The “X” does not, however, express that 
content in a syntactically explicit fashion. It is syntactically atomic and lacks constituents that 
compose in a fashion that recapitulates the semantic relation of predication present in its 
propositional content. The fact that a representation accomplishes semantic predication, therefore, 
does not entail that the representation exhibits syntactic predication. 
With these caveats in mind, we can now turn to the question of whether PORs exhibit 
syntactic predication. The distinction between the indexical constituents of PORs (i.e., visual 
                                                          
40 Rescorla (2009a; 2009b) offers interesting arguments for the conclusion that maps do not accomplish predication, 




indexes, or “FINSTs”) and feature constituents requires that there be separate vehicles 
corresponding to individual objects and the properties attributed to them by the POR. 
Furthermore, PORs can be accurate or inaccurate depending on whether the objects they pick out 
have the properties they represent. For example, a POR that stands for object O1 and encodes the 
property red is accurate iff O1 is red, and thereby has the content <O1 is red>. In that case, their 
evaluability for accuracy arises from the way their constituent feature representations are connected 
to their constituent indexical representations. That is, PORs have separate vehicles for represented 
individuals and properties, and those vehicles are syntactically ordered in a way that mirrors the 
semantic relation between their constituents. PORs, therefore, exhibit syntactic predication. PORs 
are propositionally structured perceptual representations. 
According to Burge (2010b), a representation must exhibit “pure” predication to count as 
genuinely propositional. Pure predication consists in the applicability of a predicate outside of 
purely referential contexts. For example, the application of the predicate ‘man’ in the phrase ‘that 
man is tall’ is not pure, since it appears within the scope of the demonstrative referential noun 
phrase. The application of ‘tall’, on the other hand, is an instance of pure predication. Tallness is 
attributed to the referent of ‘that man’, but outside the scope of the referential noun phrase. Burge 
further claims that, since the content of perception is always akin to a referential noun phrase, 
perception never exhibits pure predication. 
It is unclear whether Burge should be read as characterizing the structure of the vehicles of 
representation rather than the structure of content. After all, he claims that the referential-noun-




and maps (2010a, 540). Photographs and maps do not seem to have a THAT F syntactic structure—
for example, what would be the demonstrative syntactic constituent of a photograph? If Burge is 
indeed not describing the syntactic apparatus necessary for propositional structure, then his view 
may be compatible with the thesis that PORs have a propositional structure. He may instead argue 
that they lack a certain kind of propositional content that is distinctive of at least some forms of 
rational thought. This claim requires the decidedly Fregean assumption that there is more than one 
kind of content including some that are non-propositional, which I cannot address here. If Burge’s 
view just requires that propositional content involves pure predication, then it is consistent with 
the claim that there might be representations with a propositional syntactic structure that 
nonetheless lack propositional content. Since my concern is the structure of PORs rather than the 
nature of their content, this view would for present purposes be benign. 
It may nonetheless be fruitful to take Burge’s condition of pure predication as a proposal 
about the syntactic structure of propositional thought. One way of understanding pure predication 
is as requiring stimulus independence. That is, for a feature representation to function in a purely 
predicative fashion, it must be capable of being applied outside of perceptual contexts. This seems 
to follow from Burge’s claim that pure predication requires application outside the scope of a 
referential phrase together with his claim that perception always has a referential structure. But in 
that case, the pure-predication criterion faces all the same problems as the stimulus-independence 
criterion. Furthermore, the question of whether perceptual processes ever deliver propositionally 




criterion of pure predication, like all stimulus-independence-based views of conceptuality, rules 
out the possibility a priori. 
The pure predication criterion seems to be ambiguous between two claims. One is that, for 
a representation to be purely predicatively applied, the representation must be such that it could be 
deployed in non-referential contexts. The other claim is that the creature whose representation it is 
must be capable of deploying that representation in non-referential contexts. It seems possible (i) 
that a creature might form representations with a structure that would in principle allow those 
representations to be taken apart and deployed separately in other contexts, but also (ii) that the 
creature lacks the cognitive apparatus to take apart and redeploy those representations. Pure 
predication thus seems not to be a feature of the format of a representation, but rather to be a feature 
of cognitive systems. Burge’s invocation of pure predication as a condition on propositional 
structure thus seems to focus on abilities of cognitive systems rather than representational format. 
But propositional structure is better understood as a matter of representational format.  
It is precisely because a cognitive system operates on representations ordered into complex 
propositional structures that it is capable of pulling those simple representations apart and 
redeploying them elsewhere. Propositional format is ontologically prior to cognitive processing, 
and the pure predication criterion reverses that order. The redeployability of a representation 
outside purely referential, perceptual contexts may be good evidence of propositional format, but it 
should not be taken to be constitutive of propositional format. At best, doing so requires that a 
creature have amodal cognitive capacities in order to have propositional representations and thus 




causal-mechanical explanations of behavior that construe cognitive processes as computational 
operations on (ontologically prior) propositionally structured representations. 
I have been criticizing the use of pure predication as a condition on propositional structure 
and arguing that PORs might be propositional even if they fail to exhibit pure predication. It is 
consistent with that criticism, however, that PORs also happen to exhibit pure predication. I argued 
above that PORs are intrinsically amodal. They represent kinds like fish and hammer in a way that 
is totally untethered to low-level features. Moreover, these representations are mapped to lexical 
items like the word ‘fish’ and to auditory representations like the sound of a hammer banging. This 
provides independent reason for thinking these representations are the same as those we use when 
thinking about fish or hammers—that is, that they are the concepts FISH and HAMMER. The fact that 
they are deployed perceptually does not rule out this possibility, even assuming pure predication as 
a condition on propositional structure. If we were to try to find evidence of a purely predicative 
representation applied in visual perception, we would try to find evidence of its availability for 
linguistic and non-visual processes. It is plausible therefore that at least some of the constituents of 
PORs function outside purely referential, perceptual contexts and are therefore applied in a purely 
predicative fashion. 
§8—Conclusion 
An empirical hypothesis for object perception emerges from this discussion: Object representations 
in perceptual systems are compartmentalized conceptual representations. They exhibit some of the 




into individuals, representing/categorizing, local systematicity, amodality, propositional structure, 
and inferential promiscuity. They don’t occurrently exhibit others, such as global systematicity, 
because of their architectural position outside central cognition, but they may possess them in a 
counterfactual sense such that they would occurrently exhibit them if placed in central cognition. 
It could instead be true, as Scholl and Leslie write, that the “mechanisms and processes 
which drive infants’ discriminative abilities may best be characterized as neither ‘perceptual’ nor 
‘conceptual,’ but somewhere in between” (1999, 27; cf. Shea 2014). There is a substantive sense in 
which they are correct. To be sure, PORs are not cognitive representations; they are not the result 
of operations in central cognition. Indeed, I argued in Chapter 2 that the evidence overwhelmingly 
suggests that PORs are perceptual. But I have given some reason to think that they are nonetheless 
a species of conceptual representation. There is an apparent difference between such 
representations and fully promiscuous conceptual representations in central cognition, but this 
need not arise from a difference in kind. In the absence of some more substantive proposal that 
accounts for both the iconicity of early vision and the discursivity of PORs, I take it as an intact 
working hypothesis that such representations are conceptual despite their occurrence in mid-level 
perceptual systems rather than central cognition.  
We can thus draw a distinction between four kinds of representations: (i) cognitive 
conceptual representations, which are discursive representations in central cognition such as 
ordinary beliefs; (ii) perceptual conceptual representations, which are discursive representations in 
perceptual systems such as PORs; (iii) cognitive nonconceptual representations, which are 




memory; and (iv) perceptual nonconceptual representations, which are nondiscursive 
representations in perception such as iconic perceptual representations. 
One might object to this whole line of argument on grounds that being conceptual entails 
being cognitive, and being cognitive entails not being perceptual (e.g., Raftopoulous 2014).41 Of 
course, one might say, being conceptual is an architectural matter. Concepts live in central cognition 
and nowhere else—that’s part of what the term ‘conceptual’ means. So we know a priori that nothing 
in perception could be conceptual. This perspective is perhaps legitimate, but as noted above, the 
dispute at this point seems to devolve into a futile war between terminological preferences. It does 
seem, on the other hand, that there is a substantive theoretical question whether perception is 
conceptual or nonconceptual.  
Insofar as this question is substantive and there is an architectural division between 
perception and cognition, I have argued, any attempt to answer it must abstract away from merely 
architectural differences and accept ARCHITECTURAL INDEPENDENCE. Since conceptual 
representations in central cognition and some perceptual representations are internally alike, and 
                                                          
41 Raftopoulos (2014, 614–615) gives additional arguments for why concepts can’t be encapsulated, but they are tailor-
made for early vision and so don’t successfully undermine the arguments in this chapter. He argues (i) that a certain 
account from Pylyshyn doesn’t posit genuine conceptual representations but rather something implicit, (ii) that 
representations in early vision are iconic and so don’t logically combine or figure in inferences, (iii) that early visual 
representations don’t allow for reidentification, and (iv) they don’t satisfy the Generality Constraint. Claims (i) and (ii) 
aren’t relevant to the proposal at hand, claim (iii) doesn’t seem to apply to object representations in mid-level vision 
nor to face perception or other forms of late vision, and claim (iv) is argued against at length above for representations 
in mid-level vision and up. Raftopoulos may in fact agree with the thesis of this chapter, since he thinks only early 
vision is nonconceptual and iconic. But the arguments just mentioned seek to show that encapsulation is sufficient for 
nonconceptuality, and they do not succeed at establishing that conclusion. Moreover, object perception is 




their differences are entirely explicable by appeal to architectural divisions, the answer to the 







 “Does my visual image of this tree, of this chair, consist of parts? And what 
are its simple component parts?” 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §47 
§1. Problematizing Icons 
Early perceptual systems and mental imagery involve modality-specific iconic mental 
representations—perceptual icons, for short. Like photographs or paintings, perceptual icons are 
profoundly un-language-like. In particular, every part of an icon corresponds to a part of the scene 
represented by the whole icon; icons lack canonical decompositions into privileged constituents, 
rendering them fundamentally different from anything resembling human language or 
propositional thought (Kosslyn 1980, 1994; Johnson-Laird 2006; Fodor 2007; Carey 2009; Kulvicki 
2015a; Quilty-Dunn 2016).42 As I argued in Chapter 2, these syntactic facts allow icons to figure in 
substantive explanations of high-capacity short-term perceptual memory capacities (e.g., Sperling 
1960; Coltheart 1980; Bradley and Pearson 2012), as well as mental imagery (Kosslyn 1980, 1994). 
I also argued that icons may help elucidate hallmarks of perception such as representation via 
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spatial frameworks, phenomenal richness and fine-grainedness, and the cognitive impenetrability 
of early perceptual systems. 
The fact that iconic representation is so unlike linguistic representation also presents several 
special problems for icons that do not arise for language-like representations such as propositional 
thoughts (at least as understood in terms of the classical computational theory of mind—see Fodor 
and Pylyshyn 1988). I’ll begin by detailing these problems and outlining how representations with 
constituent structure easily solve them. I’ll ultimately argue that icons solve all of these problems 
by coordinating analog values together, without adverting to constituent structure. My account is 
intended to characterize not only perceptual icons, but also the bare-bones syntactic and semantic 
properties of icons more generally, including paintings, graphs, photographs and emojis. The 
resulting account is meant to provide a scaffold for understanding iconic representation both inside 
and outside the mind.  
1.1—The problem of local processing. The mind is probably computational. That is, (at least some) 
mental processes should be understood as rule-governed operations on mental representations. 
Furthermore, computation is probably syntactically driven. That is, computational processes 
operate on locally individuated symbols, irrespective of the meanings of those symbols. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the contents of mental states tend to be wide, in that they depend on 
relations to the environment (and, typically, to their referents). The concept CICERO has the content 
it does not (solely) in virtue of anything internal to the minds of those who possess it, but rather 
(at least partly) in virtue of causal chains ultimately terminating in the man himself (Kripke 1980; 




reasoning about Cicero, so these systems must operate on local properties of the concept.43 I have 
framed this point in terms of the syntax of the relevant mental representations, in contrast with 
their semantics: syntactic properties are the locally individuated, content-independent but 
semantically exploitable properties of symbols, whereas semantic properties are those constitutive 
of sense, reference, evaluability for accuracy, and so on.44 
According to the classical computationalist story—canonically defended by Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988)—thoughts have constituent structures articulated in an innate, amodal language 
of thought, and the rules built into central cognition specify types of constituent structure rather 
than the (arguably inaccessible) semantic properties of thoughts or their conceptual constituents 
(see also Fodor 1975, 1987; Pylyshyn 1984). Different elements of this story have been challenged 
by computationalists. Some argue that some thoughts are map-like (Camp 2007; Rescorla 2009a), 
others argue that the constituents of thoughts are modality specific and acquired through 
perception (Prinz 2002), others argue that thought is couched in natural language (Gauker 2011), 
                                                          
43 ‘Local’ here means internal to a representational vehicle embedded within a combinatorial system. The orthography 
of some atomic linguistic item might suffice to distinguish it from some others of the same syntactic category (e.g., 
‘dog’ and ‘cat’), but won’t determine whether it is a noun phrase or a predicate, for example. It’s only relative to the 
combinatorial syntax of the language that some string of letters is a member of this or that syntactic category. Thus 
the syntactic properties of a symbol will be determined by its internal (e.g., orthographic) features and the way that it 
combines with other symbols within a system. 
44 Rescorla (2014) argues that computational transitions can be sensitive to semantics, but his arguments involve 
interventionist counterfactuals in which a computational process cannot be altered without altering locally 
individuated or “indigenous” semantic properties. These indigenous semantic properties are said to arise from 
embedding computational processes such that the output of one functions as input to another; in such cases, altering 
the content of a symbol necessitates altering its computational role, and computational operations on it are thus 
sensitive to its semantic properties. These interventionist counterfactuals might be true in certain cases of embedded 
computational systems, and thus some forms of computation might be “sensitive” to semantics (especially on an 
interventionist model of causation). This point does not undermine the claim that computational processes operate 
on syntactic features of mental representations. Indeed, Rescorla’s arguments may be interpretable as concluding that 
computational sensitivity to semantics emerges from operations on nonsemantically individuated symbols (though 




and still others accept much of the classical framework but offer anti-nativist accounts of concept 
acquisition (Carey 2009). These alternate formulations, however, tend to presuppose the core 
computationalist picture: thoughts have constituent structures, which allows cognitive systems to 
instantiate mental processes like inference by enacting computational operations on those 
structures via purely syntactic rules (see Braine and O’Brien 1998; Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 
unpublished b). 
The problem of local processing may by this point be clear. Mainstream theories of mental 
processing for decades have understood mental processes to be computational, and have 
understood computational mental processes as operations on constituent structures. Icons lack 
constituent structures, so they cannot figure in computational processes as ordinarily understood. 
But perceptual icons surely are inputs to and outputs of mental processes: icons in early perception 
are produced on the basis of retinal input and feed into later perceptual processes, and may even 
feed directly to conceptualization (as plausibly occurs in partial report paradigms—Sperling 1960) 
and motor systems; icons in mental imagery are generated on the basis of cognitive intentions and 
information stored in long-term memory, are transformed within imagery systems in operations 
like mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler 1971) and scanning (Kosslyn et al. 1978), and enable the 
acquisition of beliefs in central cognition (such as beliefs about spatial relations between imaged 
objects—Finke and Pinker 1982). 
The same arguments that motivate computationalism about mental processes generally, 
however, should also motivate a computationalist understanding of how perceptual icons figure in 




constituent structure such that processing icons could not count as computation; but that move 
would define the problem away rather than solving it. We are still left with the problem of how 
icons figure in local processing (i.e., operations on locally individuated properties of icons), 
whether or not such processing counts as Computation-with-a-capital-C. The classical 
computationalist picture of mental computation as a matter of operations on constituent structure 
must be supplemented by an account of the local processing (which I’ll loosely call computation) 
that perceptual icons undergo. A prominent iconophobe puts the problem succinctly: “This is a 
strong conclusion about cognitive architecture. It says, in effect, that the symbolic code idea that 
forms the foundation of computational theories does not apply to mental images” (Pylyshyn 2002, 
162). This is the problem of local processing. 
1.2—The binding problem(s). Our minds are more than a collection of atomic representations of 
distinct objects, properties, and relations. A typical human being can think not only about squares 
and about the color red, but also about red squares. The content <that is a red square> is somehow 
made up of the contents <red> and <square>. There must be some relation between the 
representations that express these simple contents that enables representation of the complex 
content. Explaining how contents bind together into a complex but unified whole is sometimes 
known, especially in perceptual psychology and neuroscience, as the binding problem (Clark 2004). 
It is also known as the feature integration problem (Treisman and Gelade 1980) and the many 
properties problem (Jackson 1977). 
The binding problem comes in various forms. One is the neural binding problem, which 




the phenomenal binding problem, the problem of accounting for how conscious experience can be 
made up of separate elements but nonetheless feel phenomenally unified (Bayne 2010). A third is 
the computational binding problem, the problem of understanding which lower-level 
computational algorithms are implemented by subpersonal mental systems in order to bind 
separate person-level vehicles or contents together. 
The two forms of the binding problem that will be at issue here are the syntactic and 
semantic binding problems. The syntactic binding problem is the problem of how a single 
representational vehicle can have multiple contents. The semantic binding problem is the problem 
of how a single content can incorporate multiple contents together.  
1.2.1—The semantic binding problem. The semantic binding problem is closely related to a problem 
philosophers of language call the problem of the unity of the proposition (Gaskin 2008; Jespersen 
2012). I don’t wish to engage directly with that problem here. For now, we can construe the 
semantic binding problem innocently enough that predication provides an answer to it. That is, the 
content <that is a red square> binds <red> and <square> together because both simple contents are 
predicated of the referent of <that>. This fact solves the semantic binding problem, but may not be 
anywhere near sufficient to account for the unity of the proposition—perhaps that problem may be 
restated as a problem of what semantic predication45 really amounts to.  
In any case, the semantic binding problem arguably arises for icons. It is not clear that icons 
are capable of expressing predication (see the following subsection for explication of the notion of 
semantic expression). Predication may require a logical apparatus that icons lack. In particular, it 
                                                          




may require a separation between arguments and predicates that does not figure in the proper 
semantic analysis of icons. But icons surely bind contents together: a mental image of a red square 
combines <red> and <square> such that an image of a red square and green triangle differ 
semantically from an image of a red triangle and a green square despite the fact that those two 
images share the same simple contents <red>, <green>, <square>, and <triangle>. 
The extent to which one accepts the existence of a semantic binding problem for icons will 
likely co-vary with the extent to which one accepts the conceptual coherence of so-called 
“nonconceptual content” as semantically different from the “conceptual content” of propositional 
thoughts. One might think that all content is propositional, and think it “decidedly puzzling” 
(Byrne 2005, 245) to suppose that perception could relate us to propositions that we could not ever 
be able to think (i.e., that are nonconceptual). On Russellian views of propositions, or on 
Stalnakerian possible-worlds views of content (Stalnaker 1984), it is indeed hard to see how any 
content graspable by perceptual systems could be impossible to express by means of words or 
concepts.  
Philosophers of perception interested in nonconceptual content (e.g., Evans 1982; Peacocke 
1992; Heck 2000; Burge 2010) tend to endorse Fregean views of propositional contents, on which 
the contents of thoughts are Fregean senses and the contents of perceptual states might be 
something else entirely (such as Russellian or Stalnakerian contents, or even Fregean senses of a 
distinctly nonpropositional sort—see Burge 2010). On such Fregean views, semantic predication 
can be understood as a Fregean sense or perhaps as a relation between Fregean senses, and its 




capacities. In that case, a lack of structure may prevent perceptual icons from facilitating the 
grasping of predicative Fregean propositions. And in that case, icons cannot solve the semantic 
binding problem by means of semantic predication. We may need some alternate account of the 
semantics of icons that enables them to bind multiple contents together without semantic 
predication. 
1.2.2—The syntactic binding problem. One may reject the Fregean framework required to formulate 
the semantic binding problem. The syntactic binding problem, however, cannot be sidestepped so 
easily. Consider the thought THAT IS A RED SQUARE. This thought is a complex mental representation 
partially composed of the concepts RED and SQUARE. These vehicles are syntactically bound 
together into a larger structure in a way that enables their contents to be predicated of the referent 
of THAT. This syntactic concatenation mirrors the semantic predication found in the propositional 
content of the thought; I will thus refer to it as syntactic predication. Syntactic predication is 
arguably what marks the format of thought as propositional (Camp 2007, 157). 
Whether or not the best way of understanding the contents of icons is in terms of 
semantically predicative propositions, icons do not achieve syntactic predication. In an iconic 
representation of a red square, the part that represents its red color, the part that represents its 
square shape, and the part that represents the individual that has those features are all the very same 
part of the icon. In the linguistic expression ‘That is a red square’, we can literally point to the part 
that represents the individual and to the parts that correspond to each predicate; in a photograph 
of a red square, on the other hand, there is only one relevant part of the picture to point at. The 




respectively—may not have parts one can point at, but they do have functionally individuated 
syntactic parts that generate the same sort of distinction. The concepts RED and SQUARE have 
separate representational vehicles that both inhere in the thought THAT IS A RED SQUARE, while an 
iconic mental image of a red square lacks a canonical decomposition into separate syntactic 
predicates, and thus expresses the contents <red> and <square> via one and the same part of the 
mental image. Furthermore, icons lack explicit vehicles that correspond to individuals that have 
represented properties—they do not come labeled with names or demonstratives. 
Here is another way of putting the syntactic binding problem: What syntactic features do a 
representation of a red square and a green triangle and a representation of a green square and a red 
triangle have in common? And what syntactic features do they not have in common? When it 
comes to representations with constituent structure like propositional thoughts, the form the 
answer should take is clear. The conjunctive thought THIS IS A RED SQUARE AND THAT IS A GREEN 
TRIANGLE shares the concepts RED, GREEN, SQUARE, and TRIANGLE with the conjunctive thought THIS 
IS A RED TRIANGLE AND THAT IS A GREEN SQUARE. Those thoughts differ in how they connect those 
categorial concepts together as well as which demonstrative concepts they are connected to via 
syntactic predication. In an icon, however, the form the answer should take is not so clear. We 
cannot isolate separate compositionally efficacious syntactic constituents shared by an image of a 
red square and green triangle and an image of a red triangle and green square. Nor can predicate-
like elements of an icon be connected to representations of individuals via syntactic predication. 
This is the syntactic binding problem for icons. 






What is the representational content of this picture? It certainly seems to represent colors, 
spatial relations, luminance edges, and other low-level features. Does it represent Obama? Does it 
represent Obama as smiling? Does it represent his smile as emanating from a misguided optimism 
about his presidency? Does it represent the flags behind him as being occluded by his body? Does 
it represent them as being occluded by Michelle Obama’s husband’s body? Does it represent him 
as standing (even if he is, in fact, crouching)? Suppose the picture was not taken of Obama but was 
instead a photograph of a complicated art installation of pieces of colored metal oriented in such a 
way as to exploit depth cues and look like Obama from precisely this vantage point. Would it still 
represent the scene as containing Obama? 
There is a difference between what a representation explicitly represents and what it 
represents only implicitly. The sentence ‘Barack Obama was born in Hawaii’ represents the 44th 
president of the United States, but not explicitly so; it doesn’t represent him as the 44th president. It 
does, however, explicitly represent him as Barack Obama as well as being born in Hawaii. 
Discursive representations, particularly ones that closely resemble language, provide a 
somewhat straightforward way of delineating the explicit content of a complex representation. The 




semantic values; the explicit content of the whole representation is a function of the semantic values 
of each constituent together with the way the constituents are syntactically connected in the 
representation. Knowing what ‘Barack Obama’, ‘was’, ‘born’, ‘in’ and ‘Hawaii’ mean, together with 
how they are connected in the sentence, enables us to know straight away what the explicit content 
of ‘Barack Obama was born in Hawaii’ is. One needs the additional piece of information that Barack 
Obama is the 44th president of the United States to know that the sentence represents the 44th 
president as being born in Hawaii. Explicit content can thus be delineated by appeal to the semantic 
values of constituents and the semantically relevant relations between those constituents, while 
implicit content must be inferred from other information. 
In the case of icons, it seems reasonable to search for a distinction between explicit, “bare-
bones” (Haugeland 1998, 185) content and implicit content, including, arguably, high-level content 
(cf. Kulvicki 2006, Chapter 6). But the story just told about discursive representations cannot apply 
to icons. Icons, to repeat, lack constituents. It follows that the explicit content of an icon cannot be 
a function of its constituents and their relations to each other.  
One might think this does not present a special problem, since icons are not the only 
symbols that lack constituents. Syntactically atomic symbols can have propositional contents—for 
example, a ‘T’ on a zoo enclosure might have the content <this is a tiger enclosure>. So perhaps 
there is a more general way of explicating content without constituents that abstracts away from 
iconic format. The prospects of this general approach are grim, however. Since atomic symbols lack 
any sort of combinatorial syntactic apparatus, each atomic symbol requires its own independent 




independently—slightly change the color of one tiny part of an icon, and you have to have a 
completely new semantic interpretation for the whole icon. This approach is implausible on its face, 
and it leads to an explosion of primitive semantic values. I’ll try to show later that it can be avoided, 
but it should in any case be clear that we should try to have an account of the syntax-semantics 
interface of icons that enables some sort of semantic compositionality.  
We might just throw our hands up and say there is no way of delineating explicit content in 
an icon, and that Figure 1 represents Michelle Obama’s husband’s optimism just as well as it 
represents some pattern of light and dark. Fodor (1981a; 2007) seems to tend in this direction. 
Following Wittgenstein’s puzzlement that a picture of a man walking uphill could just as easily 
depict a man walking downhill backwards, both Fodor (1981a) and Kosslyn (1980) argue that both 
pictures and perceptual icons lack contents except via associated propositional descriptions. This 
kind of surrender seems like a severe overreaction, especially given that examples like 
Wittgenstein’s are plausibly about implicit high-level content and do not undermine the idea of 
explicit “bare bones” content. We might instead say that the explicit content of an icon is a matter 
of artistic intentions or conventions of interpretation. But this kind of approach, while it may be 
correct for at least some semantic aspects of artifactual icons, will not apply to mental 
representations like perceptual icons. We therefore need a way of delineating the explicit contents 
of icons that does not face either of these pitfalls. This is the problem of explicit content. 
This problem is not of merely theoretical significance. We live in an increasingly iconic 
world. The ease of creating, reproducing, and transmitting images means that a larger portion of 




The question of how icons should be constructed and interpreted is of communicative, moral, and 
even legal significance.  
Consider the case of emojis: small, relatively simple icons used to convey meanings in text 
messaging, email, social media, and other electronic forms of communication. The Washington 
Post reported in early 2016 that “a growing number” of cases have arisen “where authorities 
contend the cartoonish symbols have been used to stalk, harass, threaten or defame people,” which 
has “left the police and courts wrestling with” how to interpret the content of an emoji.46 For 
example, the Post mentioned that a New York City grand jury was forced to determine whether a 
use of the emojis in Figure 17 (in the depicted order) constituted a threat to the safety of police 
officers. While the case against the 17-year-old who used these emojis on social media was thrown 
out by the grand jury, the president of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association wrote that the 
teenager “sent a message through social media that was easily interpreted by any reasonable person 
as a call for violence against police officers.”47 
 
Figure 17—A threat? 
No doubt these cases must appeal to the general conventions surrounding the use of emojis 
and, especially, the recoverable intentions (especially communicative intentions) behind particular 








uses. And the most important practical, moral, and legal issues might not be the explicit content of 
an emoji but rather the kind of speech act it may be used to perform. Nonetheless, these factors are 
doubtless shaped by the explicit content of an emoji. In Figure 2, for example, it seems to matter 
that the gun emoji is “pointing” in the direction of the police officer emoji in determining whether 
its use expressed an intention to convey bodily harm to police officers. In this sort of case, 
specifying the low-level, explicit content of the icon is important for practical as well as theoretical 
purposes.  
One might think these issues are straightforward and that we can easily translate from 
propositional to iconic forms of representation and back again by relying on general semantic 
competence. But Miller et al. (2016) found that, while each emoji has a corresponding Unicode 
description such as “grinning face with smiling eyes,” these underlying descriptions are rendered 
into subtly (and sometimes drastically) different icons across different platforms in ways that lead 
to strikingly different interpretations from users. For example, Figure 18 shows the Google and 
Apple emojis corresponding to the Unicode description ‘grinning face with smiling eyes’; the 
Google icon was rated much more positively than the Apple icon, and the former was described by 
a participant as “blissfully happy” while the latter was described by a participant as “ready to fight.” 
While there perhaps may be some semantic incompetence at Apple, it seems that specifying the 
explicit content of an icon is not so easy.  
 




and Apple (right). Miller et al. (2016) found that the Google image was rated much 
more positively.  
I focus on emojis only because they provide an emerging case where the proper 
understanding of the semantics of icons is very much up for grabs, and in a way that is of some 
social importance. As our representational media become less explicitly linguistic and more iconic, 
we should turn philosophical attention to the meanings of the symbols we use. 
1.4—Signposting. These problems—the problem of local processing, the syntactic and semantic 
binding problems, and the problem of explicit content—are solved for discursive representations 
by appeal to their constituents. One and the same syntactic feature of discursive representations 
enables them to figure in local processing, to bind contents and vehicles together, and to distinguish 
explicit from implicit content. This kind of unifying explanation is elegant and satisfying. I will 
likewise appeal to a feature of the syntax of icons to solve these problems in a similar way, but 
without constituents. Icons, I’ll argue, are syntactically and semantically analog: each part of an 
icon simultaneously holds values along multiple continuous syntactic dimensions that correspond 
to continuous dimensions of represented features, and thereby solve the problems mentioned 
without having constituent structure. 
§2. Feature Placing  
One might look at the suite of problems just articulated and conclude that there must be something 
wrong with the notion of iconic representation. We might instead search for an alternative syntax 
and semantics of representations in mental imagery and early perception (hereafter “sensory 




representations in terms of a feature-placing model. Feature-placing models (also endorsed, along 
roughly the same lines, in Tye 1991) construe sensory representation as a matter of “placing” 
features “at” locations.  
The metaphor suggests both a semantic and a syntactic reading. On the semantic reading, 
the idea is simply that the content of a sensory representation is that an instance of some feature is 
present at a location or placetime. “Placing” is understood in terms of attribution; for a feature to 
be placed at some location is for it to be attributed to that location. On the syntactic reading, 
feature-placing models quantify over an array of mental “locations” at which symbols are “placed”; 
symbols stand for different features, and a feature is predicated of a location if a symbol 
corresponding to that feature is placed at the mental “location” corresponding to that objective 
location (Tye 1991). 
It is not always clear which reading Clark intends. He is certainly committed to the truth of 
the semantic reading (e.g., 2004, 450), but he also posits mental sensory qualities corresponding to 
the objective features attributed to objects (a view developed in Clark 1993). While this latter point 
seems to suggest a syntactic reading, Clark (1996) adamantly rejects the idea that there are mental 
analogues of location which could be syntactically concatenated with mental sensory qualities. He 
writes instead that his model commits to a “stand-in for the capacities of spatio-temporal 
discrimination in virtue of which the sensory quality appears where it appears” (2004, 453). I 
confess I find this notion difficult to grasp without reading it as an appeal to mental location. 
Perhaps Clark does not mean to specify the syntactic structure of sensory representation at all, in 




Indeed, his apparent agreement with Pylyshyn with respect to the imagery debate (Clark 2009), 
differing only on whether visually represented individuals are exclusively objects or also include 
locations, suggests that his feature-placing model is friendly to propositional format. Tye’s (1991) 
discussion of symbol-filled arrays seems more clearly to commit to mental locations syntactically 
connected to mental representations of features.  
I will suppose that, minimally, a syntactic reading of feature-placing requires some such 
relation between separate representations for locations and for features. I will also put aside purely 
semantic feature-placing accounts (though I will return to the semantics of feature-placing later) 
and will hereafter take feature-placing to be a syntactic proposal.  
Feature-placing models are importantly different from iconic models of sensory 
representation (Clark 2009; Prinz 2011). Iconic models are marked by the lack of canonical 
decompositions in the syntactic structures of the representations they posit. Feature-placing 
models, on the other hand, are awash in canonical decompositions. A particular instance of feature-
placing will decompose into a mental representation of a feature, a mental representation of a 
location, and a syntactic relation between them that makes the larger structure semantically 
evaluable in terms of the represented feature being instantiated at the represented location. 
One potentially worrisome aspect of this feature-placing model is that it seems to implicate 
a propositional format and cannot therefore specify the respects in which sensory representations 
differ from thoughts. First of all, it requires a syntactic canonical decomposition. But more than 




proposition.48 In this respect, the format of a feature-placing complex seems to be importantly 
propositional. The representation decomposes into a constituent corresponding to a predicate (i.e., 
a feature) and one corresponding to an argument (i.e., a location), and the syntactic relation 
between these functions to express the semantic relation of predication. Exhibiting this kind of 
syntactic predication is arguably sufficient (perhaps even necessary) for a representation to be 
syntactically propositional (Camp 2007, 157). 
The apparently propositional representations posited by feature-placing models may 
nevertheless differ from those in central cognition in other sorts of ways. For example, relations 
between mental representations of location in sensory systems may mirror relations between actual 
or imagined locations (Tye 1991), while cognitive representations of location may differ from each 
other arbitrarily (just as linguistic representations of locations typically do). And mental 
representations of features in sensory systems may stand in quality-space relations to each other 
(Clark 1993; Rosenthal 2005; 2010), while cognitive representations of features need not. The worry 
about feature-placing models adverting to propositional constituent structure may therefore be 
consistent with representations in feature-placing systems differing from propositional thoughts in 
other syntactic ways. 
Nonetheless, I think the appeal to proposition-like structure that characterizes feature-
placing models is unmotivated. The main problem Clark appeals to his feature-placing model to 
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solve is the binding problem (e.g., Clark 2004). In short, features can be bound by attributing them 
to placetimes—and mental representations of features can be bound by syntactically “placing” them 
at placetimes (though, again, I’m not confident that Clark should be interpreted this way). I will 
now put forward a rival model: the coordination model of sensory representation. The coordination 
model has much in common with Clark’s feature-placing model, in that it appeals to nonconceptual 
states that have mental quality spaces. Unlike the feature-placing model, it appeals to iconic 
representations and lacks a predicative syntax and, depending on how the chips fall on more general 
semantic issues, it may even lack a predicative semantics.  
Perhaps some feature-placing model like Clark’s is in fact better suited to explain sensory 
representation on empirical grounds. Nonetheless, since such models do not involve iconic 
representation, we still need an account of how icons work. If Clark’s model is better suited to 
explain human perception, it is not because icons are conceptually incapable of expressing contents, 
binding features, and figuring in local computational processing. The coordination model is thus 
worth developing whether or not it accurately describes human sensory representation. 
Furthermore, since the main motivation for Clark’s model is its solution of the binding problem(s), 
showing how icons can do so without feature-placing goes some way to undermining the 
motivation for feature-placing models. 
I will first sketch the coordination model before showing how it solves the problems for 




§3. Analog Values and the Coordination Model 
3.1—Analog syntax and semantics. There is an intuitive, but theoretically vexed, distinction between 
analog or continuous representations and processes on the one hand, and digital or discrete 
representations and processes on the other. The intuitive extreme cases of analog and digital 
representation are pictures and words, respectively. On the processing side, the distinction between 
analog and digital computation is well-known and arguably quite old (MacLennan 2012). In 
cognitive science, classical computational theories of mind posit discrete representations and 
computational rules sensitive to their structural features while, as noted above, operations in mental 
imagery such as mental rotation and image scanning have suggested a need for alternative, perhaps 
analog, models (Shepard and Cooper 1982). 
Nelson Goodman (1976, Chapter 4) argued that the key to analog systems of representation 
is syntactic and semantic “density.” A system is syntactically dense if there is always a third 
character (or symbol) between any two characters that differ syntactically, and a system is 
semantically dense if there is always a third character between any two that differ semantically. 
Goodman’s requirement that analog symbol systems be both syntactically and semantically dense 
is too strong, and misses out on real joints between analog and digital representational systems. 
According to Goodman’s criterion, a mercury thermometer is genuinely analog only if every 
possible change in the degree of height makes both a syntactic and semantic difference. A 
thermometer in which small degrees of height are irrelevant, and only hitting certain thresholds is 
syntactically and semantically significant, counts as “notational” (i.e., digital and language-like) by 




perfectly continuous ways. To borrow a similar example from Pylyshyn (1984, 200), the second 
hand on an analog watch intuitively represents time in an analog fashion whether it glides smoothly 
or tics from second to second. 
I think the philosophical literature trying to spell out the uniquely correct criteria for 
distinguishing analog systems (e.g., Lewis 1971; Kulvicki 2015a) is a bit misguided. The word 
‘analog’ could be used to refer to a type of computation (e.g., Anonymous 1962/2008; MacLennan 
2012), to what I call iconic format (e.g., Carey 2009; Shea 2011; Kulvicki 2015a), to the use of 
magnitudes to represent magnitudes (Lewis 1971), to the representation of non-nested contents 
(Dretske 1981), or to a number of other interesting features of representations. All that matters is 
that a particular author’s usage is clear, consistent, theoretically useful, and refers to something real; 
beyond that, different usages may cut representational systems at different, equally legitimate joints. 
As I will use the term, iconic representations are syntactically analog in the sense that parts 
of icons take values along various continuous (though not necessarily dense) syntactic dimensions. 
This analog aspect of the syntax of icons enables49 icons to represent such that (i) altering the iconic 
part along a certain syntactic dimension will alter the content of the icon along a corresponding 
semantic dimension, and (ii) the degree of semantic alteration will shift to a degree that 
corresponds in a lawlike way to the degree of syntactic variation. 
                                                          
49 I write ‘enables’ rather than ‘requires’ because an artist may choose not to exploit the analog syntax of icons in 
representing what she aims to represent. The factors that determine the contents of artworks, such as the mental states 
of artists and interpreters, may be quite independent of the kind of bare syntactic and semantic apparatuses I articulate 
here (e.g., Briscoe 2016). The nature of photographs—specifically, that artistic intentions do not mediate their contents 
as directly or completely as other iconic forms of art—may require that their bare-bones content satisfies the analog 
semantic conditions laid out here. A painter, on the other hand, might decide to represent a scene in a way that makes 
very little use of the analog syntax of icon. If this line of thinking is right, then the analog syntax of icons makes 




Take any part of a photograph. That part will have a value along multiple color dimensions 
such as hue, saturation, and brightness.50 These values are syntactic, since they are semantically 
exploitable, locally individuated features of the representational vehicle. Furthermore, they vary in 
a continuous fashion: a part of a photograph could be a little brighter or a lot brighter, or somewhere 
in between. Furthermore, these syntactic dimensions correspond to semantic dimensions; the 
brightness value in a part of a photograph corresponds to a brightness value in what it represents. 
In the case of photographs, the syntactic dimension can be the same as the semantic dimension to 
which it corresponds—viz., in the present example, brightness.51 But that is not a necessary feature 
of analog representation. A mercury thermometer has a syntactic dimension of height along which 
it varies, and its syntactic value on this dimension corresponds to its semantic value on the 
dimension of ambient temperature. A functional icon, such as a mental image, can have 
functionally specified syntactic dimensions that map onto the discriminatory capacities that the 
representation facilitates, such as functional spatial dimensions (Kosslyn 1980, 1994). 
It does not matter for present purposes whether the syntactic or semantic dimensions of an 
icon are dense. Consider again Pylyshyn’s example of a second hand that tics as opposed to gliding 
from second to second. Though each tick is discrete, and there may be no syntactic or semantic 
continuity between two adjacent ticks, still the movement of the second hand is nonetheless a 
matter of degree—it can move more or less, and some locations are closer to each other than others. 
                                                          
50 I intend to sidestep controversy about the precise dimensions one should use in characterizing color space. However 
that shakes out, it will not affect the point at issue. I will refer to hue, saturation, and brightness, but color aficionados 
may mentally substitute their preferred dimensions, such as lightness or chroma, at will. 
51 This sort of case, where a representation exemplifies the property it represents (and represents that property in virtue 




Furthermore, the degree of distance between two locations of the second hand corresponds to the 
degree of distance between the times represented at those locations. A second hand that moves 
from the two to the three and then to the four is getting syntactically and semantically further from 
its original location.  
This is the sense in which these representational schemes are analog: they vary syntactically 
by degrees in such a way that values may be more or less close to each other, and the distance 
between these values tracks distances between the properties represented. Contrast the partially 
discrete second hand with a digital system that simply writes down numerals between 1 and 60, 
every second erasing the previous numeral and writing the succeeding numeral in its place. In this 
case, the move from numeral 2 to 3 to 4 is representing increasing temporal values, but there is no 
syntactic distance relation between the numerals that tracks represented temporal distance. This 
numeral system is in no sense analog.52 
Kulvicki (2015a) describes a case of a mercury thermometer whose marks are arbitrarily 
assigned temperature values such that there is no interesting relation between how high the 
mercury is and how high the temperature. This odd thermometer is syntactically analog, since the 
level of mercury varies in degrees, but is not semantically analog, since differences in temperatures 
represented at different marks will not track the degree of syntactic variation (i.e., the degree of 
height in the mercury). A representational system can thus be syntactically analog if its vehicles 
                                                          
52 This claim is, strictly speaking, false. The token numerals in the case described would stand to each other in temporal 
relations that would suffice for some form of syntactic analogicity. More precisely, the digital clock is analog in respect 
of its syntactic temporal properties but not its syntactic spatial properties, whereas the analog clock is analog in respect 
of both its spatial and temporal properties. I gloss over this point since any system that updates its syntactic 
representation of passing seconds each passing second would be analog in respect of its syntactic temporal properties. 




vary in a continuous fashion, but it may fail to have an analog semantics if distance relations 
between syntactic values do not track distance relations in what is represented. Representational 
systems that are syntactically but not semantically analog are typically redundant, since they fail to 
exploit their own expressive power and could instead be more efficiently replaced with discrete 
representations—Figure 19 provides a helpful (and funny) example of the fecklessness of such 
systems. 
 
Figure 19—An inept graph used on the news (taken from reddit.com). Note that the failure to 
semantically exploit the syntactic analogicity of the bar graph renders it useless.53 
The focus in the literature on the idea of perfect continuity or “density” is misplaced. Analog 
values can be continuous in the sense just described even though the move from degree to degree 
is discrete in substantive ways. Goodman’s density criterion misses out on the joint in nature 
between systems like the discretely ticking second hand and systems like the machine that writes 
and erases numerals. The former is analog, and indeed represents in a syntactically and 
semantically continuous fashion, without being syntactically or semantically dense. 
                                                          
53Taken from  
https://i.reddituploads.com/09d4079fd0bf453586b8524478aac4fd?fit=max&h=1536&w=1536&s=0d63d22eed3d44a4




The notion of distance between syntactic and semantic degrees in analog representation 
can be, but need not be, literal spatial distance. Color values can be closer or further from each 
other in respect of hue; points on an audio recording can be closer or further from each other in 
respect of time. 
Two points will matter especially in what follows. First, even the spatiotemporal syntactic 
properties of icons are syntactically and semantically analog. A given part of a photograph will not 
only have color values, it will also have a value along the spatial x- and y-axes of the photograph. 
These values are just as analog as any others just discussed. One can move along a spatial axis a 
little bit, a lot, or in between, and points can be syntactically (indeed, literally) closer or further 
from each other. Furthermore, syntactic spatiotemporal differences correspond proportionally to 
spatiotemporal differences; a spot on the far right of a photograph represents a part of the scene 
that is further (along some spatial dimension) from a spot on the far left of the photograph than 
from a spot in the center of the photograph.54 
Second, the same part of an icon can simultaneously have values along multiple syntactic 
dimensions. A single part of a photograph will have values along the hue, brightness, and saturation 
color dimensions—the very same part has these values simultaneously. Indeed, that part will also 
have values along spatial dimensions as well. This point will form the basis of the coordination 
model of iconic representation. 
                                                          
54 There is a wrinkle here, in that photographs intuitively tend to represent three-dimensional scenes despite being 
syntactically two-dimensional. Thus two spots right next to each other on a photograph might represent parts of the 
scene that are extremely far apart on the z-axis of the scene (think of a photo of the Grand Canyon, where a part 




3.2—The coordination model. Any part of an icon, as just noted, holds values along multiple 
syntactic dimensions simultaneously. The analog syntactic properties of a part of an icon can thus 
be specified by a set of coordinates, each member of which is a value along a particular syntactic 
dimension. These values, and relations between them, correspond to values along dimensions of 
represented properties. The content of a part of an icon, therefore, can be specified by a set of 
coordinates along dimensions of continuous represented properties, which will correspond to the 
set of coordinates along syntactic dimensions in that part of the icon. 
For example, consider a very simple two-dimensional spatial icon with ten locations along 
the x-axis and ten locations along the y-axis. The syntax of a particular primitive part of the icon 
might be represented by the coordinates (4, 7, 89, 23, 70), where the first two coordinates are the 
spatial x- and y-axes, respectively, and the latter three are values along the dimensions of hue, 
saturation, and brightness, respectively.55 Assuming a simple one-to-one mapping of syntax to 
semantics in this case (where the icon represents a two-dimensional scene with no relevant color 
constancy effects), this set of coordinates will accurately characterize both the syntactic and the 
semantic values of the relevant part of the icon. More formally, if a primitive part p of an icon has 
values along n syntactic dimensions, the compositional syntax of p can be given as an n-tuple 
(im…jo), where im denotes a value i along syntactic dimension m. The syntax of the icon as a whole 
will be accurately and exhaustively characterized by a (typically very large) set of sets of coordinates 
                                                          
55 As has often been reiterated, every part of an icon represents some part of the represented scene. But as a matter of 
physical necessity, icons will have primitive parts. For present purposes, primitive parts are defined as the smallest 
parts of an icon that retain syntactic properties (which are to be understood in terms of coordination, as it is presently 
unpacked). One might think of primitive parts as pixel-like, though audio recordings and functional icons like sensory 




corresponding to its primitive parts. In a case where the icon does not exemplify the very properties 
it represents, there will be separate coordinates characterizing the syntactic and semantic values of 
a given part, and mapping functions from values along syntactic dimensions to values along 
semantic dimensions. There is a high degree of freedom in permissible kinds of mapping functions, 
and they might be one-to-many (as in the case of two-dimensional icons representing three-
dimensional space, perhaps, or the case of shape emerging from color and locational properties).56 
The coordination model specifies the syntax and semantics of icons in terms of sets of 
coordinates in multi-dimensional spaces incorporating continuous dimensions, including 
spatiotemporal as well as featural dimensions.57 The guiding ideas of this account are by no means 
novel. As Haugeland writes, “iconic contents might be conceived as variations of values along 
certain dimensions with respect to locations in certain other dimensions” (1998, 192). The 
coordination model is influenced by the idea of quality spaces in Clark’s (1993) work and 
Rosenthal’s (2005; 2010) quality-space theory of the consciously experienced “qualitative 
character” of perceptual states. One of the most interesting and salient aspects of Rosenthal’s 
quality-space theory is that, unlike Clark, he posits mental qualities for spatiotemporal properties 
as well as features like color, pitch, and volume. The same considerations that suggest that our 
sensory representations underwrite discriminative capacities by instantiating distance relations 
                                                          
56 It also does not matter whether the spatial structure of an icon or its corresponding scene is Euclidean or non-
Eulidean, or metric or topological, etc. All that matters, as has been emphasized, is that there are definable dimensions 
of variation. 
57 I use ‘spatiotemporal’ as a catch-all. It’s not the case that an icon must represent both spatial and temporal properties. 
A photograph has spatial but arguably no temporal dimensions, an audio recording has temporal but arguably no 




along featural dimensions apply to spatiotemporal properties just as well, so a quality-space 
treatment fits both kinds of properties equally (see Meehan 2002 for sustained discussion using 
Rosenthal’s framework). 
The coordination model incorporates key insights of Rosenthal’s quality-space theory, but 
is in some respects quite different. Quality-space theory, like Clark’s theory, is designed to account 
for aspects of conscious experience (though Rosenthal argues forcefully that mental qualities can 
occur unconsciously). In particular, Rosenthal argues that the conscious qualitative character of a 
given perceptual experience is determined by the quality locations determined by its modality-
specific sensory elements when those elements are conscious (2005, Chapters 5, 6, and 7). 
Furthermore, according to theorists like Clark and Rosenthal, the continuous nature of perceptual 
representation is actually an account of the psychosemantics (Fodor 1987) of modality-specific 
perceptual representation, i.e., how it is that they represent things at all. This psychosemantic 
project has been taken up most explicitly by Berger (2015) for Rosenthal’s quality-space theory.  
The coordination model is not committed to either of these theses, and so does not entail 
the truth of either Clark’s or Rosenthal’s theory. Moreover, since the coordination model posits 
iconic representations, Clark’s feature-placing model is incompatible with it; Rosenthal’s quality-
space theory is not obviously incompatible with it, but since he does not posit iconic representation, 
his theory does not entail the accuracy of the coordination model. 
My aim thus far has just been to sketch the coordination model and its motivations without 
delving into details. I’ll now turn to how the model deals with the problems for icons that led us 




§4. De-problematizing Icons  
Icons whose syntax and semantics are accurately described by the coordination model can solve 
the problems highlighted at the outset. 
4.1—The problem of local processing. Recall that, unlike propositional representations, icons cannot 
be computationally manipulated in ways that are sensitive to their constituent structure, because 
they don’t have any. This was the problem of local processing. But sensitivity to constituent 
structure, even on Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1988) classical computationalist theory, is not essential 
to local processing as such; rather, it is posited to explain systematicity, productivity, and signs of 
apparent structure sensitivity in inference (see Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum unpublished b). 
On the coordination model, an icon has mathematically definable values along continuous 
syntactic dimensions. Systems can operate on icons by accessing these values (which are, qua 
syntactic properties, locally individuated and therefore locally accessible). Computational 
processes involving icons will operate according to rules that concern analog values along syntactic 
dimensions. 
What rules the system follows in taking these values as inputs or delivering them as outputs, 
what information the system brings to bear in these computations, and how best to formally model 
the computational processes in question, will differ from process to process and system to system. 
My goal has not been to specify computational models of perception or mental imagery, but rather 
to sketch how it could be possible for transformations defined over representations that lack 
constituent structure to figure in computations. The syntactic apparatus of the coordination model 




The computational upshot of the coordination model is also consistent with Shepard and 
Cooper’s (1982) model of computational processes in mental imagery such as mental rotation. 
Shepard and Cooper argue that these processes exhibit a second-order isomorphism with respect 
to the physical changes they represent. The idea is that the linear relation between degree of rotation 
and time required to mentally rotate objects is due to the fact that stages of the computational 
process correspond in an isomorphic fashion to stages of actually rotated physical objects. Shepard 
(1978, 135) rightly points out that this sort of account does not require that the manipulated 
representations have an iconic format, or any other particular format. But representations with an 
iconic format as described by the coordination model would nonetheless explain the second-order-
isomorphic character of imagistic computational processes. If the spatial properties of an imaged 
object are represented via analog values along syntactic functional-spatial dimensions as the 
coordination model specifies, then “rotating” the iconic mental image from one set of coordinates 
along those spatial dimensions to another will require running through the intermediate values 
along each dimension. This predicts and explains the fact that the computational process itself, 
which operates on these values, exhibits the second-order isomorphism described by Shepard and 
Cooper. 
This result suggests that the coordination model gets something deeply right about the 
notion of mental imagery as it emerged in experimental psychology in the 1970s. The idea that 
manipulating a mental image involves continuous shifts of values along syntactic dimensions fits 
extremely well with the classic experimental literature on scanning and mental rotation. 




as mental images, its comfortable theoretical fit with mental imagery results suggests that theorists 
like Kosslyn were on the right track in characterizing mental images as sharing core syntactic 
features with literal iconic images. None of these factors provide direct deductive arguments in 
favor either of the coordination model of icons or of iconic models of mental imagery, but the 
surprising explanatory coherence and simplicity of these theories taken together provides powerful 
abductive reasons for thinking these approaches might come close to converging on the truth.58 
4.2—The binding problem(s). The syntactic binding problem was essentially the problem of 
explaining syntactic composition without syntactic constituent structure. Or as it was also framed: 
What are the syntactic similarities and differences between an icon that represents a red square and 
blue triangle on the one hand and one that represents a red triangle and blue square on the other? 
The answer provided by the coordination model is that primitive parts of icons bind 
features by holding values along multiple syntactic dimensions simultaneously. For photographs 
and other picture-like representations, shapes emerge out of complexes of primitive parts that 
coordinate colors and locations. Thus colors and shapes are bound together in a pictorial icon 
because the primitive parts of an icon coordinate syntactic analogues of colors and locations, and 
these primitive parts compose into a syntactic analogue of a colored shape. This aspect of the 
coordination-based solution to the syntactic binding problem mirrors the familiar Berkeleyan 
insistence that visual representation of shape is dependent upon visual representation of color 
(Berkeley 1710/2008, Part 1, Section 10, 86-87; see also Reid 1764/1997, Chapter 6, Section 8, 99).59 
                                                          
58 All of this is pace Pylyshyn 1973; 1984; 2002; 2003; 2007.  
59 Note that agreeing with Berkeley about this does not require that color and shape are computationally derived 




The semantic binding problem was the problem of how icons compose semantic values 
without semantic predication. Here the answer is more complicated. A possible answer, as 
aforementioned, is that cases of semantic predication outstrip cases of syntactic predication, in 
which case icons involve semantic predication just as well as propositional thoughts. Alternatively, 
however, the coordination model provides a notion of semantic coordination that does not 
necessarily involve semantic predication. I’ll explore this idea in the discussion of nonconceptual 
content later on. 
4.3—The problem of explicit content. The problem of explicit content was the problem of telling 
what an icon literally represents and what it represents only implicitly. The semantic apparatus of 
the coordination account provides a sketch of an answer: the explicit content of an icon is the set 
of sets of coordinates along the dimensions of low-level properties that map to the coordinates 
along syntactic dimensions instantiated in the icon. I call these properties “low-level” precisely 
because they need to vary along continuous dimensions, and while that condition applies to color, 
shape, location, pitch, volume, temporality, and other low-level properties, it arguably does not 
apply to high-level properties like being John Malkovich, being a pine tree, or even being a physical 
object (cf. Berger 2015). And indeed high-level perception as well as mid-level object perception 
do not appear to involve wholly iconic representations (Quilty-Dunn 2016). 
What a representation explicitly represents is a reflection of its syntactic elements and their 
semantic values. In the case of discursive representations, these syntactic elements can be 
                                                          
that Berkeley’s claim, like mine, is about the structure of person-level iconic representations (or “ideas”), not about 




standalone constituents that pick out any individual, property, or relation. In the case of icons, the 
relevant syntactic elements cannot be constituents but must be analog values that map to values of 
continuously variable properties. An icon might also be given semantic interpretations that are not 
reflected in its syntax, but these will not be part of the explicit content of the icons. Icons are capable 
of explicitly representing only continuously variable properties. 
§5. Upshots 
The coordination model solves various heretofore outstanding problems with iconic format. It also 
has some upshots for independent issues about representation, perceptual and otherwise. 
5.1—Systematicity. Fodor (1987) argues that (i) conceptual thought is systematic, and that (ii) this 
systematicity requires constituent structure. Conceptual thought is systematic in that being able to 
think JOHN LOVES MARY always goes along with the ability to think MARY LOVES JOHN. This ability is 
explained by the fact that there are separate syntactic items JOHN, MARY, and LOVES, which can be 
recombined according to built-in rules of syntactic composition. As Mohan Matthen notes, 
however, “if one is able to entertain, in visual imagination for instance, images of a blue circle and 
of a red square, then one is able to entertain visual images of a blue square and a red circle” (2005, 
80). 
The coordination model shows how a representational scheme that lacks constituent 
structure can nonetheless be systematic, albeit in circumscribed ways. If a part of an icon 
determines a certain set of coordinates along a given set of syntactic dimensions, it could in 




to represent light red at location-1 and dark red at location-2 entails being able to represent dark 
red at location-1 and light red at location-2. Icons are systematic within the parameters delineated 
by their continuous syntactic dimensions. 
This result undermines the immediate inference from systematicity of content (which icons 
display) to systematicity of vehicles (which requires freely recombinable syntactic constituents). 
This may seem to diminish the force of systematicity arguments for constituent structure in 
thought. But the kind of systematicity displayed by icons is sharply circumscribed: it only allows 
for systematicity among continuously variable property dimensions. The classic examples of 
systematicity involving explicitly represented individuals, predicates, and relations are not 
subsumable under the coordination model, and may still provide reason to posit discursive mental 
representations.  
5.2—Determinateness. It is often assumed without argument that icons must represent in a 
maximally determinate fashion. Berkeley claimed to be unable to represent any object without 
determinately representing its low-level properties (1710/2008, Introduction, Section 10, 72). More 
recently, Dennett (1981) has argued against iconic models of mental imagery on grounds that 
mental images can represent determinably. 
One might rope the coordination model in with this tradition. After all, the idea of 
continuous analog dimensions seems to suggest that the semantic values of any part of an icon will 
be extremely fine-grained. The coordination model does indeed furnish the resources to account 
for the high level of determinacy that often obtains in icons. Nonetheless, the model does not entail 




analog syntactic and semantic dimensions does not require determinacy (or “density” in 
Goodman’s terminology). All that matters is that the degree of variance along some syntactic 
dimension can be greater or lesser, and that the degree of variance along some objective property 
dimension corresponds to the degree of change along the syntactic dimension of the representation. 
This scheme can be implemented in a representation with very coarse-grained, highly determinable 
values. For instance, a very low-resolution image can represent spatial properties in an equally 
analog fashion as a high-resolution image; the difference in that case is in the level of determinacy 
(i.e., the number of syntactic and semantic values expressible in the icon), not in the format of the 
representations. 
Showing that a perceptual state represents non-maximally-determinate properties does not, 
therefore, suffice to show that the format of the state is non-iconic. One must show the property is 
not represented in a (perhaps low-resolution) analog fashion. 
5.3—Nonconceptual content. Icons coordinate represented properties together. How should we 
understand this from a semantic perspective? Is the content of a primitive part of an icon a 
proposition? Does it feature semantic predication? These questions are directly relevant to the idea 
of so-called nonconceptual content in perception, which putatively differs from the contents of 
conceptual states like beliefs in purely semantic respects (e.g., Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992; Heck 
2000). 
Content on the coordination account is, in crucial respects, unstructured. The content of a 
primitive part of an icon is simply a set of values along continuous dimensions of iconically 




tuples with each position corresponding to a particular dimension, there is nothing intrinsic to the 
syntax or semantics of an icon that demands this sort of model. Instead, the content is simply the 
set of values, without any sort of internal structure. A Stalnakerian might argue that this makes 
iconic contents of a piece with propositional content more generally; content on such a view is an 
unstructured set of possible worlds (or functions from possible worlds to truth values). As such, 
perhaps the content of a primitive part of an icon should be understood as the set of possible worlds 
wherein the represented property values are co-instantiated. In that case, as Stalnaker (1998) noted 
in a different context, the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content is nil. 
Let’s suppose, however, that the contents of propositional attitudes are structured. What do 
we say about iconic contents given that presupposition? Perhaps that alone would justify 
distinguishing (structured) propositional contents from (unstructured) iconic contents. More than 
that, however, the lack of structure in iconic contents seems to preclude an analysis in terms of 
semantic predication. 
In a discussion of contents as specified by his feature-placing model, Clark writes, 
“Specification of the content of an act of sense requires pairs of the form ([q1…qn], [r1…rm]), and (I 
argue) the pairing principle is analogous to the tie between subjects and predicates” (2004, 453), 
where the first element of the pair specifies featural “qualities” while the second specifies 
placetimes. There are two crucial difference between this semantic account of sensory 
representation, which appeals to semantic predication, and the coordination model, which doesn’t. 




from placetimes. Second, and more importantly, contents on the coordination model are 
semantically symmetric in a way that contents on Clark’s feature-placing model are not. 
Clark claims that qualities are predicated of, or attributed to, locations. On the coordination 
model, however, there is no more reason to say that a particular color instance is attributed to a 
particular location than to say that the location is attributed to the color instance. There is nothing 
in the syntactic or semantic apparatus of icons to settle the issue in one direction or the other. The 
lack of a way of distinguishing predicates from their arguments suggests that (given certain more 
general semantic presuppositions) iconic contents do not feature semantic predication. 
Coordinated iconic contents are, and semantically predicative contents are not, symmetric with 
respect to their semantic constituents. This fact might lead us to distinguish semantic coordination 
from semantic predication as a genuinely distinct semantic kind. This distinction would provide a 
novel approach to nonconceptual content as distinct from conceptual content in purely semantic 
respects.  
Michael Rescorla (2009a; 2009b) argues that maps do not feature semantic predication. 
Iconic representation, though it is arguably present in maps, is a more general kind and does not 
constitutively involve the additional syntactic or semantic apparatuses made available in 
cartographic representation. Nonetheless, it would be surprising if bare icons such as photographs 
involved a more elaborate semantic apparatus than maps. In that case, an argument that maps lack 
semantic predication is directly relevant to the question of whether icons in general feature 




According to Rescorla (2009b), once a marker is introduced in a map, the property denoted 
by the marker is represented as not being instantiated at locations in the terrain corresponding to 
locations on the map where the marker is absent. For example, if a map of a zoo has a ‘B’ for 
bathroom at location L1 and not location L2, Rescorla suggests that the map semantically expresses 
the absence of a bathroom at L2. Since semantic predication does not seem to work this way (e.g., 
if I say there’s a bathroom on your right, I don’t thereby say that there’s no bathroom on your left), 
Rescorla argues that maps lack semantic predication.  
Blumson (2012) and Bronner (2015) have argued that this feature of maps is really an aspect 
of the pragmatic, rather than semantic, features of maps. For example, Bronner provides the 
example of a map with the title “Some Cities I Have Visited,” which represents certain U.S. cities. 
Intuitively, it is not the case that a failure to represent a city on that map represents that city as not 
having been visited, since the map is simply a map of some cities visited. The fact that the putatively 
semantic feature of maps identified by Rescorla can be canceled in this way suggests that it may 
instead be a pragmatic feature. 
Rescorla argues that the absence intuition he identifies is not pragmatic. He imagines a 
mapmaker who, rather than simply failing to place a bathroom-denoting symbol at the part of the 
map corresponding to L2, instead randomly punches holes in the map including the part 
corresponding to L2 (2009b, 193). Rescorla argues that, if it turned out that there was a bathroom 
at L2, we would be much more upset with the mapmaker who left the part corresponding to L2 
empty than with the mapmaker who punched out that part of the map. The Gricean solution, he 




expressing his intention to convey the information that there are no bathrooms at L2, but the other 
mapmaker either was expressing his intention to convey that information, or failed to cancel the 
implicature that a reasonable consumer of maps would be expected to pick up on. 
However, Rescorla (2009a) also provides a detailed compositional semantics of cognitive 
point-landmark maps on which, he argues, semantic predication simply does not enter the picture. 
He argues that cognitive maps as understood in robotics and cognitive science do not display 
hallmarks of logical form such as modus ponens inference, and develops a semantics that does not 
appear to invoke predication.60 
Though I have not offered a compositional semantics for icons, the notion of semantic 
coordination seems, similarly, to characterize the semantic properties of icons without explicitly 
invoking predication (though see the conclusion for remarks about how a semantics of icons might 
proceed). Furthermore, as noted above, a compositional semantics of icons is unlikely to invoke a 
more elaborate semantic apparatus than a compositional semantics for maps. In that case, if 
Rescorla’s semantics accurately describes the relation between maps and their truth values and 
genuinely does not involve semantic predication, then there may be good prima facie reason to 
think icons lack semantic predication as well.61  
                                                          
60 Rescorla (2009a) argues the semantics of maps he provides does not involve explicit appeal to predication. But it is 
not clear from the semantics he provides that the contents of maps do not include propositions, and hence predication, 
involving the presence of properties represented by markers at their corresponding locations. The fact that maps do 
not involve a syntactically explicit predicative apparatus does not entail that they fail to accomplish semantic 
predication, and while Rescorla argues convincingly for the former thesis, it is not clear that the mere absence of an 
explicit appeal to predication in his semantic model suffices to rule out the (otherwise natural) idea that maps exhibit 
semantic predication. 
61 I argue below, however, that the semantics of artifactual icons may be shaped by the mental states of artists and 





One might instead subscribe to a view of content on which semantic predication dissolves 
into a Russellian proposition, which is simply an ordered set of referents (construed broadly to 
include properties, relations, and functions as well as individuals), or one on which semantic 
predication is simply the determining of sets of possible worlds. Someone wedded to either of these 
views might be inclined to deflate the notions of proposition and predication such that any 
representation that is evaluable for accuracy with respect to some possible state of affairs thereby 
expresses a proposition and—perhaps for that reason alone—accomplishes semantic predication.62 
On this deflationary view, theorists like Peacocke (2001) and Burge (2010) who insist that 
perceptual content is non-propositional and non-predicative but nonetheless accuracy evaluable 
would be conceptually confused. In that case, the fact that the semantic properties of icons (or 
maps, for that matter) are different in important ways from the semantic properties of explicitly 
predicative propositional representations would not undermine the claim that both involve 
propositional contents and semantic predication.  
The differences between coordination and predication, however, can simply be restated in 
terms of modes of presentation, without supposing that modes of presentation are semantic entities 
(see, e.g., Fodor 1998). Instead, modes of presentation might be defined as whatever is responsible 
for differences in cognitive significance (in Frege cases, canonically), and that definition might be 
satisfied by syntactic forms. For instance, the difference between a concept of Clark Kent and a 
                                                          
62 I suspect much of the disagreement between so-called “content conceptualists” (e.g., Byrne 2005; Speaks 2005, and 
arguably Stalnaker 1998) and “content non-conceptualists” (e.g., Heck 2000; Peacocke 2001; Burge 2010) is due to the 
fact that the former do and the latter do not wish to deflate semantic notions in this sort of way. It is hard to see on a 
view such as Stalnaker’s, for example, how an accuracy-evaluable representation could fail to express a proposition, or 




concept of Superman might be purely a difference in the syntax of the mental representations, in 
which case they constitute different modes of presentation while being semantically equivalent. If 
this Fodorian view is the right approach to solving Frege puzzles while preserving a purely 
referential semantics, then the syntactic differences between icons and propositional 
representations expounded in this chapter suffice to demonstrate that perceptual icons involve 
distinctly iconic, analog modes of presentation even if they do not involve distinct contents. The 
notion of nonconceptual content in this case might be most usefully understood in terms of modes 
of presentation rather than in terms of semantic content per se. 
§6. Conclusion: Toward a Semantics of Icons 
Icons are completely unlike linguistic, conceptual, and other forms of discursive representation. 
Icons lack constituent structures, and every part of an icon represents some part of the represented 
scene in virtue of coordinating values along continuous syntactic dimensions corresponding to 
values along continuous semantic dimensions. This enables icons to figure in local processes, to 
compose syntactically and semantically, to distinguish explicit from implicit content, to exhibit 
circumscribed systematicity, to represent at varying levels of determinacy, and perhaps to exhibit 
nonconceptual contents. 
A full account of the nature of iconic representation would include a semantics for icons, 
minimally consisting of rules for generating accuracy conditions. I have not provided such an 





There are multiple possibilities in specifying the conditions under which an icon or its 
primitive parts are accurate. A simple idea, suggested above, is that an icon is accurate iff the 
properties it semantically coordinates are co-instantiated. This simple idea can provide a 
framework for developing a semantics of icons. For example, for an icon whose primitive parts vary 
along syntactic dimensions a, b, and c corresponding to property dimensions d, e, and f, a primitive 
part that coordinates syntactic values (a1, b1, c1) will be accurate iff corresponding properties d1, e1, 
and f1 are co-instantiated in the relevant scene.63 
A central issue for such an account is determining the relevant scene (as opposed to some 
qualitatively identical scene somewhere else). This issue could be resolved by indexically anchoring 
spatiotemporal coordinates. For example, in the case of sensory representations, the relevant spatial 
framework may be egocentrically anchored (Peacocke 1992). In that case, given that values along 
spatiotemporal dimensions are among those coordinated with values along other property 
dimensions, the accuracy conditions of a perceptual icon that represents in an egocentric 
framework would specify the organism’s actual environment and not some other, otherwise 
qualitatively similar environment. 
Another resolution could come from incorporating causal relations into the accuracy 
conditions of the icon. That is, an icon is accurate with respect to scene s iff the properties it 
semantically coordinates are co-instantiated in s and its coordinating those properties is 
                                                          
63 Co-instantiation here means not merely that the properties are instantiated (e.g., that some color and some location 
are both present in the scene), but that they are instantiated together (e.g., that the location has the property of 





appropriately caused by s (or by the co-instantiation of those properties in s). Some such condition 
might be necessary to account for cases of misrepresentation that contingently happen to match 
the scene (Soteriou 2000). Note that, while this semantics would build causal relations to 
individuals into the accuracy conditions of icons, it does not (and could not) build those causal 
relations into the explicit content of icons.64 The lack of any syntactic property of icons 
corresponding to individuals or causal relations to them means that the icon does not explicitly 
represent individuals (beyond instances of coordinated properties) or causal relations to 
individuals. In that case, the iconic semantics at hand posits a division between what constitutively 
figures in the accuracy conditions of an icon and what the icon explicitly represents. 
Philosophers like Hopkins (1998), Greenberg (2013), and Briscoe (2016) offer accounts of 
the semantics of pictorial representation by appeal to factors like resemblance (Hopkins 1998 and 
Briscoe 2016) or sets of three-dimensional worlds indexed to perspectives that can be projected 
from the two-dimensional image (Greenberg 2013). The coordination model is not at odds with 
any of these approaches. The coordination model aims to characterize the syntax of icons and some 
aspects of its relation to the semantics of icons; the latter could be understood in terms of 
resemblance, projection, or something else. For instance, perhaps the way in which coordination 
along two-dimensional spatial axes in a photograph enables coordination along three-dimensional 
spatial axes in represented scenes could be understood in terms of Greenberg’s projection model. 
Perhaps the notion of semantic coordination, appealing as it does to correspondences of analog 
                                                          
64 This has the consequence that an account of perceptual content like Searle’s (1983), on which causal relations 





values along syntactic and semantic property dimensions, could be understood as instantiating a 
form of resemblance, and as explaining other forms of resemblance (such as similarity of the 
perceptual states caused by a pictorial representation on the one hand and by the scene it represents 
on the other). 
As aforementioned, there are many other aspects of the meanings of icons such as paintings, 
drawings, etc., that are not captured by the coordination model. For one thing, a painting can 
arguably represent individuals and high-level properties that do not vary along continuous 
semantic dimensions (properties such as, e.g, the purported historical inevitability of westward 
territorial expansion by the United States in John Gast’s famous pro-imperialist painting 
“American Progress”—see Fig. 20). A complete semantics of such representations will far outstrip 
the resources of the coordination model, and these high-level contents (which may arise in part 
due to artistic intentions alone) are arguably much more important for understanding art than the 
bare-bones resources of the coordination model. And different sorts of iconic or quasi-iconic 
representations, such as graphs, maps, diagrams, and models, likely require individual semantic 





Figure 20—“American Progress” by John Gast, 1872 
Moreover, while the coordination model takes it as a bedrock fact that icons are syntactically 
analog, they are not necessarily semantically analog. It need not be the case that an artist 
semantically exploits the analog syntactic apparatus of icons in an analog fashion. In the case of 
highly abstract art, there may be no semantic content at all, or it may be very indeterminate.  Even 
iconic artworks with clear, specific contents can fail to coordinate semantic properties. Imagine an 
artistic convention wherein some specific light shade of blue represents sadness, the next lightest 
shade represents joy, and the next lightest shade represents fear. Suppose an artist knows this system 
and creates a painting with patches of these three shades next to each other, and intended to make 
her audience realize that each patch represented its respective emotion. Suppose also that this 
convention is well-known enough that audience members did generally realize this, and interpreted 
the painting accordingly. It would seem that, in such a case, the painting represents sadness, joy, 
and fear in a semantically discrete (i.e., non-analog) fashion. While the painting syntactically 
coordinates values along color dimensions and shape dimensions, it does not semantically 




more akin to language. This toy example helps illustrate that the syntactically analog nature of icons 
facilitates, but does not require, semantically analog content.  
A surprising consequence of this fact is that the principle that has often anchored the notion 
of iconic representation—that parts of the vehicle represent parts of the scene—turns out not 
necessarily to be exhibited by icons. Icons are constitutively syntactically analog; in cases where this 
syntactic analogicity fails to be semantically exploited, parts of the icon will fail to represent parts 
of the represented scene. Nonetheless, icons qua syntactically analog representations are 
constitutively such that they can express analog contents (i.e., be semantically analog). It is thus a 
constitutive truth about icons that parts of an icon can be semantically exploited to represent parts 
of the scene, not that they actually do. And in the case of mental representation, where there is no 
equivalent of a painter to bestow arbitrary contents on an icon, perceptual icons may be 
semantically analog as a matter of necessity. An answer to this question depends on answers to 





THE PERCEPTION–COGNITION BORDER 
Conclusion 
The central aim of this dissertation has been to characterize the outputs of perception in a way that 
sheds light on larger questions about the architecture of the mind. The main positive thesis that has 
been advanced is perceptual pluralism, according to which perception delivers both 
unconceptualized iconic representations and conceptualized discursive representations (as well as, 
perhaps, other representational forms). A detailed account has been provided of the syntactic and 
semantic properties of iconic representation as well as the respects in which certain perceptual 
representations satisfy conditions on conceptuality. 
What are the consequences of this characterization of the outputs of perception for mental 
architecture? In particular, how should we think about the border between perception and 
cognition? 
Chapter 1 sketched an architectural strategy for distinguishing perception from cognition 
that is consistent with perceptual pluralism. According to this strategy, perceptual systems 
implement processes that are stimulus bound and informationally encapsulated from cognition. 
This strategy also holds that cognitive systems do not exhibit both of these properties (though some 
might exhibit one, e.g., certain forms of demonstrative thought might be stimulus bound but 
unencapsulated and central modules might be encapsulated but not stimulus bound). 
A full defense of this architectural strategy would require a dissertation in itself. The 




representational approaches to the perception–cognition border and that it is fully consistent with 
perceptual pluralism that perceptual processes are essentially stimulus dependent and encapsulated 
from cognition.  
Chapter 2 also provided two defenses of encapsulation. First, it argued that the information 
used by the object perception system was encapsulated from and inaccessible to central cognition, 
as shown by the fact that what we cognitively think of as an object and its conditions for persistence 
come apart from how we visually individuate and track objects. Object perception furthermore has 
been shown to directly contradict subjects’ judgments in at least one experiment (Mitroff et al. 
2005).  
Second, Chapter 2 provided some a priori reason to think that early perceptual processes 
are encapsulated. If early perceptual processes operate on and output perceptual icons, then there 
is reason to think they cannot operate on discursive representations stored in cognition. Either the 
perceptual systems would have to translate cognitive representations into iconic formats, or there 
would have to be rules that specify discursive states built into perceptual systems. While one or 
both of these disjuncts may be true, the difference in format nonetheless provides some barrier to 
direct violations of encapsulation from cognition.  
The positive proposals made here also place some constraints on how the architectural 
strategy should be pursued.Chapter 1 provided reason to think that even widespread modulation 
of perceptual processing by cognitively driven attention is compatible with the encapsulation of 




matters for the architectural strategy on offer is that perception is encapsulated from cognition to 
some explanatorily significant degree, and these dimensions may help adjudicate this matter. 
Perhaps the most significant constraint this dissertation places on the architectural strategy 
is the need for substantial diachronic cognitive penetration. If the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 
are right, then concepts like PIANO are deployed by perceptual systems. There is no independent 
reason to think that the concept PIANO is innately accessible to the visual system. Given the probable 
scarcity of pianos in the ecologies of our evolutionary ancestors, there is independent reason to 
doubt that the concept PIANO is innately accessible to the visual system or indeed any other human 
mental system. The fact that the visual system can deploy the concept PIANO should therefore make 
us think that learning processes can push concepts like PIANO into the visual system over time. How 
perceptual learning works and to what extent cognition is involved in perceptual learning are 
questions left open by this dissertation. But there must be some process by which learned concepts 
become deployable by the visual system. 
To fully pursue the architectural strategy, one must grapple with the many putative 
counterexamples to the encapsulation of perception offered in the philosophical and experimental 
literature. Nonetheless, the arguments made here provide a framework for how to pursue this 
strategy for differentiating perception from cognition. 
The distinction between iconic and discursive representational formats has played a central 
role in this framework. I suspect that future research will show this simple dichotomy to be too 
coarse grained. Perhaps a richer and more accurate characterization of the syntax and semantics of 




categories entirely. For now, however, the syntax and semantics of perceptual representation offered 
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